The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2022 will be held October 2-4, 2022 at the OMNI Richmond Hotel in Richmond, Virginia. This event will be held in person only. This will be the 21st annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.
The conference will open with a discussion on the evolving threat in the Taiwan Strait. The first session will examine the threat to Taiwan in light of the Russia-Ukraine war, and discuss any potential lessons that could be learned by China, Taiwan, and the United States.
The second session will consider the growth and evolution of Taiwan’s strategic thinking, to improve U.S. industry understanding of the current trajectory for Taiwan defense planning in the short, medium, and long term. The third session will discuss non-traditional engagement efforts between the U.S. and Taiwan – training, logistics, sustainment, industrial cooperation, etc. – with a particular focus on industry collaboration and how such undertakings can support both Taiwan and U.S. national security goals.
The fourth session will focus on deterrence and resilience, discussing Phase Zero activities and measures that could help improve Taiwan’s defensive posture, and panelists will discuss ways that bilateral cooperation could help improve deterrence and build Taiwan’s resilience. The fifth and final session will continue the discussion on deterrence and resilience, taking a regional approach to a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait by examining the role that other U.S. partners and allies such as Japan and Australia could play in ongoing deterrence efforts.
The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2021 will be held October 10-12, 2021 at the Lansdowne Resort in Leesburg, Virginia. We are currently planning to host this event in person. This will be the 20th annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.
This year, the conference will open with a discussion on the evolving threat in the Taiwan Strait. The opening session will examine how the threat picture for Taiwan is changing, given that the PRC is intensifying its threat posture towards Taiwan and intensifying its incursions into the Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). We will also discuss how Taiwan, the U.S., and their regional allies could potentially respond.
The second session will examine the big picture of Taiwan’s overarching defense strategy. As the overarching approach drives both policy and acquisitions, this session will discuss current strategic thinking in Taiwan. We will also consider the U.S. view of that approach, and how reconciling differences could provide insights into areas ripe for further development and cooperation. The third session will discuss national security as a whole-of-society approach, including ways to enhance supply chain security, how to leverage public/private partnerships to support defensive priorities, and how civic defense and civic mobilization could help Taiwan enhance deterrence and improve resilience.
The fourth session will consider how the two sides are continuing to explore ways to deepen business relationships in the defense sector. Building on the discussion at the June 2021 Taiwan-U.S. Defense Business Forum, this session will focus on new approaches to bind the defense industries on both sides closer together, as well as to support future defense and security cooperation efforts.
The fifth and final session will discuss how the Taiwan defense industrial base has continued to develop, and will examine some past and current programs where the U.S. and Taiwan have cooperated to support indigenous production of key systems for the Taiwan military. The panel will discuss how to build on what has worked in the past, and how to surface ideas and opportunities for potential future collaboration.
Virtual US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020
Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020 October 5-6, 2020 Virtual Event
The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020 was held October 5-6, 2020 as a virtual event due to the pandemic. It was the 19th annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.
The 2020 virtual defense conference opened with a discussion on the evolution of the threat to Taiwan. The opening session examined how a more perilous security environment could drive Taiwan’s deterrence and defense options, and how it determines how to meet its current and future military needs.
The second and third sessions assessed Taiwan’s doctrine, readiness, and civil-military relations, as well as how the indigenous defense industry can play a role in developing Taiwan’s capabilities to meet the evolving threat. We also explored how Taiwan is approaching combat readiness under the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), and how the island can leverage civil-military relations to continue strengthening both its democratic institutions and its defensive capabilities.
Keynote Addresses & Conference Program
Keynote speakers included senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government. For copies of released speeches from this conference, see www.us-taiwan.org.
Conference sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions may include additional commentators. Each speaker gives a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations are then followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.
Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2019 October 6-8, 2019 Ellicott City, Maryland
The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2019 will be held October 6-8, 2019
in Ellicott City, Maryland. This will be the 18th annual event in a
series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense
cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s
defense and national security needs.
This year, the conference will open with a discussion on the
future & evolution of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC),
looking at what emerging technologies may mean for the concept, and how
changes to funding, force structure, and available equipment may affect
Taiwan’s ODC plans.
The second, third, and fourth sessions will examine the
multi-faceted threat facing Taiwan – starting with lower threat levels
during everyday life in Taiwan today, moving to the medium-intensity
threat, and then to all-out war. The discussion will look at topic such
as political warfare, cybersecurity, subversion and disinformation,
potential naval and aerospace blockades, embargoes, government
decapitation schemes, and limited ballistic missile strikes. Speakers
will also discuss how a sharp conflict may develop and escalate, and
will consider the most likely assault vectors – including amphibious,
air, missile, cyber, and others. We will also examine potential Taiwan
response strategies and tactics, and the role that the U.S. and other
Taiwan allies may play.
The last session will consider the needs of Taiwan’s future
defense forces. Panelists will discuss how changes to a variety of
factors – such as the move towards an all-volunteer force; issues
surrounding adequate recruitment, training, and retention; demographic
changes; expanded reserves, among other issues – can affect Taiwan’s
military readiness, and how to meet those challenges.
Keynote Addresses & Conference Program
Keynote speakers will include senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government.
Conference sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry
Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and
some sessions may include additional commentators. Each speaker gives a
short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint
and expertise. Those presentations are then followed by a moderator-led
discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question
and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum
amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the
panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for
substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.
The US-Taiwan Business Council (USTBC) today welcomed the announcement of a possible U.S. Foreign Military Sale of 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets to Taiwan for a total estimated value of US$8 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan sale on August 20, 2019.
The F-16 Block 70 is the most advanced variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighter. The F-16 Block 70 allows for improved interoperability, and integrates advanced capabilities including an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, a state of the art electronic warfare suite, and upgraded avionics.
Today’s Congressional Notification (transmittal number 19-50) included the 66 F-16 aircraft, 75 F110 General Electric Engines, 75 Link-16 Systems, 75 Improved Programmable Display Generators (iPDG), 75 APG-83 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radars, 75 Modular Mission Computers 7000AH, 75 LN-260 Embedded GPS/INS, and 75 M61 Vulcan 20mm Guns. At a quantity of 75, each item comes with 9 spares.
The notification also included 138 LAU-129 Multipurpose Launchers, 18 of various FMU Fuze systems for Guided Bombs, 6 MK-82 Filled Inert Bombs for Guided Bombs, 3 KMU-572 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Tail Kits, GBU-38/54, along with numerous other related equipment and logistics, program, and sustainment support.
This proposed arms sale will allow Taiwan to field a modern and capable fleet of fighter aircraft in sufficient numbers to meet the evolving military threat from China. Taiwan’s Air Force has indicated that it will increase the number of tactical fighter wings from seven to eight after receiving the new aircraft.
USTBC has spent more than a decade advocating for the United States to sell additional F-16s to Taiwan, publishing several reports on Taiwan’s need for new-build fighter jets. The 66 new F-16 Block 70s will help close the looming fighter gap by addressing both quantitative and qualitative challenges faced by the Taiwan Air Force, and the sale will significantly improve Taiwan’s air defenses.
Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented that “the sale of F-16 Block 70 fighters is the most important arms sale to Taiwan since the 2001 commitments by the Bush Administration. The modernization of the fleet by these new planes has several significant benefits. 1) The consolidation of the Taiwan fighter force around a single platform, given Taiwan’s ongoing upgrade of its legacy F-16 fleet to the same variant. 2) The consummate reduction in operating and maintenance costs realized by simplifying the fighter fleet. 3) The reduction in the mean age of the fleet, which should raise the operational and availability rates for the overall Taiwan fighter force. 4) A platform that will significantly improve interoperability amongst Taiwan forces. 5) A bridge to potential future purchases of fifth-generation fighters like the F-35.”
Hammond-Chambers went on to say, “The policy significance of this sale should not be overlooked. For 20+ years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has had an over-weighted role in U.S. deliberations around arms sales to Taiwan. That included the Bush Administration in 2006, when Taiwan’s original request for new F-16s was rejected over fears of the PRC’s response. Since then, the PRC has effectively limited – through threats and coercion – what the U.S. would consider for sale to Taiwan and the timeline for such sales. This approach immeasurably damaged Taiwan’s security, and negatively impacted the interests of the U.S. in Asia. The rejection of PRC coercion – along with rejecting its stated “red lines” over certain capabilities such as new F-16s – fully restores American security interests related to Taiwan arms sales, and removes PRC considerations from the ongoing development of American and Taiwan joint security interests.”
The procurement of F-16 C/D fighter jets from the United States is still an option to beef up Taiwan’s defense capabilities, the Ministry of National Defense said Monday, dismissing a report that the military has decided not to purchase the aircraft.
Lessons and experiences from previous Taiwan Strait crises have shown that it is imperative for Taiwan to maintain a measure of qualitative superiority over China – not only to attempt to prevail in conflict, but also to reinforce deterrence, to allow Taiwan to negotiate from a position of strength, and to prevent war. However, a careful and objective analysis of the current balance of air power in the Taiwan Strait reveals that Taiwan’s current air defense forces are only marginally capable of meeting the island’s air defense needs, and that it faces real and significant future challenges in maintaining its current capabilities.
The U.S. decision in 2011 to assist Taiwan with the mid-life upgrade (MLU) of its existing fleet of F-16A/B fighters will significantly improve Taiwan’s air defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the upgrade program still does not adequately address all of Taiwan’s legitimate air defense requirements. Without additional procurement programs, a tangible and substantial front-line fighter gap will develop in Taiwan within the next five to ten years, as a significant portion of the Taiwan Air Force (TAF) aircraft inventory reaches the end of its useful service life.
Figure 1: Estimated Fighter Numbers Through 2023
Taiwan’s fleet of Mirage 2000s and the F-CK-1A/B Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) both contend with serious availability issues, and may be facing retirement after 2018. The shortfall in front-line fighters will be further exacerbated by the rapidly approaching obsolescence of Taiwan’s fleet of F-5 Lead-In Fighter Training (LIFT) aircraft. Together, this will reduce the Taiwan air defense force structure to rely primarily on a small fleet of 145 F-16A/Bs whose operational rate takes the number of available planes to approximately 107. During the scheduled upgrade program for these fighters, however, as many as a squadron (24) at a time of F-16A/Bs will be unavailable for service, further reducing Taiwan’s air defense forces.
By 2023, at the expected end of the upgrade program, Taiwan’s operationally-available fighter strength will have declined to a point where the TAF will no longer possess the minimum requisite number of combat aircraft necessary to defend its air space from Chinese aggression or military coercion. Moreover, the quantitative shortfall is certain to also erode the quality of Taiwan’s air force, manifesting in decreased aircraft performance, reduced pilot training opportunities, and lack of pilot experience.
This significant air power shortfall will emerge in Taiwan while China continues to aggressively modernize and expand its missile strike capabilities, and while the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is simultaneously and rapidly introducing modern combat aircraft into service in large numbers.
The United States has both a clear legal and moral obligation to respond to the ongoing Chinese intimidation tactics and attempts at coercion of Taiwan. Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Washington must ready itself and Taiwan to resist that coercion. The germane parts of the TRA make it the policy of the United States:
to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.[1]
Arguably the mere existence of China’s current large arsenal of ballistic missiles, land attack cruise missiles (LACMs), and fighter aircraft opposite Taiwan is “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific,” as it is undermining the long-standing, stability-enhancing military balance in the region. Clearly targeted at Taiwan, China’s standing arsenal is certainly a means of coercion even if the missiles and aircraft are never used.
The United States and Taiwan need to craft and implement counter-coercive strategies that undercut the utility of Chinese aerospace power, while demonstrating Taiwan’s ability to defend its airspace in peacetime and wartime.
