Tag: china

In the wake of Taiwan’s legislative elections in December 2004, Chen Shui-bian’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration is grappling with a range of domestic and international challenges to safeguard Taiwan’s defense and national security. Over the past year, President Chen – having overseen a major transition in defense leadership during the first month of his second term and failing to secure a legislative majority in December – is trying to consolidate control over the country’s national security and defense establishments and trying to implement a far reaching force modernization and defense reform program.

However, a number of obstacles continue to slow progress. First, a highly divided domestic polity in which the opposition is using defense issues as a bully pulpit to further political agendas continues to stymie his efforts to develop a force capable of standing up to the growing threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan continues to suffer from limited choices in its force modernization plan, an issue that is further complicated by an inefficient defense industrial infrastructure. This defense and national security analysis reviews the key events of 2004, assesses the results of the December 2004 legislative elections, and examines developments in Taiwan’s defense budget and procurement programs.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Annual Review, 2004

As Taiwan enters a politically sensitive period preceding highly contested legislative elections in December, Chen Shui-bian’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration is traveling along a bumpy path to guarantee Taiwan’s defense and national security. President Chen, having overseen a major transition in defense leadership during the first month of his second term, is consolidating control over the country’s national security and defense establishments and trying to implement a far-reaching force modernization and defense reform program. However, a number of obstacles continue to slow progress.

First, a strategic and rational approach to force modernization is complicated by a highly divided domestic polity in which the opposition is using defense issues as a bully pulpit to further its political agenda. Second, Taiwan continues to suffer from limited choices in its force modernization plan, an issue that is only further complicated by an inefficient defense industrial infrastructure. This quarter’s defense and national security analysis examines the domestic political and economic environment in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative elections, defense budget and procurement developments, and provides an update on key procurement programs.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q3, 2004

As they begin their second term, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) face a number of challenges in ensuring Taiwan’s defense and national security. Over the next four years, President Chen will seek to consolidate control over the country’s national security and defense establishments, and to implement an ambitious force modernization and defense reform program.

Obstacles in his path include a highly divided domestic polity in which a large segment of the opposition is against significant additional investment into defense, a restrictive international environment that limits Taiwan’s choices for procurement, a weak defense industrial base, and an economy that is becoming increasingly reliant on the mainland for growth.

This quarter’s defense and national security analysis examines the domestic political and economic environments that will help shape the direction of Taiwan’s defense and national security policies. The report will also discuss defense policy issues – including defense and national security leadership transitions and other personnel shifts – as well as defense budget and procurement developments, it will then conclude with a discussion of U.S.-Taiwan defense relations.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q2, 2004

Taiwan is in a period of political transition, as President Chen Shui-bian’s electoral victory is being contested within Taiwan’s judicial system. A second Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration has significant implications for force modernization and budget issues, as well as for defense reform, strategy, and U.S.-Taiwan defense relations.

Under normal circumstances, Chen’s election to a second term would have given the President more confidence to press the DPP’s defense agenda, which was first articulated in the party’s defense white paper issued in November 1999. However, allegations of DPP improprieties by the KMT/People’s First Party (PFP) coalition – collectively known as “Pan-Blue” – the narrow margin of victory, and the failure of the two referenda could hinder progress on a range of fronts, at least for the initial few months into Chen’s second term.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q1, 2004

The US-Taiwan military relationship saw a major, positive evolution during 2003. Although the year started out at low ebb, apparently hampered by major differences in strategic outlook and planning, it ended with a comprehensive, shared strategic vision to guide Taiwan’s modernization program over the next decade. This annual issue of the Defense & Aerospace Report will address those developments in the US-Taiwan military relationship, where funding is a key component, as well as the successful implementation of the plan for procurement, tied to the annual budget and to the special arms budget, which will be critical to achieving the shared strategic objectives that have emerged in the US-Taiwan relationship

In addition, we will examine the upcoming Taiwan presidential elections in March, a closely contested race that will have wide-ranging consequences not only for Taiwan’s domestic economic and political situation, but that will also impact China’s cross-Strait policies and influence the full scope of US-PRC-Taiwan relations. Incumbent President and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian, with running mate Vice President Annette Lu, and the allied Kuomintang/People’s First Party (KMT/PFP) candidates Lien Chan and James Soong are already pulling out all the stops as they vie for popular support. Chen is appealing heavily to a populist sense of identity and nationalism with calls for constitutional change and a public referendum. Lien was carving out a platform calling for a more moderate approach to cross-Strait relations, but the Pan-Blue (KMT/PFP) coalition did not make headway attacking the quality of DPP governance, and has in recent weeks launched its own “nationalist” appeal with competing proposals for referenda and constitutional changes.

Finally, we will review some of what is known of the 2004 national defense budget, and provide a status report on the special arms budget and on the progress of Taiwan’s major arms programs. If President Chen wins the election, the special arms budget will likely move through as expected during the summer months, whereas a Pan-Blue victory could potentially delay the process as a result of the change in administration. As for the overall procurement program – addressing all the systems and projects that the Bush Administration approved in April 2001 – it is moving fairly slowly. With a plan finally in place, however, that pace should accelerate over the course of 2004. Barring unforeseen disruptions, the Taiwan military is poised to move forward on addressing its defense modernization objectives.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Annual Review, 2003

Taiwan’s presidential elections in March 2004 will influence the debate and color any government decisions throughout the next six months. Key issues in the upcoming elections include the overall state of the Taiwan economy, as well as the state of U.S.-Taiwan and cross-Strait relations.

The elections will also signal Taiwan’s long- term strategic approach to the relationship with China, either towards unification if the pan-Blue Kuomintang (KMT)-People’s First Party (PFP) coalition wins, or continuing de facto independence if the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its pan-Green supporters retains the presidency. The election results will have serious consequences for the losing party in the short run, as it will likely undergo major restructuring in hopes of regaining relevance on the Taiwan political scene, while also having consequences for the terms of Taiwan’s existence in the long run.

Over the past quarter, Taiwan officials have continued to be concerned over apparent improvements in U.S.-PRC relations, and they are taking clear and definitive steps to reassure the Taiwan public that the island’s interests will not be sacrificed because of those improvements. The Chen Administration’s draft defense budget for 2004 and its proposed special defense budget are both designed to show the public its commitment to national security, an issue that has garnered particular attention because of the ongoing discourse on direct cross-Strait links. With the continued sluggish economy, however, the increased size of the proposed 2004 defense budget could also increase Taiwan’s budget deficit and may also become an issue in the election.

On a positive note, the state of Taiwan’s military relations with the United States has taken a turn for the better over the last quarter, with much of the uncertainty that characterized the relationship in the first half of the year dissipating. That uncertainty has been replaced with more and better communication, which has led to a better understanding of each side’s needs, priorities, and strategic direction. Expanding U.S.-Taiwan military ties and continued and significant developments in the progress of arms sales programs both bode well for U.S. defense contractors.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q3, 2003

Following the US-Taiwan Business Council’s Defense Industry conference this past February in San Antonio, Texas, one may have been left with the impression that the arms sales programs were stalled and the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Taiwan was strained. This appeared to be the case due to the differing assessments made by the two sides of the degree of seriousness of the Chinese threat facing Taiwan, and the level of urgency required to meet that threat. The United States sees the threat as more immediate — one that might impact the cross-Strait situation between 2005 and 2007 — while Taiwan believes that the threat will not become critical until at least the next decade. Consequently, the United States and Taiwan, while both sharing a long-term strategic interest in promoting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, each operate with a different sense of urgency, leading to different acquisition priorities and different perspectives on the need to commit resources to the problem. The United States is continuing to refine its set of strategic priorities for Taiwan, emphasizing improvements in missile defense capabilities, C4ISR, and anti-submarine warfare.

Furthermore, the dramatic impact of SARS also contributed to the sense that aspects of the US-Taiwan relationship were stalled. SARS affected the region by greatly restricting business travel, reducing face-to-face contacts, and directing most of the affected regions’ governments to focus on the crisis rather than on defense issues. Finally, with less than a year before Taiwan’s next presidential elections, the maneuvering for advantage in Taiwan’s domestic politics has picked up speed, particularly around the controversial issue of national referendums, which may also affect cross-Strait relations and consequently issues of national defense.

However, as we move into the third quarter of 2003, a brighter picture is emerging. SARS is under control for the time being, and dialogue with the U.S. government during recent visits to Washington by senior Taiwan officials has also helped to clarify priorities for arms sales programs.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q2, 2003

In February of 2003, the US-Taiwan Business Council held the second in a series of defense industry meetings focusing on the security relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Our goal was to build on the success of last year’s event in Saint Petersburg, Florida which featured Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense, Tang Yiau-ming, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz as keynote speakers. This year’s keynote speakers were Taiwan’s Vice Minister of Armament & Acquisition, General Chen Chao-min, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific Richard Lawless. Vice Minister Chen brought a delegation to San Antonio comprised of high-level military officials representing each branch of the military and several departments within the Ministry of National Defense (MND). By inviting such a large delegation from Taiwan to the United States, we hoped to provide ample opportunity for all of our members to interact with these officials and to build important relationships.

As was the case in 2002, the event was strictly off the record and all sessions were off-limits to the press. While the keynote speeches were made available to the media the actual sessions remained private, which allowed for a very high level of comfort for our speakers. In addition, it allowed for very candid question & answer periods following each of the sessions, and the dialogue between the audience and the panel participants was more extensive and productive than during the previous Saint Petersburg event.

The Council’s newly appointed Chairman, former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, opened the event with an introductory keynote speech. Attendees then spent a day and a half looking at the risks now apparent in the US-Taiwan-China relationship and the barriers to the stated goal of a robust and modern deterrent capability for the people on Taiwan. It is the Council’s view that America’s leading defense and security companies can play a vital role in building that deterrence, and can work with Taiwan to integrate the myriad of complex systems and platforms.

This analysis will summarize the three main topics covered during the conference, including Taiwan’s defense reorganization, the budgetary process in the Legislative Yuan and MND, and Taiwan’s future defense needs.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q1, 2003

The stability of U.S., China, and Taiwan relations constituted one of the relatively bright spots in the world in 2002, particularly given the turbulence and anxiety with which the year began in the aftermath of the horrific events of September 11th. There were no major domestic political crises impacting relations among the three, no severe national disasters or domestic disturbances to challenge the leadership in any of the three countries, and no serious international incidents threatening to throw the cross-Strait region into conflict.

Domestically, each economy placed greater emphasis on their economic challenges and internal political developments, while internationally the U.S.-led global war on terrorism drove the agenda. Cross-Strait political bickering took a back seat to increasing economic and social interactions, and the military components in the relationship – China’s steady military modernization and accompanying training and exercise program, Taiwan’s ongoing military reform, and the U.S.’s continuing provision of arms and defense services—took a back seat to the greater imperative economic development.

Within this context, this report reviews the major developments in China, in the U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan military relationships, cross-Strait dynamics, and, finally, the key arms sales programs during 2002.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Annual Review, 2002

The summer quarter was a remarkable period in the evolution of Taiwan-China-U.S. relations. A number of events transpired that just a year ago might have led to the brink of a cross-Strait war, but this year raised only mild reactions in Beijing. Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s August remarks on Taiwan “walking its own road,” First Lady Wu Shu-chen’s highly publicized visit to the United States, and several well reported exchanges of military delegations – particularly Vice Minister of National Defense (MND) Kang Ning-hsiang’s early September visit – all evoked only muted responses from China. Beijing, apparently, is fully focused on its leadership transition in the lead-up to the 16th Party Congress, while Washington continues with the war on terrorism, Afghanistan, and preparations for a potential conflict in Iraq.

Against this backdrop, China steadily continues its modernization program which is producing a visible increase in military capabilities. In turn, Taiwan is carrying out a modernization program that places priority on streamlining and reducing costs, with questionable results in terms of operational capabilities. To close the triangle, the U.S. marches forward with arms sales and enhanced military-to-military relations across the board with Taiwan. This quarterly report will attempt to clarify this complex picture as we look at future developments in the arms sales area and in the cross-Strait political dynamic.

Executive Summary: Taiwan Defense & Security Report – Q3, 2002