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Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes the Proposed Sale of 66 F-16 Block 70 Fighter Jets to Taiwan, an Arms Sale Years in the Making


The US-Taiwan Business Council (USTBC) today welcomed the announcement of a possible U.S. Foreign Military Sale of 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets to Taiwan for a total estimated value of US$8 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan sale on August 20, 2019.
 
The F-16 Block 70 is the most advanced variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighter. The F-16 Block 70 allows for improved interoperability, and integrates advanced capabilities including an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, a state of the art electronic warfare suite, and upgraded avionics.
 
Today’s Congressional Notification (transmittal number 19-50) included the 66 F-16 aircraft, 75 F110 General Electric Engines, 75 Link-16 Systems, 75 Improved Programmable Display Generators (iPDG), 75 APG-83 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radars, 75 Modular Mission Computers 7000AH, 75 LN-260 Embedded GPS/INS, and 75 M61 Vulcan 20mm Guns. At a quantity of 75, each item comes with 9 spares.
 
The notification also included 138 LAU-129 Multipurpose Launchers, 18 of various FMU Fuze systems for Guided Bombs, 6 MK-82 Filled Inert Bombs for Guided Bombs, 3 KMU-572 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Tail Kits, GBU-38/54, along with numerous other related equipment and logistics, program, and sustainment support.
 
This proposed arms sale will allow Taiwan to field a modern and capable fleet of fighter aircraft in sufficient numbers to meet the evolving military threat from China. Taiwan’s Air Force has indicated that it will increase the number of tactical fighter wings from seven to eight after receiving the new aircraft.
 
USTBC has spent more than a decade advocating for the United States to sell additional F-16s to Taiwan, publishing several reports on Taiwan’s need for new-build fighter jets. The 66 new F-16 Block 70s will help close the looming fighter gap by addressing both quantitative and qualitative challenges faced by the Taiwan Air Force, and the sale will significantly improve Taiwan’s air defenses.
 
Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented that “the sale of F-16 Block 70 fighters is the most important arms sale to Taiwan since the 2001 commitments by the Bush Administration. The modernization of the fleet by these new planes has several significant benefits. 1) The consolidation of the Taiwan fighter force around a single platform, given Taiwan’s ongoing upgrade of its legacy F-16 fleet to the same variant. 2) The consummate reduction in operating and maintenance costs realized by simplifying the fighter fleet. 3) The reduction in the mean age of the fleet, which should raise the operational and availability rates for the overall Taiwan fighter force. 4) A platform that will significantly improve interoperability amongst Taiwan forces. 5) A bridge to potential future purchases of fifth-generation fighters like the F-35.
 
Hammond-Chambers went on to say, “The policy significance of this sale should not be overlooked. For 20+ years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has had an over-weighted role in U.S. deliberations around arms sales to Taiwan. That included the Bush Administration in 2006, when Taiwan’s original request for new F-16s was rejected over fears of the PRC’s response. Since then, the PRC has effectively limited – through threats and coercion – what the U.S. would consider for sale to Taiwan and the timeline for such sales. This approach immeasurably damaged Taiwan’s security, and negatively impacted the interests of the U.S. in Asia. The rejection of PRC coercion – along with rejecting its stated “red lines” over certain capabilities such as new F-16s – fully restores American security interests related to Taiwan arms sales, and removes PRC considerations from the ongoing development of American and Taiwan joint security interests.

http://www.us-taiwan.org/pressrelease/2019august20congressionalnotificationf-16armssaletotaiwan.pdf

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Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the July 8, 2019 U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan of M1A2 Abrams MBTs & Stinger Missiles

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of two possible Foreign Military Sales of M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks (MBT), Stinger Missiles, and related equipment and support to Taiwan for a total estimated value of US$2 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sales on July 8, 2019.

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 19-21 and 19-22) are for a total value of approximately US$2 billion, with the Stinger Missiles at an estimated cost of US$223.56 million.

The first notification includes 108 M1A2T Abrams Tanks; 14 M88A2 HERCULES Vehicles; 16 M1070A1 Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET); 338 M2 Chrysler Mount and M240 Machine Guns; a variety of munitions and other equipment and services; as well as program logistics and additional support. The second notification includes 250 Block I -92F MANPAD Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and 4 Block I -92F MANPAD Stinger Fly-to-Buy missiles, along with related equipment and support.

The 108 M1A2 Abrams MBTs appear destined for the 6th Army Corps’ two armored battalions stationed in northern Taiwan. The new tanks will replace some of Taiwan’s existing M60A3 Patton and CM-11 Brave Tiger tanks in service with the Taiwan Army, as part of a refresh of some of its older existing equipment.

The US-Taiwan Business Council is encouraged by these Congressional notifications. Despite initial concerns over the efficiency of the M1A2 Abrams platform on Taiwan’s coastal wetlands and in its mountains, the U.S. has provided the Taiwan military with the equipment it has requested, trusting to Taiwan war planners and military strategists to make their own determination of Taiwan’s needs.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said that “these tanks and missiles will provide the Taiwan army with a modern capability to deter and complicate the operational planning of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces that coerce and threaten Taiwan. They will also offer new opportunities to engage in cooperation with the United States in both the deployment and operations phases, and to maximize the effectiveness of the equipment.

Hammond-Chambers went on to say, “the Trump Administration recognizes that even at a time of higher tensions in the U.S.-China relationship, the U.S. providing material support for Taiwan’s ongoing force modernization should not be predicated on U.S.-China priorities. The Administration has made a commitment to regularize and normalize the arms sales process to Taiwan, and today’s announcement is a testament to that commitment. It is a sound and responsible policy that will maximize the deterrent nature of a modern, well-equipped Taiwan military capable of complicating and deterring any actions by the PLA.

http://www.us-taiwan.org/pressrelease/2019july08congressionalnotificationsarmssalestotaiwan.pdf

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Air Force Information U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the April 15, 2019 U.S. Arms Sale to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of F-16 Pilot Training & Maintenance/Logistics Support

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of F-16 Pilot Training and Maintenance/Logistics Support to Taiwan at an estimated cost of US$500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on April 15, 2019.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 19-11) is for the continuation of a pilot training program and maintenance/logistics support for F-16 aircraft currently at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, to include flight training; participation in approved training exercises; inert/dummy training munitions; supply and maintenance support; spares and repair parts; support equipment; program management; publications; documentation; personnel training and training equipment; fuel and fueling services; engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of program and logistical support necessary to sustain a long-term CONUS training program.[1]

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “the announcement of an arms sale today, the ongoing pilot training, maintenance and logistics of Taiwan’s F-16 aircraft at Luke Air Force Base, is a timely reminder of the ongoing relevance of the Taiwan Relations Act which is being celebrated for its 40th anniversary this week. The Trump Administration is continuing to provide timely and regular arms sales in support of Taiwan’s ongoing military readiness.

[1] See the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales

https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-tecro-conus-based 

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Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the September 24, 2018 U.S. Arms Sale to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the decision by the U.S. Department of State to announce its approval of a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) to Taiwan for an estimated value of US$330 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on September 24, 2018.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 18-09) is for an FMSO II that would provide funds for blanket order requisitions – under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement – for stock replenishment supply of standard spare parts and repair/replace of spare parts in support of the F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), all other aircraft systems and subsystems, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

The US-Taiwan Business Council is encouraged by this Congressional notification, which appears to move away from the previous “bundling” method for Taiwan arms sales. Notifying each sale when it is ready is a positive development, and indicates more potential activity at the end of this year and into early 2019. It is the approach the Council has advocated for since the original bundling began in 2008.

Real issues remain, however, with Taiwan’s ability to ask for the defensive systems it wants and needs. Since 2011, U.S. arms sales have focused almost exclusively on sustainment and maintenance of Taiwan’s existing military capabilities. There has seemingly been no willingness by the U.S. to assess new capabilities for Taiwan, with requests for new systems apparently rejected or deterred prior to the initial stages of evaluation.

New arms sales requests by Taiwan should be subject to an interagency assessment that includes the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State, the Indo-Pacific Command, the American Institute in Taiwan, and other organizations. All such requests should be evaluated on their merits only, with potential Chinese reactions to a sale not a part of the calculus.

“Intelligent” Requests
In speeches and other statements, the State Department has discussed the need for “intelligent” arms sales, which leave unanswered questions both about the criteria for arms sales and the existing process. Is Taiwan free to make any request, or only those deemed “intelligent?” Who makes the determination of what is “intelligent,” and at what stage in the review process does this determination take place?

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “the Trump Administration’s stated policy is that Taiwan may submit a Letter of Request (LoR) for Pricing & Availability (P&A) data for any platform or system Taiwan feels they need to mount a credible defense, and it is entitled to receive a full assessment and timely response to their request by the full interagency review process.

Hammond-Chambers added, “This gets at the heart of normalizing the arms sales process. Will Taiwan be able to ask for all that it feels it needs, to then have that LoR accepted – not deterred if deemed “unintelligent” – and assessed on its merits? If the U.S. deems that a request is not doable at the moment, will they offer an alternative solution? It is not for any one department to determine what is “intelligent,” but for the full interagency review process to be employed to ensure that Taiwan can mount a credible and full defense as required by the Taiwan Relations Act.

http://www.us-taiwan.org/pressrelease/2018september25congressionalnotificationsarmssalestotaiwan.pdf

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U.S. Government

September 24, 2018 – U.S. Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to Taiwan

On September 24, 2018 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) made the following statement:

The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) for an estimated cost of $330 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today. TECRO has requested a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions, under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement for stock replenishment supply of standard spare parts, and repair/replace of spare parts in support of the F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), all other aircraft systems and subsystems, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is $330 million.

This proposed sale is consistent with U.S. law and policy as expressed in Public Law 96-8.This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security and defensive capability of the recipient, which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability, military balance, and economic progress in the region. The proposed sale of spare and repair parts is required to maintain the recipient’s defensive and transport aerial fleet. The recipient has been operating these fleets since 1996 and will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. There are no principal contractors involved with this potential sale. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the permanent assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. This notice of a potential sale is required by law and does not mean the sale has been concluded.

All questions regarding this proposed Foreign Military Sale should be directed to the State Department’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, pm-cpa@state.gov.

The original news release is available on the DSCA website:
http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-tecro-foreign

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Notes U.S. Government

Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress, 1990-2017

Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2017
Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2017

Updated Chart: Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress, 1990-2017

Shows clearly notification packaging/bundling and the long freeze.

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Press Releases U.S. Government

The Trump Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the decision by the U.S. Department of State to announce its approval of seven possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan, with a total value of US$1.363 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sales on June 29, 2017. A direct commercial sale was also notified, bringing the total to approximately US$1.4 billion.

The published FMS Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 16-67, 16-68, 16-69, 16-70, 16-73, 16-74, and 16-75) were for SM-2 Block IIIA All-Up Rounds, associated equipment and technical support (US$125 million); MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo Conversion Kits, spare parts and other support and assistance (US$175 million); MK 48 Mod 6AT Heavyweight Torpedoes, other support, spare parts, training, and assistance (US$250 million); Hardware, software, and other upgrades to the AN/SLQ-32(V)3 Electronic Warfare Systems supporting Taiwan’s KEELUNG Class destroyers (US$80 million); AGM-154C JSOW Air-to-Ground Missiles, spare/repair parts and other support and assistance (US$185.5 million); AGM-88B HARMs and Training HARMs, spare/repair parts, testing, and other support and assistance (US$147.5 million); SRP Operations and Maintenance follow-on sustainment (US$400 million).

The US-Taiwan Business Council welcomes these Congressional notifications in adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, which obligates the U.S. to help enable Taiwan’s self-defense. However, it has been 562 days since the last arms sale to Taiwan in late 2015. The Council questions the impact that delays in consideration and execution of Taiwan arms requests are having on the island’s ability to maintain its self-defense capabilities.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “support for Taiwan remains an essential aspect of the U.S. national security posture in Asia, particularly as increased cross-Strait tensions would fundamentally threaten stability in the region. The U.S. is legally and historically committed to providing Taiwan with arms of sufficient quantity and quality to provide for its own self-defense. Arms sales have long been a mainstay of U.S. security relations with the island, supporting U.S. efforts to deter coercion from the PRC and help provide for Taiwan’s self-determination.

Hammond-Chambers added “The Council supports the return to a normal and regular process for assessing all Taiwan arms sales requests and sales. Packaging several years’ worth of items drives up the overall dollar value of each tranche of notifications. Each Taiwan arms sale also becomes a rare and compelling event, drawing significantly more attention than it might otherwise garner. This creates a more substantial opportunity for Chinese protests and posturing in response to each sale, protests that have had a deterrent effect on U.S. willingness to release needed but advanced systems to Taiwan – such as new-build fighters and submarines. It would be in the U.S. interest to provide less of an impetus for Chinese protests in response to Taiwan arms sales, and moving away from packaging would be a substantial step in the right direction.

The Trump Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

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Press Releases U.S. Government

The Obama Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

 

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the decision by the U.S. Department of State to announce its approval of possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan sales on December 16, 2015.

 

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 15-27, 15-44, 15-45, 15-72, 15-74, 16-01, 16-05, and 16-06) were for two of the four FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates that that the U.S. authorized by law for transfer to Taiwan a year ago, and associated materials (at a refurbishment and upgrade cost of US$190 million); 36 AAV-7 Assault Amphibious Vehicles (US$375 million); 13 MK 15 Phalanx Block 1B ship defense Close-In Weapon Systems, upgrade kits, ammunition, and support (US$416 million); 208 Javelin guided missiles, technical assistance, logistics, and program support (US$57 million); 769 BGM-71F-series TOW 2B Aero Radio Frequency anti-armor missiles, support, and training (US$268 million); 250 Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger missiles, related equipment and support (US$217 million); Taiwan Advanced Tactical Data Link System (TATDLS) and Link 11 communication systems integration (US$75 million); Follow-on support for Taiwan’s MIDS/LVT-1 and JTIDS previously procured (US$ 120 million).[i]

 

Taiwan is poised to elect a new President on January 16, 2016. The timing of this announcement is therefore useful as a modest signal to China that the U.S. has equities in the peaceful transition of power on the island, and that it supports Taiwan’s democratic system. However, the Taiwan Relations Act states that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In light of this recent sale, the US-Taiwan Business Council poses a number of questions for the Obama Administration:

 

  1. Why did it take over four years to prepare this arms package? The last U.S. arms sale to Taiwan took place on September 21, 2011.
  2. Why isn’t Taiwan being offered any new capabilities to counter changes to the Chinese threat over this period?
  3. What impact are delays in consideration and execution of Taiwan arms requests having on the island’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability?

 

The contents of the arms package announced today – along with the unprecedented four-year delay since the last arms sale – raises serious questions as to whether it serves as a response commensurate to the threat posed by China’s military. The past four years has seen increased Chinese force modernization efforts, and according to the U.S. Department of Defense “the PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary.[ii]

 

The Obama Administration’s focus on China military-to-military engagement and other initiatives in which China’s cooperation is viewed as crucial, such as on climate change efforts, is directly and negatively impacting U.S. willingness to maintain consistent and credible support for Taiwan’s self-defense. This in turn directly impacts the seriousness with which China views our intentions to assist Taiwan.

 

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “There have been myriad initiatives in U.S.-Taiwan bilateral security relations since the last arms sale in 2011. However, while China has deployed new fighters, submarines, and missiles during the last four years, the U.S. has consistently refused to consider providing Taiwan access to similar platforms, or even aiding their indigenous development.

 

In addition, the process for considering, assessing, and processing Taiwan arms sales is broken. The contorted efforts to provide the minimum over an extended period has amounted to long delays and to the U.S. providing only second-hand equipment and additional munitions for systems already in Taiwan’s inventory. The U.S. is placing its China priorities ahead of our legacy and legal requirement to provide for Taiwan’s self-defense. We see no effort to meaningfully address China’s modernization efforts with new capabilities for Taiwan – not because they are unneeded, but because the political cost to China relations is perceived as being too high. Yet that perception was roundly debunked by the Council and Project 2049 in our 2012 report on Chinese reactions to arms sales.[iii]

 

Hammond-Chambers also said “The process that has seen the bundling of Taiwan arms sales into large packages has run its course. The arbitrary manner in which programs are considered, the absence of a broader strategy for providing Taiwan consistent material support, and the long delays in processing and notifying them to Congress is hampering Taiwan’s ability to mount a serious defense. By bundling programs into packages, the U.S. forces Taiwan to buy all necessary equipment at once rather than in an orderly year-on-year process. If requests go unaddressed for years, or programs are long delayed, how can Taiwan reasonably maintain domestic political support for them, or develop the budget for its ongoing force modernization?

 

The US-Taiwan Business Council supports the return to a normal and regular process for assessing all Taiwan arms sales requests and sales. Additionally, the Council believes that the bilateral security relationship needs to be clear about what new capabilities should accompany ongoing training and exchanges in aid of Taiwan’s self-defense – including addressing quantitative issues impacting its fighter fleet, its requirement for submarines to complicate Chinese invasion scenarios, as well as further improvements in Taiwan’s missile defense capabilities.

 

[i] As of 1:00 pm on December 16, 2015. For details, see the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales
[ii] See: “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015” http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf
[iii] See: “Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales” http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf

Press Release: The Obama Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (PDF)

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Analysis & Commentary

Special Commentary: The Obama Administration Notifies Taiwan’s F-16A/B Upgrade Program To Congress. Where Are The F-16C/Ds?

The US-Taiwan Business Council welcomes the news that the Obama Administration will proceed with a commitment to upgrade Taiwan’s present inventory of F-16 A/Bs at a possible cost of US$5.3 billion, the continuation of the Luke Air Force Base training program at a potential cost of US$500 million, and a requisition for up to US$52 million in parts for Taiwan’s F-16 A/Bs, F-5s, C-130s and IDFs. The congressional notifications are attached.

The Council welcomes the Obama Administration’s partial commitment to supporting Taiwan’s efforts to upgrade and modernize its air power capabilities. As we noted in our 2010 report “The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait”, Taiwan certainly needs to implement a robust mid-life retrofit/modernization program for its existing fleet of F-16 A/Bs. The FMS programs notified to Congress today will help Taiwan address diminishing manufacturing sources and obsolescence issues, improve reliability and maintainability, improve survivability, and update aircraft capabilities to remain abreast of current mission requirements.

Upgraded F-16 A/Bs Are Not Enough to Face the Threat from China

A recent U.S. Department of Defense report states that “China has continued to develop a wide range of weapons and capabilities designed to provide credible military options in a Taiwan contingency.” The report goes on to note that the military threat posed by China to Taiwan continues to grow rapidly.

The Taiwan Air Force is therefore in dire need of a robust and modern fighter fleet in order to prepare for all possible contingencies. The upgrade of Taiwan’s F-16 A/Bs will go some way towards moving the Taiwan Air Force in the right direction, if the upgraded fighters are equipped with modern systems and munitions.

However, with the Taiwan Air Force retiring its obsolete F-5s and prohibitively expensive Mirage 2000-5s, Taiwan will still fall perilously short of the airframes it requires to maintain an adequate air defense force, even with the scheduled upgrade. This shortfall is inherently destabilizing, and if not addressed it will threaten the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and encourage Chinese adventurism in the coming years.

Unnamed Obama Administration officials have been stating – as they did in the Wall Street Journal yesterday – “Taiwan gets them quicker and they are cheaper than C/Ds”.

This is a false statement. The upgrade program is comprehensive, but spans almost 10 years with the first upgraded A/B coming as late as the 6th year of the program. If the Obama Administration were to accept a Letter of Request for 66 F-16 C/Ds now, the entire tranche of new fighters could be delivered before Taiwan receives any of its upgraded F-16 A/Bs.

Secondly, the Obama Administration is suggesting that the choice was between either the F-16 A/B upgrade or the F-16 C/Ds. Again, this is a false choice. It is not either but both programs that are required. The correct approach would have both programs running sequentially, so that as new F-16 C/Ds are delivered to Taiwan – before Taiwan starts pulling front line F-16 A/Bs out of operations – there will be no degradation of Taiwan’s fighter strength. As presently structured, Taiwan will actually see a reduction in the number of operational F-16s over the next 10 years.

The solution to this shortfall is the sale of 66 F-16 C/D fighters to Taiwan, as a follow up and in addition to the announced upgrade of Taiwan’s existing fleet of A/Bs. Together, these two programs would help Taiwan adequately fill the fighter gap, and would ensure that Taiwan has an air force capable of deterring China from provoking or attacking it. A fighter force able to handle all of Taiwan’s many contingencies.

The Council comments on Congressional Notifications for Taiwan Arms Sales:

Special Commentary: The Obama Administration Notifies Taiwan’s F-16 A/B Upgrade Program To Congress. Where Are The F-16 C/Ds?

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Analysis & Commentary

Special Commentary: Taiwan Congressional Notifications Released

The US-Taiwan Business Council comments on Congressional Notifications for Taiwan Arms Sales

While there has been a delay of over 7 months for 8 separate Congressional Notifications (CNs) for arms sales to Taiwan, on October 3 the U.S. Department of State released six items for notification: Javelin, Harpoon, spare aircraft parts, PAC-III, E-2T retrofit, and Apache. The total DSCA estimated cost is US$6.463 billion.

Two of the programs in the original request were omitted – the submarine Phase I design program and the Black Hawk program – while the PAC-III program was reduced. [The original request included the Harpoon anti-ship missiles; Apache helicopters (x30 units); PAC-III (x7 units, 6 operational batteries + 1 training battery); diesel-electric submarine design – Phase I; airplane spare parts (mostly for fighters); E-2T retrofit; UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters (x60 units); and Javelin anti-vehicle missiles.]

It seems as if the Bush Administration’s intention today was to create an overall package based on a dollar figure. They viewed the Black Hawks as a large but not controversial program, and therefore it was one they could punt into 2009 with a degree of confidence that the incoming U.S. administration would not view it as controversial and would likely send it to the Hill. Omitting the submarines was not controversial within decision-making circles, and in the case of PAC-III it pared back the buy to reduce its overall cost.

The impasse over arms sales has done immeasurable damage to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship over the past several years, and these Congressional Notifications – while very late and incomplete – are an important and positive step forward in US-Taiwan relations. However, it has taken over 10 months for the notifications to accumulate – an unprecedented action irrespective of Bush Administration claims that this was part of a normal inter-agency process. There is simply no existing example of notifications being stacked in such a manner.

 

Special Commentary: Taiwan Congressional Notifications Released (PDF)
Related DSCA Notices (PDF)