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Updated Chart: Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2019
Taiwan Arms Sales notified to Congress from 1990 to August, 2019. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) only, in US$ billion and by number of notifications.
August 28, 2019
Corrected total 2019 figures and updated the cited version of the Major U.S. Arms Sales report. With thanks to Shirley Kan. Also added a chart showing the number of FMS notifications by year.
Sources:
– FMS Data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency at http://www.dsca.mil
– Kan, Shirley A., “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990” Congressional Research Service Report RL30957, January 5, 2015
The US-Taiwan Business Council (USTBC) today welcomed the announcement of a possible U.S. Foreign Military Sale of 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets to Taiwan for a total estimated value of US$8 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan sale on August 20, 2019.
The F-16 Block 70 is the most advanced variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighter. The F-16 Block 70 allows for improved interoperability, and integrates advanced capabilities including an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, a state of the art electronic warfare suite, and upgraded avionics.
Today’s Congressional Notification (transmittal number 19-50) included the 66 F-16 aircraft, 75 F110 General Electric Engines, 75 Link-16 Systems, 75 Improved Programmable Display Generators (iPDG), 75 APG-83 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radars, 75 Modular Mission Computers 7000AH, 75 LN-260 Embedded GPS/INS, and 75 M61 Vulcan 20mm Guns. At a quantity of 75, each item comes with 9 spares.
The notification also included 138 LAU-129 Multipurpose Launchers, 18 of various FMU Fuze systems for Guided Bombs, 6 MK-82 Filled Inert Bombs for Guided Bombs, 3 KMU-572 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Tail Kits, GBU-38/54, along with numerous other related equipment and logistics, program, and sustainment support.
This proposed arms sale will allow Taiwan to field a modern and capable fleet of fighter aircraft in sufficient numbers to meet the evolving military threat from China. Taiwan’s Air Force has indicated that it will increase the number of tactical fighter wings from seven to eight after receiving the new aircraft.
USTBC has spent more than a decade advocating for the United States to sell additional F-16s to Taiwan, publishing several reports on Taiwan’s need for new-build fighter jets. The 66 new F-16 Block 70s will help close the looming fighter gap by addressing both quantitative and qualitative challenges faced by the Taiwan Air Force, and the sale will significantly improve Taiwan’s air defenses.
Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented that “the sale of F-16 Block 70 fighters is the most important arms sale to Taiwan since the 2001 commitments by the Bush Administration. The modernization of the fleet by these new planes has several significant benefits. 1) The consolidation of the Taiwan fighter force around a single platform, given Taiwan’s ongoing upgrade of its legacy F-16 fleet to the same variant. 2) The consummate reduction in operating and maintenance costs realized by simplifying the fighter fleet. 3) The reduction in the mean age of the fleet, which should raise the operational and availability rates for the overall Taiwan fighter force. 4) A platform that will significantly improve interoperability amongst Taiwan forces. 5) A bridge to potential future purchases of fifth-generation fighters like the F-35.”
Hammond-Chambers went on to say, “The policy significance of this sale should not be overlooked. For 20+ years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has had an over-weighted role in U.S. deliberations around arms sales to Taiwan. That included the Bush Administration in 2006, when Taiwan’s original request for new F-16s was rejected over fears of the PRC’s response. Since then, the PRC has effectively limited – through threats and coercion – what the U.S. would consider for sale to Taiwan and the timeline for such sales. This approach immeasurably damaged Taiwan’s security, and negatively impacted the interests of the U.S. in Asia. The rejection of PRC coercion – along with rejecting its stated “red lines” over certain capabilities such as new F-16s – fully restores American security interests related to Taiwan arms sales, and removes PRC considerations from the ongoing development of American and Taiwan joint security interests.”
http://www.us-taiwan.org/pressrelease/2019august20congressionalnotificationf-16armssaletotaiwan.pdf
The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of two possible Foreign Military Sales of M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks (MBT), Stinger Missiles, and related equipment and support to Taiwan for a total estimated value of US$2 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sales on July 8, 2019.
The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 19-21 and 19-22) are for a total value of approximately US$2 billion, with the Stinger Missiles at an estimated cost of US$223.56 million.
The first notification includes 108 M1A2T Abrams Tanks; 14 M88A2 HERCULES Vehicles; 16 M1070A1 Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET); 338 M2 Chrysler Mount and M240 Machine Guns; a variety of munitions and other equipment and services; as well as program logistics and additional support. The second notification includes 250 Block I -92F MANPAD Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and 4 Block I -92F MANPAD Stinger Fly-to-Buy missiles, along with related equipment and support.
The 108 M1A2 Abrams MBTs appear destined for the 6th Army Corps’ two armored battalions stationed in northern Taiwan. The new tanks will replace some of Taiwan’s existing M60A3 Patton and CM-11 Brave Tiger tanks in service with the Taiwan Army, as part of a refresh of some of its older existing equipment.
The US-Taiwan Business Council is encouraged by these Congressional notifications. Despite initial concerns over the efficiency of the M1A2 Abrams platform on Taiwan’s coastal wetlands and in its mountains, the U.S. has provided the Taiwan military with the equipment it has requested, trusting to Taiwan war planners and military strategists to make their own determination of Taiwan’s needs.
Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said that “these tanks and missiles will provide the Taiwan army with a modern capability to deter and complicate the operational planning of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces that coerce and threaten Taiwan. They will also offer new opportunities to engage in cooperation with the United States in both the deployment and operations phases, and to maximize the effectiveness of the equipment.”
Hammond-Chambers went on to say, “the Trump Administration recognizes that even at a time of higher tensions in the U.S.-China relationship, the U.S. providing material support for Taiwan’s ongoing force modernization should not be predicated on U.S.-China priorities. The Administration has made a commitment to regularize and normalize the arms sales process to Taiwan, and today’s announcement is a testament to that commitment. It is a sound and responsible policy that will maximize the deterrent nature of a modern, well-equipped Taiwan military capable of complicating and deterring any actions by the PLA.”
http://www.us-taiwan.org/pressrelease/2019july08congressionalnotificationsarmssalestotaiwan.pdf
The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.
- Press Release: DOD to Release 2019 Report on Military and Security Developments in China
- Video: Pentagon Releases 2019 Report on China – Randall G. Schriver, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, briefed the media on the release of the 2019 Report on Military and Security Developments in China at the Pentagon on May 3, 2019
- Report: 2019 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)
Reorganizing for Operations along China’s Periphery
China’s overall strategy toward Taiwan continues to incorporate elements of both persuasion and coercion to hinder the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence. Taiwan lost three additional diplomatic partners in 2018, and some international fora continued to deny the participation of representatives from Taiwan. Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.
Military Strategy and Doctrine
Taiwan persistently remains the PLA’s main “strategic direction,” one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as having strategic importance, in authoritative military publications. Other strategic directions include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China’s borders with India and North Korea. PLA reforms have oriented each new theater command toward a specific strategic direction.
China’s Strategy and Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait
China appears prepared to defer the use of military force as long as it believes that unification with Taiwan over the long-term remains possible and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and prevent Taiwan from making moves toward independence.
For decades, China has refused to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Simultaneously, China’s leaders proclaim their desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems,” as emphasized in President Xi Jinping’s addresses opening the CCP’s 19th Party Congress.
The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
- Formal declaration of Taiwan independence
- Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence
- Internal unrest in Taiwan
- Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
- Indefinite delays in the resumption of
cross-Strait dialogue on unification- Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal
affairs and- Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.
Key Takeaways
Key takeaways listed in the report include:
- The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.
- Relations between China and Taiwan remained cool through 2018.
- Bowing to Chinese pressure, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing.
- The PLA continued Taiwan Strait contingency preparations.
- Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which China has historically warned it would use force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
- China has an array of options for a Taiwan campaign, ranging from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
- PLA services and support forces continue to improve training and acquire new capabilities for a Taiwan contingency, but there is no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
- Taiwan’s advantages continue to decline as China’s modernization efforts continue.
- To counter China’s improving capabilities,Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of F-16 Pilot Training & Maintenance/Logistics Support
The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of F-16 Pilot Training and Maintenance/Logistics Support to Taiwan at an estimated cost of US$500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on April 15, 2019.
The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 19-11) is for the continuation of a pilot training program and maintenance/logistics support for F-16 aircraft currently at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, to include flight training; participation in approved training exercises; inert/dummy training munitions; supply and maintenance support; spares and repair parts; support equipment; program management; publications; documentation; personnel training and training equipment; fuel and fueling services; engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of program and logistical support necessary to sustain a long-term CONUS training program.[1]
Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “the announcement of an arms sale today, the ongoing pilot training, maintenance and logistics of Taiwan’s F-16 aircraft at Luke Air Force Base, is a timely reminder of the ongoing relevance of the Taiwan Relations Act which is being celebrated for its 40th anniversary this week. The Trump Administration is continuing to provide timely and regular arms sales in support of Taiwan’s ongoing military readiness.“
[1] See the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales
The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the decision by the U.S. Department of State to announce its approval of a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) to Taiwan for an estimated value of US$330 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on September 24, 2018.
The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 18-09) is for an FMSO II that would provide funds for blanket order requisitions – under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement – for stock replenishment supply of standard spare parts and repair/replace of spare parts in support of the F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), all other aircraft systems and subsystems, and other related elements of logistics and program support.
The US-Taiwan Business Council is encouraged by this Congressional notification, which appears to move away from the previous “bundling” method for Taiwan arms sales. Notifying each sale when it is ready is a positive development, and indicates more potential activity at the end of this year and into early 2019. It is the approach the Council has advocated for since the original bundling began in 2008.
Real issues remain, however, with Taiwan’s ability to ask for the defensive systems it wants and needs. Since 2011, U.S. arms sales have focused almost exclusively on sustainment and maintenance of Taiwan’s existing military capabilities. There has seemingly been no willingness by the U.S. to assess new capabilities for Taiwan, with requests for new systems apparently rejected or deterred prior to the initial stages of evaluation.
New arms sales requests by Taiwan should be subject to an interagency assessment that includes the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State, the Indo-Pacific Command, the American Institute in Taiwan, and other organizations. All such requests should be evaluated on their merits only, with potential Chinese reactions to a sale not a part of the calculus.
“Intelligent” Requests
In speeches and other statements, the State Department has discussed the need for “intelligent” arms sales, which leave unanswered questions both about the criteria for arms sales and the existing process. Is Taiwan free to make any request, or only those deemed “intelligent?” Who makes the determination of what is “intelligent,” and at what stage in the review process does this determination take place?Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “the Trump Administration’s stated policy is that Taiwan may submit a Letter of Request (LoR) for Pricing & Availability (P&A) data for any platform or system Taiwan feels they need to mount a credible defense, and it is entitled to receive a full assessment and timely response to their request by the full interagency review process.”
Hammond-Chambers added, “This gets at the heart of normalizing the arms sales process. Will Taiwan be able to ask for all that it feels it needs, to then have that LoR accepted – not deterred if deemed “unintelligent” – and assessed on its merits? If the U.S. deems that a request is not doable at the moment, will they offer an alternative solution? It is not for any one department to determine what is “intelligent,” but for the full interagency review process to be employed to ensure that Taiwan can mount a credible and full defense as required by the Taiwan Relations Act.”
http://www.us-taiwan.org/pressrelease/2018september25congressionalnotificationsarmssalestotaiwan.pdf
On September 24, 2018 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) made the following statement:
The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) for an estimated cost of $330 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today. TECRO has requested a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions, under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement for stock replenishment supply of standard spare parts, and repair/replace of spare parts in support of the F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), all other aircraft systems and subsystems, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is $330 million.
This proposed sale is consistent with U.S. law and policy as expressed in Public Law 96-8.This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security and defensive capability of the recipient, which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability, military balance, and economic progress in the region. The proposed sale of spare and repair parts is required to maintain the recipient’s defensive and transport aerial fleet. The recipient has been operating these fleets since 1996 and will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. There are no principal contractors involved with this potential sale. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the permanent assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. This notice of a potential sale is required by law and does not mean the sale has been concluded.
All questions regarding this proposed Foreign Military Sale should be directed to the State Department’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, pm-cpa@state.gov.
The original news release is available on the DSCA website:
http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-tecro-foreign
The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.
2018 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)
2018 – Military Power Report Fact Sheet (PDF)
Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency
China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long-term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. Simultaneously, China’s leaders proclaim their desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems,” most recently as part of President Xi Jinping’s address opening the CCP’s 19th Party Congress.The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:
- Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
- Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
- Internal unrest on Taiwan;
- Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
- Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
- Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
- Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.
Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted.
The ambiguity of these conditions preserves China’s flexibility. In December 2017, Chinese Embassy official Li Kexin, in response to U.S. Congressional language recommending the U.S. Navy explore visiting Taiwan, stated that such a visit would prompt China to take Taiwan by force.
Key Takeaways
Key takeaways listed in the report include:
- While China advocates for peaceful reunification with Taiwan, China has never repudiated the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy increasingly advanced capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.
- Circumstances that would prompt the use of force remain ambiguous, preserving China’s flexibility.
- Multiple military options exist for a Taiwan campaign, ranging from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
- China could engage in a deliberate force buildup to signal an imminent military campaign or conduct a surprise campaign to force rapid military and political resolutions before other countries could respond.
- Should the United States intervene, China would try to delay effective intervention and seek victory in a high-intensity, limited war of short duration.
- The PLA aims to increase its ability to conduct complex joint operations.
- Although ongoing reforms may decrease near-term readiness, in the long-term they should enable better planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA services and support forces continue to improve training and acquire new capabilities for a Taiwan contingency.
- Although the PLAN seeks to achieve maritime superiority within the first island chain and to deter a third party from intervening in a Taiwan campaign, there is no indication it is significantly expanding its landing ship force necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
- Taiwan’s advantages continue to decline as China’s modernization efforts continue.
- Taiwan’s transition to an all-volunteer force by 2019 will be costlier than anticipated, straining the limited defense budget and diverting funds from defense acquisition, training, and readiness.
- To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
- The PLAA and PLANMC continue to equip, plan, and train for sustained amphibious operations.
- The PLAN did not make significant additions to its amphibious fleet in 2017 but launched a YUZHAO LPD that could enter service in 2018.
Update, August 13, 2018
On this date, President Trump signed the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 into law (Public Law No: 115-232).
Update, August 3, 2018
On this date, Congress submitted the 2019 NDAA to the President for signature. The following Taiwan-related language was included in the final version of the bill:
SEC. 1257. Strengthening Taiwan’s Force Readiness.
(a) DEFENSE ASSESSMENT. – The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with appropriate counterparts of Taiwan, conduct a comprehensive assessment of Taiwan’s military forces, particularly Taiwan’s reserves. The assessment shall provide recommendations to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, readiness, and resilience of Taiwan’s self-defense capability in the following areas:
(1) Personnel management and force development, particularly reserve forces.
(2) Recruitment, training, and military programs.
(3) Command, control, communications and intelligence.
(4) Technology research and development.
(5) Defense article procurement and logistics.
(6) Strategic planning and resource management.(b) REPORT REQUIRED. –
(1) IN GENERAL. – Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing each of the following:
(A) A summary of the assessment conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
(B) A list of any recommendations resulting from such assessment.
(C) A plan for the United States, including by using appropriate security cooperation authorities, to–
(i) facilitate any relevant recommendations from such list;
(ii) expand senior military-to-military engagement and joint training by the United States Armed Forces with the military of Taiwan; and
(iii) support United States foreign military sales and other equipment transfers to Taiwan, particularly for developing asymmetric warfare capabilities.
(2) APPROPRIATE SECURITY COOPERATION AUTHORITIES – For purposes of the plan described in paragraph (1)(C), the term “appropriate security cooperation authorities” means–
(A) section 311 of title 10, United States Code (relating to exchange of defense personnel);
(B) section 332 such title (relating to defense institution building); and
(C) other security cooperation authorities under chapter 16 of such title.
(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. – In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means–
(A) the congressional defense committees; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.SEC. 1258. Sense of Congress on Taiwan.
It is the sense of Congress that –
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the “Six Assurances” are both cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan;(2) the United States should strengthen defense and security cooperation with Taiwan to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(3) the United States should strongly support the acquisition by Taiwan of defensive weapons through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with a particular emphasis on asymmetric warfare and undersea warfare capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act;
(4) the United States should improve the predictability of arms sales to Taiwan by ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and defense services;
(5) the Secretary of Defense should promote Department of Defense policies concerning exchanges that enhance the security of Taiwan, including—
(A) opportunities for practical training and military exercises with Taiwan; and
(B) exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan
consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135);(6) the United States and Taiwan should expand cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and
(7) the Secretary of Defense should consider supporting the visit of a United States hospital ship to Taiwan as part of the annual “Pacific Partnership” mission in order to improve disaster response planning and preparedness as well as to strengthen cooperation between the United States and Taiwan.
Update, July 23, 2018
On this date, the conference report, reconciling the House and Senate versions of the bill, was filed. The conference report was agreed to in the House on July 26, 2018 and in the Senate on August 1, 2018.
The conference report notes:
Strengthening Taiwan’s force readiness (sec. 1257).
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1253) that would direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment, in consultation with appropriate counterparts of Taiwan, on ways to enhance and reform Taiwan’s military forces, particularly Taiwan’s reserve forces. The provision would also require that the assessment include recommendations to strengthen bilateral cooperation and improve Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. The provision would require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to submit a report on the assessment and a list of recommendations and planned actions to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.The Senate amendment contained no similar provision
The Senate recedes
Sense of Congress on Taiwan (sec. 1258)
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1243) that would express the sense of the Senate on the importance of a strong U.S. defense relationship with Taiwan.The House bill contained no similar provision.
The House recedes with an amendment that would clarify that the provision expresses the sense of the Congress. The amendment would also clarify that the Secretary of Defense should promote Department of Defense policies concerning exchanges that enhance the security of Taiwan, including opportunities for practical training and military exercises with Taiwan.
Senior Defense Engagement with Taiwan
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1262) that would express the sense of Congress that, pursuant to the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135), a service secretary or member of the joint chiefs should visit Taiwan for a senior-level defense engagement.The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The House recedes.
Update, June 18, 2018
On this date, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for 2019 by Yea/Nay Vote of 85 – 10.
Update, April 13, 2018
The NDAA, as H.R.5515, was introduced in the House on April 13, 2018. On May 24, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2019.