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Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2022

Update, December 27, 2021

On this date, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2022. The NDAA became Public Law No: 117-81.

Update, December 15, 2021

On this date, the U.S. Senate agreed to the House amendments in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S.1605) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 88 – 11.

The NDAA 2022 now goes to the President’s desk to be signed.

Update, December 7, 2021

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S.1605) was passed in the House by a Yea/Nay Vote of 363 – 70.

This legislation is substantially based on two bills: (1) H.R. 4350, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, which passed the House on September 23 by a vote of 316-113; and (2) S. 2792, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, which was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 21 by a vote of 23-3. 
(source)

The December 7 version of the bill included multiple Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1246. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations

It is the sense of Congress that–
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of a peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan and the policy of the United States to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability should be maintained; and

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by–
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales,
direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests by Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan, including, as appropriate, inviting Taiwan to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2022, that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) deepening interoperability with Taiwan in defensive capabilities, including maritime and air domain awareness and integrated air and missile defense systems;
(E) encouraging exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of–
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(F) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(G) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

SEC. 1247. Statement of Policy on Taiwan

a) Statement of Policy — Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.
(b) Definition — In this section, the term “fait accompli” refers to the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.

SEC. 1248. Annual Report on Taiwan Asymmetric Capabilities and Intelligence Support

(a) In General — The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall each year through fiscal year 2027, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), perform an annual assessment of matters related to Taiwan, including intelligence matters, Taiwan’s asymmetric defensive capabilities, and how defensive shortcomings or vulnerabilities of Taiwan could be mitigated through cooperation, modernization, or integration. At a minimum, the assessment shall include the following:
(1) An intelligence assessment regarding–
(A) conventional military threats to Taiwan from China, including exercises intended to intimidate or coerce Taiwan; and
(B) irregular warfare activities, including influence operations, conducted by China to interfere in or undermine the peace and stability of the TaiwanStrait.
(2) The current defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional and irregular military threats.
(3) The interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners.
(4) The plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures underpinning the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan.
(5) A description of additional personnel, resources, and authorities in Taiwan or in the United States that may be required to meet any shortcomings in the development of Taiwan’s defensive capabilities identified pursuant to this section.
(6) The applicability of Department of Defense authorities for improving the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
(7) The feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan in the domestic production of defensive asymmetric capabilities, including through the transfer of intellectual property, co- development, or co-production arrangements.
(8) An assessment of ways in which the United States could enhance cooperation with on intelligence matters with Taiwan.
(9) A description of any non-Department of Defense efforts by the United States Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external efforts that degrade its free and democratic society.
(10) A description of any significant efforts by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and other elements of the intelligence community to coordinate technical and material support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence operations referred to in this subsection.
(11) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(b) Plan — The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop a
plan for assisting Taiwan in improving its defensive asymmetric capabilities and addressing vulnerabilities identified pursuant to subsection (a) that includes-
(1) recommendations for new Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to existing Department authorities, necessary to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and subject matter expert engagement between Department personnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and
(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for leveraging non-Department authorities, resources, and capabilities to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

(c) Report — Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually through fiscal year 2027, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-
(1) a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) the plan required by subsection (b).

(d) Form –The report required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Definitions — In this section:
(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means–
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) The term “defensive asymmetric capabilities” means the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan against conventional external threats, including coastal defense missiles, naval mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, cyber defenses, and special operations forces.

SEC. 1249. Feasibility Briefing on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) In General — Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.

(b) Elements — The briefing required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.
(2) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including –
(A) disaster and emergency response;
(B) cyber defense and communications security;
(C) military medical cooperation;
(D) Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and
(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.
(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.
(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate

Update, September 23, 2021

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (H.R.4350) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 316-113.

The passed text included 3 additional Taiwan-related amendments:

Floor 53, Rule 628
Directs the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific Region and efforts by the U.S. to work with Taiwan to disrupt such operations.

Floor 59, Rule 616
Supports Taiwan’s investment in an asymmetric defense strategy by requiring a report with programmatic and policy options to support Taiwan’s defense budgeting and procurement process in a manner that facilitates sustained investment in capabilities aligned with Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy.

Floor 84, Rule 795
Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of Commerce to submit a report that includes an assessment of establishing a preclearance facility in Taiwan.

Update, September 17, 2021

On this date, the House Committee on Armed Services filed a supplemental report on the NDAA. The text of the supplemental report mentioned Taiwan in regards to Chinese Mine Warfare and on PLA Civilian Strategic Mobility Capacity. It also included two additional Taiwan-related items:

TITLE XII–MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

Items of Special Interest

Report on Anti-Ship Systems for Defense of Taiwan

The committee supports the strategic partnership between the United States and Taiwan, and notes the importance of anti-ship systems in defending the territorial integrity of the Government of Taiwan. The committee further notes the urgent need for ground-based anti-ship cruise missiles, ground-based cruise missiles, and anti-ship mines to defend United States and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific against growing threats and deter conflict in the region.

The committee strongly supports an effort to expand defense industrial cooperation with the Government of Taiwan. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report by January 31, 2022, on what anti-ship systems and capabilities in the extant U.S. military hardware inventory might be used to enhance the defense of Taiwan, and plans on how these systems and capabilities could be incorporated into the current military of the Government of Taiwan to enhance their self-defense capabilities.

Report on Engaging Taiwan in Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogues or Forums

The committee recognizes the value of Taiwan-U.S. relations, and the importance Taiwan plays in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2022, on the Department of Defense’s plan to meaningfully engage Taiwan in regional security dialogues or forums that shall include the following:

    (1) An assessment of list of security regional dialogues or forums that would fit for Taiwan’s participation.

    (2) A discussion of current and future plans to achieve engaging Taiwan in regional security dialogues or forums.

    (3) An evaluation of the feasibility of cooperating on a range of activities with the aforementioned security dialogues or forums, including: (a) humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief; (b) supply chain security; (c) cyber security; (d) coast guard; and (e) any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

Update, September 10, 2021

On this date, the NDAA, as H.R.4350, was reported (amended) in the House by the House Committee on Armed Services.

The text included three provisions for enhancing the defense and security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan:

SEC. 1243. Report on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) Report – Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan. Such report shall include the following:

(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the 10 preceding calendar years,
including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.

(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including-
(A) disaster and emergency response;
(B) cyber defense and communications security;
(C) military medical cooperation;
(D) cultural exchange and education of members of the National Guard in Mandarin Chinese; and
(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.

(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.

(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.–In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means-
(1) the congressional defense committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 1247. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations

It is the sense of Congress that –
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C.3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by–
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of–
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should be committed to the defense of a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC. 1248. Sense of Congress on Inviting Taiwan to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise.

It is the sense of Congress that the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2022.

July 21, 2021

On this date, the NDAA 2022, as S. 2792, was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee by a vote of 23-3. 

The text included three Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1245. Assessment of and Plan for Improving the Defensive Asymmetric Capabilities of Taiwan

(a) Assessment – The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall conduct an assessment of –
(1) the current defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional military threats;
(2) the applicability of Department of Defense authorities for improving the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(3) the feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan in the domestic production of defensive asymmetric capabilities, including through the transfer of intellectual property, co-development, or co-production arrangements;
(4) the plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures underpinning the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan;
(5) the interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners; and
(6) any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(b) Plan – The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan for assisting Taiwan in improving its defensive asymmetric capabilities that includes –
(1) recommendations for new Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to existing Department authorities, necessary to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and subject matter expert engagement between Department personnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and
(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for leveraging non-Department authorities, resources, and capabilities to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(c) Report – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-(1) a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) the plan required by subsection (b).

(d) Definitions – In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress – The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means –
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Defensive asymmetric capabilities.–The term “defensive asymmetric capabilities” means the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan against conventional external threats, including coastal defense missiles, naval mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, cyber defenses, and special operations forces.

SEC. 1246. Annual Feasibility Briefing on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) Sense of Congress — It is the sense of Congress that the United States should —
(1) continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by increasing exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and
functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of –
(A) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan;
(B) improving the reserve forces of Taiwan; and
(C) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
(2) expand and strengthen Taiwan’s capability to conduct security activities, including traditional activities of the combatant commands, cooperation with the National Guard, and through multilateral activities; and
(3) using appropriate authorities and consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), seek to develop a partnership between the National Guard and Taiwan as a means of maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) Briefing —
(1) In general — Not later than February 15, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.
(2) Elements — Each briefing required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.
(B) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including–
(i) disaster and emergency response;
(ii) cyber defense and communications security;
(iii) military medical cooperation;
(iv) Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and
(v) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.
(C) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.
(D) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

SEC. 1247. Defense of Taiwan

(a) Definitions — In this section:
(1) Deny — The term “deny” means to use combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, resulting in–
(A) the termination of hostilities or at least the attempted fait accompli; or
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.
(2) Fait accompli — The term “fait accompli” refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces can respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the United States Armed Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

(b) Statement of Policy — It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

July 2, 2021

The NDAA 2022, as H.R.4350, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on July 2, 2021.

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2021 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2021 report.

Taiwan language in the 2020 report: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2020-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

Selected Taiwan Language

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the East China Sea and likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2020, the Eastern Theater Command focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, and live-fire training. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include three group armies, a naval fleet, a naval aviation division, two marine brigades, two Air Force divisions, two operational Air Force bases, and one Rocket Force base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while they are conducting Senkakus-related operations. During a contingency, the Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some Strategic Support Force (SSF) units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.

In August and September 2020, the Eastern Theater Command conducted a series of military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan that featured large-scale naval and air maneuvers, amphibious operations, and multiple instances of PLA aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait. An Eastern Theater Command spokesperson stated that these drills were meant to further test and improve multi-service joint operations capabilities, as well as to deter “Taiwan independence” forces and foreign actors from threatening the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait region.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2020, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. In January 2020, despite the PRC’s election interference, President Tsai Ing-wen won reelection for a second term. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains steadfast that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “one China Principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan. President Tsai has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for the PRC to respect Taiwan’s democracy and agree to negotiations without preconditions. In her May 2020 inauguration speech, Tsai reiterated that her China policy would be based on the Republic of China’s constitution and the law governing cross-Strait relations, with a willingness to engage in dialogue on the principles of “peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue” to the PRC’s displeasure.

The PRC also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, thwarting Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Criminal Policy Organization (INTERPOL). Despite the stalled consultations with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to engage with Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party, and the PRC continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum, held virtually in August 2020, due to the pandemic.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention, such as the United States and/or other like- minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration, and signal its displeasure at warming Washington-Taipei ties, China has persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency. Throughout 2020, China’s military increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting combat drills such as island seizure operations. In 2020, Beijing also publicly refuted the existence of the Taiwan Strait ‘median line,’ a decades-long tacit agreement between the two sides intended to reduce miscalculation and avoid sparking accidental crises.

East China Sea

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which Taiwan also claims. It also continues to uphold the importance of abiding by the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the East China Sea but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only as a visible representation of the PRC’s sovereignty claims, but also in an effort to improve readiness and respond quickly to potential contingencies. During 2020, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous and territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In July, two PRC coast guard vessels conducted a record-setting patrol within the 12nm territorial waters that lasted 39 hours and 23 minutes, following a similar patrol just two days prior. These two patrols represented the longest time PRC vessels have ever spent continuously operating inside the Senkakus’ territorial waters since 2012. By the end of the year, PRC vessels had been observed in the contiguous waters of the islands for 333 days, breaking 2019’s record of 282 days.

PRC coast guard vessels also acted more assertively during their patrols in 2020, shadowing Japanese fishing vessels operating within the Senkakus’ territorial waters and ordering them to leave on multiple occasions. Japan’s government protested in late November 2020 when PRC ships entered Japan’s contiguous zone for the 306th time this year, further straining the relations between the PRC and Japan in relation to the Senkakus and complicating plans to reschedule a planned visit to Japan by President Xi Jinping.

The PRC’s Strategy & Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, and staked the PRC’s position for peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” Based on the 2019 speech, “once country, two systems” entails the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured. In 2020, senior PRC leaders and government spokespersons continued to call for cross-Strait discussions on the foundation of adhering to Beijing’s interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” and opposing Taiwan independence, and reiterated contents of Xi’s 2019 speech.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan, according to recent polling data, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under the pretenses of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC has increasingly resorted to an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to continue to develop and perfect its strategy and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
‒ Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
‒ Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
‒ Internal unrest in Taiwan;
‒ Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
‒ Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification; and
‒ Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non- peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC will also likely complement its air and maritime blockade operations with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island. In 2020, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan. Furthermore, the PRC continues to build capabilities that would contribute to a full-scale invasion; in 2019, the PLA completed construction of its first helicopter dock amphibious assault ship (LHA).

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRCs combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.

The PLA is capable of attempting various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture for a Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA)
The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and cross-sea amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate supporting a Taiwan operation is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. Despite COVID-19 mitigation efforts, extensive flooding in southern China, and conflict on the Indian border, PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2020. Training events included nighttime loading, concealed landing, simulated sea crossing operations, and joint landing operations integrating PLAA aviation, Special Forces, EW, armor, and mechanized infantry. Press reports also claim extensive use of sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

In addition to amphibious assault, PLAA aviation and air assault brigades will likely play a role in a large-scale amphibious assault. PLAA aviation and air assault brigades conducted significant training throughout 2020—some directly supporting a Taiwan scenario and others that improve skill sets necessary for a cross-sea invasion. Exercises included single-service operations and joint operations with the PLAN and PLAAF. In August 2020, PLAA helicopters left their land base, landed on PLAN ships, and then conducted an air assault mission. PLAA aviation units also completed “cross-sea [aerial] assault drills,” using UAVs to target opposing forces for air strikes in support of ground forces. PLAA aviation assets also conducted an exercise attacking air and maritime assets in an open-sea environment. Army aviation and air assault units extensively trained on scenarios in a maritime environment that support joint force operations similar to those necessary for a Taiwan invasion.

PLA Navy (PLAN)
The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, developing an at-sea nuclear deterrent, and introducing new multi- mission platforms capable of striking Taiwan’s naval forces in a cross-Strait conflict as well as conducting diverse missions in other contingency operations. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious ship fleet, however, has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious platform docks (LPDs) and flat deck landing helicopter assault (LHAs) ships, indicating a near term focus on regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault. There is also no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its force of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time—suggesting a traditional large-scale direct beach— assault operation requiring extensive lift remains aspirational. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assess it has sufficient amphibious capacity and mitigated shortfalls through investments in other operational modalities able to bring forces onto Taiwan such as the PLA’s rapidly expanding fleet of rotary-wing assets. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
The PLAAF has maintained a force posture that provides a variety of capabilities for a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long- range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. In addition, the PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations in a contingency.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)
The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations and in heightened readiness in preparation for rapid nuclear counterstrikes if called on.

Strategic Support Force (SSF)
PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper states that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyber operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain battlefield information control in contemporary informatized warfare. The SSF 311 Base would also be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF)
The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and
campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities

Taiwan is taking important steps to compensate for the growing disparities it has compared to the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges. Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirms recent adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense in depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. As of the end of 2020, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished its goal of filling 90 percent of the active duty billets, totaling approximately 169,000 personnel, with volunteers. Taiwan’s military modernization program envisions a continued decrease in Taiwan’s active duty force to approximately 175,000 personnel as part of a transition to an all-volunteer force. This transition has slowed due to severe difficulties recruiting volunteers. The cost savings from manpower reductions provides some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. The unanticipated magnitude of transition costs has led Taiwan to divert funds from foreign and indigenous defense acquisition programs, as well as near-term training and readiness. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisition and reforms. In August 2019, Taiwan said it would increase the island’s defense budget by 5.2 percent to NT $358 billion ($11.6 billion). In August 2020, the Tsai administration announced an additional 10% increase to the defense budget, increasing overall defense spending to more than 2% of gross domestic product and the highest level since the 1990’s. Meanwhile, the PRC’s official defense budget continues to grow, with much of it focused on developing the military joint operations capability that could be used to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include Electronic Warfare, cyber and information operations, fast attack maritime vessels, coastal defense missiles, rapid naval mining, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection.

The United States maintains its one-China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The United States is committed to deepening ties with Taiwan, which is a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner. The United States will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In October 2019, Taiwan announced the purchase of F-16V fighter aircraft for $8 billion. In 2020, the frequency of arms sales to Taiwan increased with authorizations totaling more than $5 billion. Authorized weapons sales included advanced unmanned aerial systems, long range missiles and artillery, and the Harpoon Coastal Defense System. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $23 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. In support of these efforts, the U.S. continues to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.

Key Take Aways

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.
  • PRC diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan intensified in 2020.
  • Throughout 2020, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting combat drills such as island seizure operations.
  • The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. In 2020, the PRC stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols.
  • Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • The PRC has a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap between the PLA and Taiwan’s military.
  • To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
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Past Events

October 10-12, 2021 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2021

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2021
October 10-12, 2021
Leesburg, Virginia

www.taiwandefenseconference.com

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2021 will be held October 10-12, 2021 at the Lansdowne Resort in Leesburg, Virginia. We are currently planning to host this event in person. This will be the 20th annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

This year, the conference will open with a discussion on the evolving threat in the Taiwan Strait. The opening session will examine how the threat picture for Taiwan is changing, given that the PRC is intensifying its threat posture towards Taiwan and intensifying its incursions into the Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). We will also discuss how Taiwan, the U.S., and their regional allies could potentially respond.

The second session will examine the big picture of Taiwan’s overarching defense strategy. As the overarching approach drives both policy and acquisitions, this session will discuss current strategic thinking in Taiwan. We will also consider the U.S. view of that approach, and how reconciling differences could provide insights into areas ripe for further development and cooperation. The third session will discuss national security as a whole-of-society approach, including ways to enhance supply chain security, how to leverage public/private partnerships to support defensive priorities, and how civic defense and civic mobilization could help Taiwan enhance deterrence and improve resilience.

The fourth session will consider how the two sides are continuing to explore ways to deepen business relationships in the defense sector. Building on the discussion at the June 2021 Taiwan-U.S. Defense Business Forum, this session will focus on new approaches to bind the defense industries on both sides closer together, as well as to support future defense and security cooperation efforts.

The fifth and final session will discuss how the Taiwan defense industrial base has continued to develop, and will examine some past and current programs where the U.S. and Taiwan have cooperated to support indigenous production of key systems for the Taiwan military. The panel will discuss how to build on what has worked in the past, and how to surface ideas and opportunities for potential future collaboration.

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website is at www.taiwandefenseconference.com

Categories
U.S. Government

Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress 1990-2021

Updated Charts: Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2021

Notified Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2021 - Amount
Notified Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2021 - Number of Notifications

Taiwan Arms Sales notified to Congress from 1990 to August 4, 2021. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) only, in US$ billion and by number of notifications.

Sources:

– FMS Data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency at http://www.dsca.mil

– Kan, Shirley A., “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990” Congressional Research Service Report RL30957, January 5, 2015

Note that the gaps in notifications were as follows:
October 25, 2005 – February 28, 2007
October 3, 2008 – January 29, 2010
September 21, 2011 – December 16, 2015
December 16, 2015 – June 29, 2017

Categories
Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of 40 150mm M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzers for US$750 million

(Arlington, Virginia, August 4, 2021)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of 40 155mm M109A6 Paladin Medium Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems and related equipment to Taiwan at an estimated cost of US$750 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on August 4, 2021.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 21-44) is for 40 155mm M109A6 Medium Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems; 20 M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicles (FAASV); 1 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); 5 M88A2 Hercules vehicles; 5 M2 Chrysler Mount .50 caliber machine guns; and 1,698 multi-option, Precision Guidance Kits (PGK). Also included are M109A6/M992A2 overhaul, conversion and refurbishment services, along with additional equipment, testing, software and technical documentation, technical assistance, engineering, storage, and other related elements of technical, logistics, and program support.

Taiwan already operates older M109A2 and M109A5 variants of the Paladin, and holds M110A2 self-propelled howitzers and towed M114 howitzers in its existing inventory. The M109A6 provides enhanced armor and improved survivability over the older variants, and features a reduction in the time required for set up and fire.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “This notification for the M109A6 Paladin program is the first Taiwan arms sale under the Biden Administration. It serves as a timely reminder of the close national security partnership between the United States and Taiwan, particularly as the PRC is now violating the Taiwan AIDZ on a near daily basis. We expect to continue seeing normalized, timely, and regular arms sales from the U.S. that promote Taiwan’s military readiness. We also hope to see additional offers from the Biden Administration of new capabilities for Taiwan, to both help expand its current military posture and to continue improving its multilayered self-defense capacity.”

The US-Taiwan Business Council would also like to recognize the work of our dearly departed friend and former Board Member Greyson T. Bassett on this program.

Press Note: The words “package” and “packaging” often refer to slowing/stacking Taiwan arms sales notifications and sending them to Congress as a group, instead of individually forwarding them to Congress when they are ready. This was a common practice from 2007 to 2017, and resulted in large and irregular arms sales packages. The word “program” is preferred for items released in one Congressional notification.

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed Taiwan FMS of 40 M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzers
Categories
U.S. Government

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2021

Update, January 1, 2021

On this date, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 2021 became Public Law No: 116-283.

On this date, the NDAA 2021 passed in the Senate, overriding the veto by a Yea-Nay vote of 81-13 (the required 2/3 affirmation).

Update, December 28, 2020

On this date, the NDAA 2021 passed in the House, overriding the veto by a Yea-Nay vote of 322-87 (the required 2/3 affirmation).

Update, December 23, 2020

On this date, the Enrolled Bill was vetoed by the President. The bill is now passed to the House and Senate for a vote.

Update, December 11, 2020

On this date, the conference report was agreed to in the Senate by a Yea/Nay Vote of 84-13.

On this date, Congress also submitted the 2021 NDAA to the President for signature. The following Taiwan-related language was included in the enrolled version of the bill:

SEC. 1260. Statement of Policy and Sense of Congress on the Taiwan Relations Act

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—
(1) that the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) to fully pursue the deepening of the extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United States and Taiwan pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the intent of which is to facilitate greater cooperation and the broadening and deepening of United States-Taiwan relations;

(3) that the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) shall be implemented and executed, consistent with the Six Assurances, to address evolving political, security, and economic dynamics and circumstances;

(4) that, as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

(5) that the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan; and

(6) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by—
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(D) examining the potential for expanding professional military education and technical training opportunities in the United States for military personnel of Taiwan;
(E) increasing exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of—
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;

(2) the Secretary of State should ensure that any policy guidance related to United States-Taiwan relations is fully consistent with the statement of policy set forth in subsection (a);

(3) the Secretary of Defense should ensure that policy guidance related to United States-Taiwan defense relations is fully consistent with the statement of policy set forth in subsection (a); and

(4) the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other Federal agencies and departments, as appropriate, should issue new guidance as required to carry out such policy.

SEC. 1260A. Annual Briefing on Taiwan Arms Sales

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, or his or her designee, shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the United States commitment to supporting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self defense capability, as required by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and affirmed in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 3301 note).

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each briefing required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of United States efforts to implement section 209(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 3301 note) by conducting regular transfers to Taiwan of defense articles tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from the People’s Republic of China, including any effort to support Taiwan in the development and integration into its military forces of asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabilities.

(2) A description of the role of such transfers of defense articles and services in supporting Taiwan in maintaining the capabilities, readiness levels, and resourcing necessary to fulfill and implement Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept.

(3) A description of—
(A) United States efforts to conduct a regularized process for consideration of transfers of defense articles and services to Taiwan; and
(B) any barriers to conducting such a process.
(c) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2026.

SEC. 1260B. Report On United States-Taiwan Medical Security Partnership

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the feasibility of establishing a medical security partnership with the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan that shall include the following:

(1) The goals and objectives of developing a medical security partnership on issues related to pandemic preparedness and control.

(2) A discussion of current and future plans to cooperate on medical security activities.

(3) An evaluation of the feasibility of cooperating on a range of activities under the partnership, including—
(A) research and production of vaccines and medicines;
(B) joint conferences with scientists and experts;
(C) collaboration relating to and exchanges of medical supplies and equipment; and
(D) the use of hospital ships such as the United States Naval Ship Comfort and United States Naval Ship Mercy.

(4) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

SEC. 9724. Fairness for Taiwan Nationals Regarding Employment at International Financial Institutions

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) Taiwan is responsible for remarkable achievements in economic and democratic development, with its per capita gross domestic product rising in purchasing power parity terms from $3,470 in 1980 to more than $55,000 in 2018;
(2) the experience of Taiwan in creating a vibrant and advanced economy under democratic governance and the rule of law can inform the work of the international financial institutions, including through the contributions and insights of Taiwan nationals; and
(3) Taiwan nationals who seek employment at the international financial institutions should not be held at a disadvantage in hiring because the economic success of Taiwan has rendered it ineligible for financial assistance from such institutions.

b) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to seek to ensure that Taiwan nationals are not discriminated against in any employment decision by the institution, including employment through consulting or part-time opportunities, on the basis of—
(1) whether they are citizens or nationals of, or holders of a passport issued by, a member country of, or a state or other jurisdiction that receives assistance from, the international financial institution; or
(2) any other consideration that, in the determination of the Secretary, unfairly disadvantages Taiwan nationals with respect to employment at the institution.

(c) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of the Treasury may waive subsection (b) for not more than 1 year at a time after reporting to the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that providing the waiver
(1) will substantially promote the objective of equitable treatment for Taiwan nationals at the international financial institutions; or
(2) is in the national interest of the United States, with a detailed explanation of the reasons therefor.

(d) PROGRESS REPORT.—The Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies shall submit to the committees specified in subsection (c) an annual report, in writing, that describes the progress made toward advancing the policy described in subsection (b), and a summary of employment trends with respect to Taiwan nationals at the international financial institutions.

(e) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘international financial institutions’’ has the meaning given the term in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2)).

(f) SUNSET.—The preceding provisions of this section shall have no force or effect beginning on the earlier of—
(1) the date that is 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act; or
(2) the date that the Secretary of the Treasury reports to the committees specified in subsection (c) that each international financial institution has adopted the policy described in subsection (b).

Continue reading “Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2021”
Categories
Notes U.S. Government

Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress, 1990-2020

See Also: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-arms-sales-notified-to-congress-1990-2021/

Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2020 amount in billions (December 7, 2020)
Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2020 number of notifications (December 7, 2020)

Taiwan Arms Sales notified to Congress from 1990 to December 7, 2020. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) only, in US$ billion and by number of notifications.

Sources:

– FMS Data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency at http://www.dsca.mil

– Kan, Shirley A., “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990” Congressional Research Service Report RL30957, January 5, 2015

 

Note that the gaps in notifications were as follows:
October 25, 2005 – February 28, 2007
October 3, 2008 – January 29, 2010
September 21, 2011 – December 16, 2015
December 16, 2015 – June 29, 2017

 

 

 

Categories
Past Events

October 5-6, 2020 – Virtual US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020

Virtual US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020
October 5-6, 2020
Virtual Event

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2020 was held October 5-6, 2020 as a virtual event due to the pandemic. It was the 19th annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

The 2020 virtual defense conference opened with a discussion on the evolution of the threat to Taiwan. The opening session examined how a more perilous security environment could drive Taiwan’s deterrence and defense options, and how it determines how to meet its current and future military needs.

The second and third sessions assessed Taiwan’s doctrine, readiness, and civil-military relations, as well as how the indigenous defense industry can play a role in developing Taiwan’s capabilities to meet the evolving threat. We also explored how Taiwan is approaching combat readiness under the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), and how the island can leverage civil-military relations to continue strengthening both its democratic institutions and its defensive capabilities.

Keynote Addresses & Conference Program

Keynote speakers included senior representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and from the U.S. government. For copies of released speeches from this conference, see www.us-taiwan.org.

Conference sessions at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference feature a moderator and several speakers on the panel, and some sessions may include additional commentators. Each speaker gives a short presentation on the session topic from his or her own viewpoint and expertise. Those presentations are then followed by a moderator-led discussion among the panelists, as well as a moderator-driven question and answer period with the attendees. This format offers the maximum amount of time for exchanges among the panelists, as well as between the panel and the audience, allowing the sessions to become a forum for substantial and valuable interaction and discussion.

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website is at www.taiwandefenseconference.com

Categories
News U.S. Government

2020 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2020 report.

Selected Taiwan Language

Capabilities for Counter Intervention and Power Projection

The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. The PRC also continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency

China’s Coercive Approach

China’s leaders use tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s objectives. China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.1 In recent years, the PLA has also increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China also employs non-military tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2019, the Eastern Theater Command focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, and live-fire training. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while conducting Senkakus-related operations.

In April 2019, the Eastern Theater Command JOCC commanded joint training east of Taiwan, which they asserted was to train for joint fire and maritime strike. The training included bombers, fighters, electronic jamming and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft circumnavigating Taiwan while naval combatants trained for mock strikes and helicopters delivered an amphibious landing force. In March, two J-11 fighters crossed the unofficial median line of the Taiwan Strait, for the first time since 1999. The Eastern Theater Command also likely played a significant role in a nationwide exercise across all five theater commands based on the locations of some of the exercise activity near Taiwan.

As of March 2019, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assigned its first fifth generation J-20s to an operational unit, a fighter brigade in the Eastern Theater Command, probably to improve its ability to respond to U.S. and allied aircraft in the area. In March 2019, a likely Eastern Theater Y-8Q anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft was also first observed operating in the East China Sea by Japan.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Relations between the PRC and Taiwan remained at an impasse through 2019. Since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president, China halted formal communication with Taiwan and has repeatedly stressed that Taiwan must accept the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. Since November 2016, China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to “one China,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for China to respect Taiwan’s democracy and agree to negotiations without preconditions.

The PRC also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, thwarting Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and INTERPOL. In 2019, the PRC convinced the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Despite the stalled consultations with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to engage with Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party, and the PRC continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai Administration, China has increased military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLAAF and naval exercises in the East China Sea.

Taiwan’s national defense report released in 2017 cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan poses an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait,” and that Taiwan requires a “multiple deterrence strategy,” including an emphasis on developing asymmetric warfare to counter PLA advances.

China’s Strategy and Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, President Xi Jinping publicly reiterated China’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. In the same speech, Xi also reaffirmed China’s longstanding position for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
– Formal declaration of Taiwan independence
– Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence
– Internal unrest in Taiwan
– Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
– Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification
– Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs
– Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. China’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

China continues to view the Taiwan issue as the most important and sensitive issue between the United States and China.

China’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. China could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or unification dialogue under China’s terms. Notably, China would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, China would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, China might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which China would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. China will also likely complement its air and maritime blockade operations with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. China could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. China could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island. In 2019, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan. Furthermore, China continues to build capabilities that would contribute to a full-scale invasion; in 2019, the PLA completed construction of its first helicopter dock amphibious assault ship (LHA).

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk.

The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan as well. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate international opposition.

Effect of PLA Reform on a Taiwan Contingency

One of the overarching goals of the structural reforms to reshape the PLA was to construct a military capable of conducting complex joint operations, including those that would be involved in a Taiwan contingency. PLA reforms seek to clarify command authorities, improving joint integration, and facilitating the transition from peace to war. The abolishment of military regions in favor of military theaters – in this case, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command – has also likely streamlined and improved the PLA’s ability to conduct yearlong planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA combat units are likely experiencing temporary decreases in readiness and proficiency to conduct large-scale joint operations as they reorganize units, integrate new capabilities, and adjust to new command structures.

A significant addition to the overall structure of the PLA is the establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). During a Taiwan contingency, the JLSF, in conjunction with subordinate joint logistics support centers, would coordinate joint logistics and the delivery of materiel as well as oversee various civil-military support systems to sustain the campaign. The creation of the SSF likely improves the PLA’s ability to execute and coordinate IO (particularly cyber, EW, and counterspace) in a Taiwan contingency. It may also improve the PLA’s ability to manage and provide space-based reconnaissance to the CMC and the Eastern Theater Command, improving PLA command staffs’ situational awareness of Taiwan’s military units and facilities. The PLA is likely still exploring how to reform its joint command processes to integrate IO and ISR capabilities more fully at the theater-level, but structural reforms have removed the biggest barriers to integrating these strategic capabilities at the theater-level.

Structural reforms within the military and paramilitary forces also have implications on resources and operational capabilities available to the PLA for a future Taiwan contingency.

Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities

Taiwan has historically enjoyed military advantages in the context of a cross-Strait conflict, such as technological superiority and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense, but China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of these advantages. Although Taiwan is taking important steps to compensate for the growing disparities – building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps – these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s declining defensive advantages.

Taiwan’s military spending remains at approximately two percent of its gross domestic product. In August 2019, Taiwan said it would increase the island’s defense budget by 5.2 percent to NT $358 billion ($11.6 billion). Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow, and for 2019, is roughly 15 times that of Taiwan, with much of it focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and EW, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection.

The United States maintains a “one-China” policy that is based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the three Joint Communiqués. The United States opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo. The United States continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace acceptable to both sides.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In May 2020, the White House publicly released a report to Congress entitled, United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China. The report states, “Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense, which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region.

In a 1982 memorandum, President Ronald Reagan insisted ‘that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.’” In October 2019, Taiwan announced the purchase of F-16V fighter aircraft for $8 billion. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $23 billion in arms sales to Taiwan.

Key Takeaways

  • The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. U.S. defense planners often refer to these collective capabilities as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
  • The PRC continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency.
  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.
  • Relations between the PRC and Taiwan remained tense through 2019.
  • The PLA continued Taiwan Strait contingency preparations
  • Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which China has historically warned it would use force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • China has a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of the military advantages that Taiwan has historically enjoyed the context of a cross-Strait conflict.
  • To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
Categories
U.S. Government

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2020

Update, December 20, 2019

On this date, President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 into law (Public Law No: 116-92)

Update, December 19, 2019

On this date, Congress submitted the 2020 NDAA to the President for signature. The following Taiwan-related language was included in the final version of the bill:

Sec. 1260b. Report on Cybersecurity Activities with Taiwan

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the following:

(1) The feasibility of establishing a high-level, interagency United States-Taiwan working group for coordinating responses to emerging issues related to cybersecurity.
(2) A discussion of the Department of Defense’s current and future plans to engage with Taiwan in cybersecurity activities.
(3) A discussion of obstacles encountered in forming, executing, or implementing agreements with Taiwan for cybersecurity activities.
(4) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines should be included.

Sec. 1260c. Review and Report Related to the Taiwan Relations Act.

(a) REVIEW.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall conduct a review of—

(1) whether, and the means by which, as applicable, the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party are affecting, including through military, economic, information, digital, diplomatic, or any other form of coercion—
(A) the security, or the social and economic system, of the people of Taiwan;
(B) the military balance of power between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan; or
(C) the expectation that the future of Taiwan will continue to be determined by peaceful means; and
(2) the role of United States policy toward Taiwan with respect to the implementation of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

(b) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the review under subsection (a).
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED. The report under paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) The assessments resulting from the review.
(B) Recommendations on legislative changes or Department of Defense or Department of State policy changes necessary to ensure that the United States continues to meets its obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) S. 1790—484
(C) Guidelines for—
(i) new defense requirements, including requirements relating to information and digital space;
(ii) exchanges between senior-level civilian and military officials of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) the regular transfer of defense articles, especially defense articles that are mobile, survivable, and cost effective, to most effectively deter attacks and support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 1260D. Sense of Congress on Enhancement of the United States-Taiwan Defense Relationship.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Taiwan is a vital partner of the United States and is critical to a free and open Indo-Pacific region;
(2) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the “Six Assurances” are both cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan;
(3) the United States should continue to strengthen defense and security cooperation with Taiwan to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(4) consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the United States should strongly support the acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, defensive naval mining, and resilient command and control capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan;
(5) the President and Congress should determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, as required by the Taiwan Relations Act and in accordance with procedures established by law;
(6) the United States should continue efforts to improve the predictability of United States arms sales to Taiwan by ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(7) the Secretary of Defense should promote policies concerning exchanges that enhance the security of Taiwan, including—

(A) opportunities with Taiwan for practical training and military exercises that—
(i) enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self defense capability, as described in section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(a)); and
(ii) emphasize capabilities consistent with the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan; S. 1790—485
(B) exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135), especially for the purpose of enhancing cooperation on defense planning and improving the interoperability of United States and Taiwan forces; and
(C) opportunities for exchanges between junior officers and senior enlisted personnel of the United States and Taiwan;

(8) the United States and Taiwan should expand cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
(9) the Secretary of Defense should consider options, including exercises and ship visits, as appropriate, to expand the scale and scope of humanitarian assistance and disaster response cooperation with Taiwan and other regional partners so as to improve disaster response planning and preparedness; and
(10) the Secretary of Defense should continue regular transits of United States Navy vessels through the Taiwan Strait, commend the armed forces of France for their April 6, 2019, legal transit of the Taiwan Strait, and encourage allies and partners to follow suit in conducting such transits, in order to demonstrate the commitment of the United States and its allies and partners to fly, sail, and operate anywhere international law allows.

SEC. 5513. Report on Efforts by People’s Republic Of China to Influence Election in Taiwan.

(a) REPORT.—

Consistent with section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, not later than 45 days after the date of the election for the President and Vice President of Taiwan in 2020, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on any—
(1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine such election; and
(2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such operations.

(b) ELEMENTS.—

The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of any significant efforts by the intelligence community to coordinate technical and material support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1).
(2) A description of any efforts by the United States Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external efforts that degrade a free and fair election process.
(3) An assessment of whether and to what extent China conducted influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1), and, if such operations occurred—
(A) a comprehensive list of specific governmental and nongovernmental entities of China that were involved in supporting such operations and a description of the role of each such entity; and
(B) an identification of any tactics, techniques, and procedures used in such operations.

(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Update, December 17, 2019

On this date, the conference report, reconciling the House and Senate versions of the bill, was filed. The conference report was agreed to in the House on December 11, 2019 and in the Senate on December 17, 2019.

The conference report notes:

Report on cybersecurity activities with Taiwan (sec. 1260B)
The House amendment contained a provision (sec. 1250G) that would direct, not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on cybersecurity activities with Taiwan.

The Senate bill contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes.

Review and report related to the Taiwan Relations Act (sec. 1260C)
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 6211) that would express the sense of the Congress concerning the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8). The provision would also direct the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to conduct a review of coercive behavior by the Government of the People’s Republic of China directed at Taiwan, as well as the role of United States policy toward Taiwan with respect to the implementation of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The provision would direct a report to be delivered to the appropriate committees of Congress on the results of the review.

The House amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes with an amendment that would make clarifying changes to the content of the required report.

Sense of Congress on enhancement of the United States-Taiwan defense relationship (sec. 1260D)
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 1257) that would express the sense of the Senate concerning the enhancement of the United States-Taiwan defense relationship.

The House amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 1248).

The House recedes with an amendment that would express the sense of the Congress that Taiwan is a vital partner of the United States, and that the United States should continue to strengthen defense and security cooperation in support of Taiwan maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. In light of the fortieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), the conferees encourage the Department of Defense to focus attention and resources on the future of the United States-Taiwan defense relationship, particularly in relation to implementation of the National Defense Strategy and strategic competition with China.

Implementation of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act with regard to Taiwan arms sales
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 6212) that would, among other things, express the sense of the Congress that the United States should fully implement the provisions of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) with regard to regular defensive arms sales to Taiwan.

The House amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes.

The conferees note that the matter of arms sales to Taiwan is addressed elsewhere in this report.

Update, July 12, 2019

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2020 by Yea/Nay Vote of 220-197.  Several Taiwan-related initiatives were included. The bill now awaits reconciliation.

Update, June 27, 2019

On June 27, 2019, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2020 by Yea/Nay Vote of 86-8.

The U.S. Senate adopted multiple provisions for enhancing the defense and security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan.

Update, June 11, 2019

The NDAA, as S.1790, was introduced in the U.S. Senate on June 11, 2019.

Update, May 2, 2019

The NDAA, as H.R.2500, was introduced in the House on May 2, 2019.