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Featured U.S. Government

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2025

Update, May 31, 2024

On this date, the House Committee on Armed Services reported (amended) the NDAA with the United States House of Representatives.

The reported version included several Taiwan provisions:

Logistical Requirements to Deliver F-16 Block 70/72 Fighter Aircraft to Taiwan
The committee is concerned about delays in F-16 Block 70/72 Fighter Aircraft Foreign Military Sales deliveries to Taiwan. Originally intended to be delivered in 2025/2026 the 66 F-16 Block 70/72 Fighter Aircraft are now expected to be delivered in 2026/2027. On top of these delays, the logistical requirements to ensure these deliveries occur are complex.
Therefore, the committee directs the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, in coordination with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than December 1, 2025, on the logistical and tactical plan to deliver these fighter aircraft to Taiwan. The briefing should cover:
(1) the plan for in-flight refueling of the F-16 Block 70/72 Fighter Aircraft en route to Taiwan, including the number and type of refueling tankers required and the number of times the F-16 Block 70/72 Fighter Aircraft will need to be refueled while in flight; and
(2) any variables that could further delay delivery of the aircraft to Taiwan including new technology integration and modification.

United States and Taiwan Cooperation
The committee supports U.S. cooperation with Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. The committee commends efforts to enable Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities in an effort to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan cooperation. The oceanic global commons, including the Taiwan Strait, are significant to global commerce, and the stability of the western Pacific region is vital to the economic stability of the world. United States cooperation with Taiwan supports maintenance of this stability. Accordingly, the committee encourages the Department of Defense to continue to advise and to train with Taiwan’s defense forces and to leverage other engagements in the Indo-Pacific theater that will support U.S. cooperation with Taiwan. The committee also supports current and future Foreign Military Sales of defense articles to Taiwan and to other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Sales of U.S. equipment such as the Harpoon missile and other items will contribute to credible deterrence of competitors attempting to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region.


Update, April 18, 2024

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2025 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as H.R.8070. The NDAA was introduced as the “Service Member Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024.” It was then referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

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Upcoming Events

September 22-24, 2024 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2024

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2024

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2024
September 22-24, 2024
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

www.taiwandefenseconference.com

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2024 will be held September 22-24, 2024 at the Logan Hotel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This event will be held in person only. This will be the 23rd annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website is at www.taiwandefenseconference.com.

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Featured U.S. Government

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2024

Update, December 22, 2023

On this date, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023.

The bill became Public Law No: 118-31 and contained several Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1301. Sense of Congress on Defense Alliances and Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific Region.
(6) strengthening the United States partnership with Taiwan, consistent with the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), and the Six Assurances, with the goal of improving Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and promoting peaceful cross-strait relations;

SEC. 1307. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States’ one China policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. et seq.), the Three Communiques between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982, is the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, including by –
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of– (i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning; (ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and (iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) cooperating with Taiwan to improve its ability to employ military capabilities in asymmetric ways, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should increase its support to a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC 1309. Training, Advising, and Institutional Capacity-Building Program for Military Forces of Taiwan.
(a) Establishment.–Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and pursuant to section 5504 of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (22 U.S.C. 3353), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with appropriate officials of Taiwan, shall establish a comprehensive training, advising, and institutional capacity-building program for the military forces of Taiwan using the authorities provided in chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code, and other applicable statutory authorities available to the Secretary of Defense.

SEC. 1518. Military Cybersecurity Cooperation with Taiwan
(a) Requirement.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in coordination with the Commander of the United States Cyber Command and the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall seek to engage with appropriate officials of Taiwan for the purpose of cooperating with the military forces of Taiwan on defensive military cybersecurity activities.

(b) Identification of Activities. –In cooperating on defensive military cybersecurity activities with the military forces of Taiwan under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense may carry out efforts to identify cooperative activities to–
(1) defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
(2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
(3) leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and
(4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.

(c) Briefings.
(1) Requirement.–Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the implementation of this section.
(2) Contents.–The briefing under paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A description of the feasibility and advisability of cooperating with the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan on the defensive military cybersecurity activities identified pursuant to subsection (b). (B) An identification of any challenges and resources that would be needed to addressed to conduct such cooperative activities. (C) An overview of efforts undertaken pursuant to this section. (D) Any other matters the Secretary determines relevant.

(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined. —In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means–
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 7407. Independent Study on Economic Impact of Military Invasion of Taiwan by People’s Republic of China.
(a) Requirement. —Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall seek to enter into a contract with an eligible entity to conduct a comprehensive study on the global economic impact of a military invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China or certain other aggressive or coercive actions taken by the People’s Republic of China with respect to Taiwan.

(b) Matters Included. —The study required under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the economic impact globally, in the United States, and in the People’s Republic of China that would result from an invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China under various potential invasion and response scenarios, including with respect to the impact on–(A) supply chains; (B) trade flows; (C) financial markets; (D) sovereign debt; and (E) gross domestic product, unemployment, and other key economic indicators.
(2) An assessment of the economic impact globally, in the United States, and in the People’s Republic of China that would result from of an aggressive or coercive military, economic, or other action taken by the People’s Republic of China with respect to Taiwan that falls short of an invasion, including as a result of a blockade of Taiwan.
(3) The development of economic policy options, to include sanctions and supply chain restrictions, designed to cause escalating impacts on the economy of the People’s Republic of China during a pre-conflict phase.

(c) Report. —
(1) In general.–Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the eligible entity that the Director of National Intelligence enters into an agreement with under subsection (a) shall submit to the Director a report containing the results of the study conducted under such subsection.
(2) Submission to congress.–Not later than 30 days after the date the Director receives the report under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit the report to– (A) the congressional intelligence committees; (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(3) Form of report. –The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(d) Eligible Entity Defined. –In this section, the term “eligible entity” means a federally funded research and development center or nongovernmental entity which has–
(1) a primary focus on studies and analysis;
(2) experience and expertise relevant to the study required under subsection (a); and
(3) a sufficient number of personnel with the appropriate security clearance to conduct such study.


Update, December 14, 2023

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives agreed on the Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2670. The House moved on motion to suspend the rules and agree to the conference report (2/3 required) by a Yea/Nay vote of 310-118.

The NDAA 2024 now goes to the President’s desk to be signed.


Update, December 13, 2023

On this date, the U.S. Senate agreed on the Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2670 by a Yea/Nay vote of 87-13. The report now goes to the House of Representatives chamber for a vote.


Update, December 7, 2023

On this date, the Conference Committee released the reconciled fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (as Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2670). The report now goes to the Senate and House chambers for a final vote.


Update, July 27, 2023

On this date, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (as S.2226) by a Yea/Nay vote of 86-11. The bill now goes to Conference Committee for reconciliation of the two versions (House and Senate).


Update, July 14, 2023

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (as H.R.2670) by a Yea/Nay vote of 219-210.


Update, July 11, 2023

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee filed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA) with the United States Senate as S. 2226. The action was led by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) and Ranking Member Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS).

The filed text had several Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1242. Training, Advising, And Institutional Capacity-Building Program For Military Forces Of Taiwan.
(a) Establishment.—Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title LV of Public Law 117–263), the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with appropriate officials of Taiwan, shall establish a comprehensive training, advising, and institutional capacity building program for the military forces of Taiwan using the authorities provided in chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code, and other applicable statutory authorities available to the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Purposes.—The purposes of the program established under subsection (a) shall be—
(1) to enable a layered defense of Taiwan by the military forces of Taiwan, including in support of the use of an asymmetric defense strategy;
(2) to enhance interoperability between the United States Armed Forces and the military forces of Taiwan;
(3) to encourage information sharing between the United States Armed Forces and the military forces of Taiwan;
(4) to promote joint force employment; and
(5) to improve professional military education and the civilian control of the military.

(c) Elements.—The program established under subsection (a) shall include efforts to improve—
(1) the tactical proficiency of the military forces of Taiwan;
(2) the operational employment of the military forces of Taiwan to conduct a layered defense of Taiwan, including in support of an asymmetric defense strategy;
(3) the employment of joint military capabilities by the military forces of Taiwan, including through joint military training, exercises, and planning;
(4) the reform and integration of the reserve military forces of Taiwan;
(5) the use of defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan;
(6) the integration of the military forces of Taiwan with relevant civilian agencies, including the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency;
(7) the ability of Taiwan to participate in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, as appropriate;
(8) the defensive cyber capabilities and practices of the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan; and
(9) any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers relevant.

(d) Deconfliction, Coordination, And Concurrence.—The Secretary of Defense shall deconflict, coordinate, and seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant departments and agencies with respect to activities carried out under the program required by subsection (a), in accordance with the requirements of the authorities provided in chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code, and other applicable stat tory authorities available to the Secretary of Defense.

(e) Reporting.—As part of each annual report on Taiwan defensive military capabilities and intelligence support required by section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81; 135 Stat. 1988), the Secretary of Defense shall provide—
(1) an update on efforts made to address each element under subsection (c); and
(2) an identification of any authority or resource shortfall that inhibits such efforts.

SEC. 1247. Extension And Modification Of Certain Temporary Authorizations.
(a) In General.—Section 1244 of the James M.Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (Public Law 117–236; 136 Stat. 2844) is amended—
(1) in the section heading, by striking “OTHER MATTERS” and inserting “TAIWAN”; and
(2) in subsection (a)— (A) in paragraph (1)— (i) in subparagraph (B), by inserting “or the Government of Taiwan” after “the Government of Ukraine”; and (ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting “or the Government of Taiwan” after “the Government of Ukraine”; (B) in paragraph (5)— (i) by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following: “(A) the replacement of defense articles from stocks of the Department of Defense provided to—“(i) the Government of Ukraine; “(ii) foreign countries that have provided support to Ukraine at the request of the United States; “(iii) the Government of Taiwan; or “(iv) foreign countries that have provided support to Taiwan at the request of the United States; or”; and (ii) in subparagraph (B), by inserting “or the Government of Taiwan” before the period at the end; (C) in paragraph (7), by striking “September 30, 2024” and inserting “September 30,2028”; (D) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and (E) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new paragraph (7): “(7) Notification.—Not later than 7 days after the exercise of authority under subsection (a) the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of the specific authority exercises, the relevant contract, and the estimated reductions in schedule.’’.

(b) Clerical Amendments.—
(1) The table of contents at the beginning of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–236; 136 Stat. 2395) is amended by striking the item relating to section 1244 and inserting the following: “Sec. 1244. Temporary authorizations related to Ukraine and Taiwan.” (2) The table of contents at the beginning of title XII of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–236; 136 Stat. 2820) is amended by striking the item relating to section 1244 and inserting the following: “Sec. 1244. Temporary authorizations related to Ukraine and Taiwan.”

SEC. 1252. Military Cybersecurity Cooperation With Taiwan.
(a) Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in coordination with the Commander of the United States Cyber Command and the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall seek to engage with appropriate officials of Taiwan for the purpose of expanding cooperation on military cybersecurity activities using the authorities under chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code, and other applicable statutory authorities available to the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Cooperation Efforts.—In expanding the cooperation of military cybersecurity activities between the Department of Defense and the military forces of Taiwan under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense may carry out efforts—
(1) to actively defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
(2) to eradicate malicious cyber activity that has compromised such networks, infrastructure, and systems;
(3) to leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such networks, infrastructure, and systems; and
(4) to conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.

(c) Briefings.—
(1) Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the implementation of this section.
(2) Contents.—The briefing under paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A description of the feasibility and advisability of expanding the cooperation on military cybersecurity activities between the Department of Defense and the military forces of Taiwan. (B) An identification of any challenges and resources that need to be addressed so as to expand such cooperation. (C) An overview of efforts undertaken pursuant to this section. (D) Any other matter the Secretary considers relevant.

(d) Appropriate Committees Of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 1255. Report On Range Of Consequences Of War With The People’s Republic Of China
(a) In General.—Not later than December 1, 2024, the Director of the Office of Net Assessment shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the range of geopolitical and economic consequences of a United States-People’s Republic of China conflict in 2030.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall
(1) account for potential—… (D) impacts on the civilian populations of Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region …

SEC. 1260. Semiannual Briefings On Military Of The People’s Republic Of China.
(a) In General.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter through March 30, 2027, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on—
(1) the military activities of the People’s Republic of China with respect to Taiwan and the South China Sea;
(2) efforts by the Department of Defense to engage with the People’s Liberation Army; and
(3) United States efforts to enable the defense of Taiwan and bolster maritime security in the South China Sea.

(b) Elements.—Each briefing required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An update on— (A) military developments of the People’s Republic of China relating to any possible Taiwan or South China Sea contingency, including upgrades to the weapon systems of the People’s Republic of China, the procurement of new weapons by the People’s Republic of China, and changes to the posture of the People’s Liberation Army; (B) military equipment acquired by Taiwan pursuant to the Presidential drawdown authority under section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)) or through the direct commercial sales or foreign military sales processes; (C) United States efforts to deter aggression by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region, including any campaigning or exercise activities conducted by the United States; and (D) United States efforts to train the military forces of Taiwan and allies and partners in Southeast Asia.
(2) The most recent information regarding the readiness of or preparations by the People’s Liberation Army to potentially conduct aggressive military action against Taiwan.
(3) A description of any military activity carried out during the preceding quarter by the People’s Republic of China in the vicinity of Taiwan.
(4) A description of engagements by Department of Defense officials with the People’s Liberation Army, including with respect to maintaining open lines of communication, establishing crisis management capabilities, and deconfliction of military activities.
(5) Any other matter the Secretary considers relevant.

SEC. 1266. Assessment Of Absorptive Capacity Of Military Forces Of Taiwan.
(a) Report.—
(1) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the absorptive capacity of the military forces of Taiwan for military capabilities provided and approved by the United States for delivery to Taiwan in the last 10 years, including the date of projected or achieved initial and full operational capabilities.
(2) Briefing Requirement.—Not later than 30 days after the delivery of the required report, the Secretary shall provide a briefing on the report to the appropriate committees of Congress.
(3) Form.—The required report shall be provided in classified form with an unclassified cover letter.

(b) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) Absorptive Capacity.—The term “absorptive capacity” means the capacity of the recipient unit to achieve initial operational capability, including to operate, maintain, sustain, deploy, and employ to operational effect, a defense article or service for its intended end-use.
(2) Appropriate Committees Of Congress.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 1267. Analysis Of Risks And Implications Of Potential Sustained Military Blockade Of Taiwan By The People’s Republic Of China.
(a) Analysis Required.
(1) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall complete a comprehensive analysis of the risks and implications of a sustained military blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China.
(2) Elements.—The analysis required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) An assessment of the means by which the People’s Republic of China could execute a sustained military blockade of Taiwan, including the most likely courses of action through which the People’s Republic of China could accomplish such a blockade. (B) An identification of indications and warnings of a potential sustained military blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, and the likely timelines for such indications and warnings. (C) An identification of other coercive actions the People’s Republic of China may potentially take before or independently of such a blockade, including the seizure of outlying islands of Taiwan. (D) An assessment of the impact of such a blockade on the ability of Taiwan to sustain its military capabilities, economy, and population. (E) An assessment of threats to, and other potential negative impacts on, the United States homeland during such a blockade scenario. (F) An assessment of key military operational problems presented by such a blockade. (G) An assessment of the concept-required military capabilities necessary to address the problems identified under subparagraph (F). (H) An assessment of challenges to escalation management. (I) An assessment of military or nonmilitary options to counter or retaliate against such a blockade or the seizure of outlying islands of Taiwan, including through horizontal escalation. (J) An assessment of the extent to which such a blockade is addressed by the Joint Warfighting Concept and Joint Concept for Competing. (K) An identification of necessary changes to United States Armed Forces force design, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for responding to or mitigating the impact of such a blockade. (L) An assessment of the role of United States partners and allies in addressing the threats and challenges posed by a such a potential blockade. (M) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers relevant.

(b) Interagency Engagement.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall seek to engage with the head of any other appropriate Federal department or agency—
(1) regarding the threats and challenges posed by a potential sustained military blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China; and
(2) to better understand potential options for a response by the United States Government to such a blockade.

(c) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a classified report—
(1) on the assessment required by paragraph (1) of subsection (a), including all elements described in paragraph (2) of that subsection; and
(2) the interagency engagements conducted under subsection (b).

(d) Appropriate Committees Of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.


Update, June 30, 2023

On this date, the House Committee on Armed Services reported their amended version of the NDAA 2024 with the United States House of Representatives.

The reported version included several Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1070. Plan for Taiwan Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
(a) Plan.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall maintain a sufficient evacuation plan that is suitable for execution as a noncombatant evacuation operations plan or any other evacuation mission conducted by the Department of Defense from Taiwan.

(b) Annual Review and Update.—On an annual basis, the Secretary of Defense shall—
(1) review the plan required under subsection (a)and update such plan as the Secretary determines necessary; and
(2) submit to Congress certification that the plan is either sufficient or needs to be updated.

(c) Congressional Briefings.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities shall provide to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives an unclassified and classified briefing on the plan required under subsection (a).

SEC. 1304. Sense Of Congress On Taiwan Defense Relations.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, including by—
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of — (i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning; (ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and; (iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) cooperating with Taiwan to improve its ability to employ military capabilities in asymmetric ways, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should increase its support to a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC. 1305. Briefing On Multi-Year Plan To Fulfill Defensive Requirements Of Military Forces Of Taiwan.
(a) Briefing Required.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the status of the efforts to develop and implement the joint multi-year plan to fulfill defensive requirements of military forces of Taiwan required under section 5506 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263; 22 U.S.C. 3355).

(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 1309. Expansion Of International Technology Focused Partnerships And Experimentation Activities In The Indo-Pacific.
(a) Establishment.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan and roadmap to—
….
(3) identify and accelerate the fielding of new capabilities and critical technologies that would improve Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities…

SEC. 1505. Military Cybersecurity Cooperation With Taiwan.
(a) Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in concurrence with the Secretary of State and in coordination with the Commander of the United States Cyber Command and the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall seek to cooperate with the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan on defensive military cybersecurity activities.

(b) Identification of Activities.—In cooperating on defensive military cybersecurity activities with the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense may carry out efforts to identify cooperative activities to—
(1) defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
(2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems;
(3) leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and
(4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.

(c) Briefings.
(1) Requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the implementation of this section.
(2) Contents.—The briefing under paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A description of the feasibility and advisability of cooperating with the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan on the defensive military cybersecurity activities identified pursuant to subsection (b); (B) An identification of any challenges and resources that would be needed to addressed to conduct such cooperative activities; (C) An overview of efforts undertaken pursuant to this section; (D) Any other matters the Secretary determines relevant.

(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined. —In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.


Update, June 23, 2023

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee completed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 .

The executive summary of the draft bill included Taiwan as an important priority:

Major Highlights:
(1) Supports the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, including defending the U.S.
homeland; deterring adversaries; prevailing in long-term strategic competition; and
building a resilient Joint Force:

– Establishes a comprehensive training, advising, and institutional
capacity-building program for the military forces of Taiwan.

Strengthening U.S. Posture in the Indo-Pacific Region
– Establishes a comprehensive training, advising, and institutional
capacity-building program for the military forces of Taiwan.
– Requires engagement with appropriate officials of Taiwan for the purpose of
expanding cooperation on military cybersecurity activities.


Update, June 22, 2023

On this date, the House Armed Services Committee finished its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024.

The summary of the committee’s draft version included support for Taiwan:

Support for Taiwan and Pacific Allies:
– Reaffirms U.S. support to the defense of Taiwan.
– Authorizes U.S. Special Operations Forces to continue training Taiwan and other partner nations in resisting the aggression and malign influence from China.
– Fully funds military exercises with our allies and partners in the Pacific to counter China’s growing reach.
– Strengthens military cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan.
– Encourages the expansion of local military acquisition agreements with Pacific Island nations to improve bilateral relationships and counter the CCP’s increased presence and activity.
– Improves the training and development of the security cooperation workforce to expedite the delivery of Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan and other partners.


Update, April 18, 2023

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as H.R.2670. It was then referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

For the 2023 version of this post, see Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2023

Categories
Featured News U.S. Government

2023 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on China’s military power. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2023 report.

The Taiwan language in the previous year’s report (2022) is available here: 2022 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

Selected Taiwan Language

Eastern Theater Command

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the ECS.
  • The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of a Taiwan Invasion.
  • The Eastern Theater Command was responsible for executing the PLA’s large-scale joint exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan in August 2022.

The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the ECS and likely executes operational control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. During 2022, the Eastern Theater Command maintained focus on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified civilian ferries to help augment transportation.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

  • In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. The PLA’s increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait included ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan.
  • At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as an option.
  • The PLA practiced elements of each of its military courses of action against Taiwan during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States.

Throughout 2022, the PRC conducted large-scale joint military exercises focused on training to deter further U.S. and allied operations along China’s periphery. Many of these exercises focused on combat realism and have featured night missions, training in extreme weather, and simultaneous multi-domain operations. The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived as necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration and signal its displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, the PRC has persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency. Throughout 2022, the PLA increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, significantly increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared air defense identification zone, and conducted a series of large-scale military exercises around Taiwan.

  • According to Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) data, the PLA sent a total of 1,737 aircraft in Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2022. This is a 79 percent increase from 972 incursions in 2021.
  • Throughout 2022, the PLA also diversified the type of aircraft it sent into Taiwan’s ADIZ.

Since September 2022, when the Taiwan MND began releasing information on UAV operations in the ADIZ, UAVs have made up around 10 percent of aircraft tracked. At the 20 th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as an option. Additionally, the CCP amended its constitution to reaffirm that it will resolutely oppose and deter Taiwan independence. The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicted it would consider the use of force has evolved over time. These circumstances have included the following:

  • Formal declaration of Taiwan’s independence
  • Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence
  • Internal unrest in Taiwan
  • Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
  • Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue on unification
  • Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

PLA Aircraft Entering Taiwan ADIZ

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan increased in 2022, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House CODEL to Taiwan in August 2022, Beijing released a new Taiwan white paper, which was the third paper issued by Beijing since 1993. The content of the white paper appears consistent with familiar talking points from Beijing, albeit with a more pointed tone. It highlights that unification is foundational to the PRC’s “national rejuvenation,” Beijing’s preference for peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework, and a refusal to renounce the use of force to compel reunification, if needed.

Unlike the previous Taiwan white paper (released in 2000), this iteration explicitly calls out Taiwan’s ruling Democratic People’s Party for “having adopted a separatist stance,” and features heavier criticism on “external interference” by singling out the United States. The paper further asserts that all U.S. “interference” in Taiwan is guided by a strategy to use Taiwan as a “pawn” in an effort to contain China. The PRC continues to suspend formal communications with Taiwan, which began in 2016, and remains steadfast that Taiwan must accept the PRC’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart such engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to the PRC’s “One China principle,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

Consistent U.S. Defense Engagement with Taiwan

In response to U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan, Beijing routinely accuses the United States of not abiding by its One China principle. U.S. defense engagements with Taiwan, as one element of the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship, remain consistent with our one China policy – as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan has evolved over time in response to the PRC’s capacity and willingness to use military coercion against Taiwan. This evolution does not contradict publicly-stated U.S. policy, and it is in fact required by U.S. policy.

The 1979 TRA states that the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In 1982, President Reagan clarified in an internal memo—which the United States made public in 2019—that the quantity and quality of U.S. defense assistance provided to Taiwan be “conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.” President Reagan further emphasized that this linkage is intended as a “permanent imperative” of foreign policy.

The United States opposes unilateral changes to the cross-Strait status quo by either side; does not support Taiwan independence; and expects cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means. United States defense engagement with Taiwan’s will continue to bolster these positions and be conditioned entirely on the evolving threat posed by the PRC and the interests of the people of Taiwan, as enumerated in U.S. policy.

PLA Response to High-Profile Visit to Taiwan by Foreign Figures

Throughout 2022, the PRC continued to respond to high-level foreign visits to Taiwan with low-level military drills near Taiwan, typically including Taiwan Strait centerline crossings, increased PLA Navy activity around Taiwan, and public statements condemning the visits. In stark contrast, the PLA responded in early August 2022 to the CODEL visit to Taiwan with significantly larger-scale military activities that included several unprecedented actions. The Eastern Theater Command conducted snap military drills that included PLA aviation flying more than 250 fighter aircraft into Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and 13 PLA Navy vessels operating around Taiwan. The PLARF fired multiple ballistic missiles into impacts zones in waters around Taiwan, including the first-seen instance of at least four missiles overflying Taiwan. These military drills also afforded the PLA an opportunity to train simulated joint blockade and simulated joint firepower strike operations.

PRC Military Courses of Action against Taiwan

Although Beijing reaffirms that “peaceful reunification” is its preferred course of action, the PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could increasingly signal its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a range of cyberspace, blockade, and kinetic campaigns designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the PRC’s terms. In any case, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement.

The PLA could offer Xi the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities associated risk. The PRC’s perception of domestic and international receptivity to military action, the expected impact on its economy of resulting sanctions, political trends in Taiwan, and its level of confidence in the PLA’s capability to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan will determine which military option the PRC chooses during crises. The PLA practiced elements of each of these military options during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing- wen’s transit of the United States.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely would complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent EW, network attacks, and IO to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA SOF could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize its leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Amphibious Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent Taiwan’s shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island.

The PLA continues to test new options to force unification. In October 2022, seven Chinese civilian car ferries, under CMM, participated in amphibious landing drills on Chinese beaches in the Taiwan Strait. In August 2022, in response to the U.S. Speaker of the House CODEL to Taiwan, the PLA conducted joint exercises focusing on establishing air, maritime, and information superiority. The exercise consisted of joint air and maritime activities to the north, southwest, and southeast of Taiwan, focused on establishing air dominance, according to Eastern media reporting.

A large-scale amphibious invasion would be one of the most complicated and difficult military operations for the PLA, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. It would likely strain the PRC’s armed forces and invite a strong international response. These factors, combined with inevitable force attrition, the complexity of urban warfare, and potential for an insurgency, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi and the CCP, even assuming a successful landing and breakout past Taiwan beachhead defenses.

Small Island Seizure. The PLA also is capable of attempting various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the SCS, such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island, such as Matsu or Kinmen, is also within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

Civilian Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO) Ships and Their Potential Use in a Taiwan Invasion

The lack of significant PLA amphibious ship buildup does not independently reflect a PLA deficiency toward building a military option to take Taiwan by force, but rather, is consistent with the PRC’s exploratory approach to testing multi-dimensional Taiwan seizure concepts.

In 2015, China’s official media reported that all future builds of five categories of civilian vessels had to be built to “national defense requirements” including container ships, RORO ferries, multipurpose vessels, bulk carriers, and break bulk ships. In 2019, images emerged on Chinese state television that at least one of its RORO ferries had been modified with a ramp to allow amphibious vehicles to disembark at sea suggesting these ferries could be used to deliver first echelon forces without requiring prior seizure of a pier. By demonstrating intent to use commercial ROROs during an amphibious invasion, the PLA is eroding the principle of distinction under the law of armed conflict and obscuring crucial lines between warships and non-warships, civilians and combatants, and civilian objects and military objectives. In a similar state media disclosure, images emerged in 2021 showing that China had modified a flat deck container vessel to function as a landing platform helicopter (LPH) or as an expeditionary transfer dock (ESD); such modification could serve as a mid-way refueling point for helicopters returning from delivering air assault forces to Taiwan or enable PLA helicopters to transport forward stocks of logistics ashore.

Although China has not officially revealed the size of its civilian fleet or how it plans to use it during an invasion, 2019 information indicated the PLA have at least 63 civilian ROROs suitable for military operations. Subsequent information from one Chinese province indicates as many as 64 civilian ROROs would be made available to the PLA in wartime and that these platforms would be equipped with weapons as part of the mobilization process. Some public estimates suggest that China’s use of its dual-capable civilian fleet could provide it greater displacement tonnage than the sum of all of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ships.

In 2022, the PLA significantly stepped up RORO training to support China’s military activities by more than doubling the number of ROROs used to support similar activity in the prior year. Although most of these events consisted of troop movements within or between theaters, several marked a continued maturation towards using ROROs and other civilian shipping to support PLA amphibious force employment against Taiwan. However, these events have not demonstrated the realism or requisite tactical proficiency to engage in wartime operations. This includes the absence of opposed landing operations in unfavorable weather conditions and sea states. It also includes a lack of RORO training to operate in convoys, conduct rapid disembarkation, and the offload of PLA forces at sea while underway.

Floating Causeway Improvement. During three events between May and July 2022, two Chinese civilian ROROs participated in docking evolutions with a new floating causeway system intended to allow ROROs to disembark forces onto a beach without seizing a port or being modified to discharge amphibious vehicles at sea. The causeway observed in 2022 featured several improvements over the one used in 2021 to include having six uniform self- propelled sections extendable to an additional 200 meters. The causeway system seems to rely on a semi-submersible barge to stabilize the causeway, which may limit its utility for a cross strait invasion. However, PLA naval writings stress the importance of floating causeways, especially those with wave attenuation capabilities, as one solution to dealing with Taiwan ports that might be inaccessible for off-loading operations in wartime.

Large-Volume Lift Exercise. From mid-July to mid-August, the PLA conducted large amphibious lift exercises along China’s Northern and Southern coast, using 12 civilian ships including eight large RORO ferries. The lift capacity, number of vessels stops, and the number of participating ground vehicles suggest this training could have simulated the movement of up to a full group army for the first time. The PLA also conducted a five-day loading/unloading exercise in September 2022 using six ROROs and three cargo ships to simulate the movement of a heavy combined arms brigade in a Taiwan invasion.

Denial and Deception Training. In August 2022, a PLAA air defense brigade exercise attempted to obscure observation of its loading onto a RORO in the Bohai Gulf. A PLA video showed the brigade entering a dock-side building where it hid for an undetermined period of time before loading onto a RORO using a tarp that extended from the building to the ship, likely intended to limit observation of their loading activity.

Austere Port Operations. In mid-August 2022, a single RORO supported the transport of roughly 40 vehicles from a portion of Dongshan Port that had little cargo handling infrastructure, no pier-side RORO ramp, and no tugboat support. This training suggests the PLA seeks the capability to operate from any intact pier, even ones without offloading infrastructure.

RORO Participation in PLAN Amphibious Forces. From August 31 st to September 2 nd , 2022, the PLA conducted its most complex use of civilian shipping for amphibious assault operation at Dacheng Bay and Honghai Bay in southern China. The exercise featured 10 civilian ships – including RORO ferries and RORO vehicle carriers – operating alongside PLAN amphibious ships, including at least one Type-071 LPD. The operations at Dacheng Bay made use of the new six-segment floating causeway, supported by a San Hong Gong submersible floating barge, which docked with at least one RORO ferry. ROROs in both exercise area off-loaded forces at sea, suggesting stern ramp modifications allowing for at-sea disembarkation are becoming more commonplace within the RORO fleet. One combined-arms amphibious brigade and one combined-armed amphibious battalion were believed to have been delivered as part of this exercise.

The PLA’s Current Posture for a Taiwan Conflict

PLAA. The PLAA has increased its posture in the Eastern Theater Command and along the Taiwan Strait, providing the PLAA with enhanced firepower, mobility, and rapid strike capabilities. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations. The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2022. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed that the PLA extensively used sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

PLAN. The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war and has increased its posture surrounding Taiwan since August 2022. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the FIC as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean- going LPD and LHA ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its number of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLAAF. The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. The PLAAF also has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention. Throughout 2022, Eastern Theater Command-based PLAAF units operated at higher levels than in previous years. Taiwan ADIZ incursions involved greater numbers of aircraft and were more frequent than in 2021, demonstrating the PLAAF’s improved ability to sustain pressure on Taiwan.

PLARF. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. As of 2023, the PLARF is increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an increasing number of deployed missiles.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL in August 2022, Taiwan’s MND claimed that China launched widespread cyber-attacks against Taiwan.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms. The JLSF participates in joint, theater-level exercises, becoming most relevant when units operate far from their home garrisons and beyond their organic logistics capabilities. 

Taiwan’s Ability to Deter the Mainland

Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to generate international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island by placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures.

In 2022, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the PRC’s forceful response to then-U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL to Taiwan in August increased the urgency with which Taiwan is pursuing defense reforms. The PRC’s response to the then-U.S. House Speaker’s visit accelerated the PRC’s ongoing military and gray zone activity toward Taiwan. The PRC’s actions likely intended to establish a new status quo and to place greater operational demands on Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s planned improvements only partially address its defense challenges, and a majority of Taiwan citizens believe that the then-Speaker’s visit and the PLA response were detrimental to Taiwan’s security.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active-duty billets. As of 2021, the MND had accomplished its goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitions to an all-volunteer force, the cost savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay. However, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness obstacles.

Reservists, conscripts, and civil defense volunteers support the volunteer active duty forces. Taiwan’s number of reserve personnel ranges from one to two million, while there are fewer than half a million conscripts. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization to improve the mobilization of reserves and civilians to support military operations. In 2022, Taiwan implemented this legislation by establishing the All Out Defense Mobilization Agency, which coordinates a whole-of-society approach to support military operations and disaster prevention and response. In December 2022, Taiwan announced that it would extend the duration of mandatory military conscription service from four months to one year and double conscripts’ monthly salary starting in 2024.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget to support defense acquisitions and strengthen its forces against Chinese pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense spending to be the highest level since 1990. In October 2022, Taiwan proposed total defense spending of about $19 billion for 2023, a 13.9 percent increase from 2022, which will represent about 2.4 percent of Taiwan’s GDP. In January 2022, Taiwan approved an $8 billion multi-year supplemental defense budget to strengthen Taiwan’s air and sea combat capabilities. Over half of Taiwan’s supplemental defense spending will fund missile corvettes and anti-ship weapons, such as the Hsiung Feng missile system. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow to around $230 billion in 2022, about 12 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of China’s defense budget focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force.

Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Specific areas of emphasis in Taiwan’s strategy include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems, domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters and producing the remaining three of a previously planned four transport docks.

The United States maintains a one-China policy that is based on the TRA, the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances; opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo; and continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace acceptable to both sides. Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Since 2009 Taiwan has received about $30 billion in arms sales from the United States. Taiwan currently has arms sales agreements to acquire Stinger missiles, Javelins, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, Harpoon missiles, and F-16 fighter jets.

Categories
Analysis & Commentary Featured Taiwan Government

Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) Reports

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) occasionally publishes reports on the status of the military and national security in Taiwan.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

The Amendment to Article 31 of the National Defense Act passed by the Legislative Yuan on July 17, 2008 mandates the MND to submit a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) within ten months after every new president takes office in order to review and confirm defense strategy and military strategy, and provide a vision for future development.

The Taiwan Quadrennial Defense Review publications are available at www.mnd.gov.tw. Follow links to the MND publication page.

Quadrennial Defense Review 2009

Published in March, 2009

Quadrennial Defense Review 2013

Published in March, 2013

Quadrennial Defense Review 2017

Published in March, 2017

Quadrennial Defense Review 2021

Published in March, 2021

National Defense Report

The Ministry of National Defense is obligated to periodically report “what it has done, what it is doing, what it prepares to do, why it is going to do so” to the people in accordance with Article 30 of the National Defense Act. The National Defense Report is published to give citizens a better understanding of the nation’s current security environment and national defense policy.

For the Chinese language and comic book versions of these reports, and for all MND publications, see www.mnd.gov.tw. Follow links to the publication page.

National Defense Report 2002

Published July, 2002

National Defense Report 2006

Published August 14, 2006

National Defense Report 2008

Published May 13, 2008

National Defense Report 2009

Published October, 2009

National Defense Report 2011

Published July, 2011

National Defense Report 2013

Published October, 2013

National Defense Report 2015

Published October, 2015

National Defense Report 2017

Published December, 2017

National Defense Report 2019

Published September, 2019

National Defense Report 2021

Published November 9, 2021

National Defense Report 2023

Published September 12, 2023

Additional versions of these reports are also available at the Taiwan in Perspective’s “Complete Collection of Taiwan’s Defence Policy Documents” page.

Categories
Past Events

October 1-3, 2023 – US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2023

US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2023

Event: US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2023
October 1-3, 2023
Williamsburg, Virginia

www.taiwandefenseconference.com

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2023 will be held October 1-3, 2023 at the Williamsburg Lodge in Williamsburg, Virginia. This event will be held in person only. This will be the 22nd annual event in a series of ongoing conferences addressing the future of U.S. defense cooperation with Taiwan, the defense procurement process, and Taiwan’s defense and national security needs.

The US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference website is at www.taiwandefenseconference.com

Categories
Taiwan Government

MND Paper and Presentation: Taiwan Force Structure Adjustment for Enhancing All-Out Defense

Taiwan Force Structure Adjustment for Enhancing All-Out Defense
by
Horng-Huei “Alex” Po, Vice Minister of Defense (Policy), Ministry of National Defense


The US-Taiwan Business Council recently received copies of a paper and presentation on Force Structure Adjustment for Enhancing All-Out Defense, given by Horng-Huei “Alex” Po, the Vice Minister of Defense (Policy) at Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND).

Excerpt from the MND paper:

The shift of the conscription service from 4 months to one year is a big national policy. After assessing for two years, drawing experiences from the conscription system of democratic countries in the world, and considering national security, we will shift to the 1-year conscription service under the Military Service System Act. Starting from January 1st 2024, men who were born in 2005 will be drafted under the 1-year conscription service. After going through complete military training, they can take the responsibility to safeguard the homeland. We will continue to open for public opinions in order to make the adjustment perfect for the public. The shift also shows ROC’s resolution to stay steadfast in holding the value of freedom and democracy. We hope that the youth realize that it is every young Taiwanese’s glorious mission and obligation to protect their country. They need to rise to the challenge of military training with courage. We request every fellow citizen’s support so that we may ensure the sustainable development of the ROC and the well-being of the people of Taiwan.

The US-Taiwan Business Council is pleased to share these documents. Please see below:

Taiwan Force Structure Adjustment for Enhancing All-Out Defense – Presentation

Taiwan Force Structure Adjustment for Enhancing All-Out Defense – Paper

Categories
U.S. Government

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2023

Update, December 23, 2022

On this date, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023.


Update, December 15, 2022

On this date, the U.S. Senate passed the bipartisan, bicameral text of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 by a vote of 83-11.

The NDAA 2023 now goes to the President’s desk to be signed.


Update, December 8, 2022

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the bipartisan, bicameral text of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 by a vote of 350-80.


Update, December 6, 2022

On this date, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) jointly released the the text of an agreement reached on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. The NDAA now goes to the Senate and House for a vote.

The released text included multiple Taiwan provisions, including the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (see below selections from Subtitle A). A selection of the Taiwan provisions are reproduced below.

In summarizing these provisions, the HASC said:

Expresses congressional support for the U.S. defense relationship with Taiwan, requires additional measures to improve readiness related to Taiwan, and supports the use of joint military exercises with Taiwan, including the 2024 Rim of the Pacific exercise.

House Armed Services Committee (HASC)

Select Taiwan provisions

SEC.1263. Statement of Policy on Taiwan
(a)Statement of Policy. —Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.
(b)Fait Accompli Defined. —In this section, the term “fait accompli” refers to the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.

SEC.1264. Sense of Congress on Joint Exercises with Taiwan
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) joint military exercises with Taiwan are an important component of improving military readiness;

(2) the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command possesses the authority to carry outsuch joint military exercises, including those that—
(A) involve multiple warfare domains and exercise secure communications between the forces of the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners;
(B) incorporate the participation of multiple combatant and subordinate unified commands; and
(C) present complex military challenges, including the multi-domain capabilities of a capable adversary;

(3) the United States should seek to use existing authorities more effectively to improve the readiness of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and

(4) the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise, as appropriate, conducted in 2024.

SEC.1265. Sense of Congress on Defense Alliances and Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific Region
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should continue efforts that strengthen United States defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region so as to further the comparative advantage of the United States in strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China, including by—

(6) strengthening the United States partnership with Taiwan, consistent with the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), and the Six Assurances with the goal of improving Taiwan’s defensive military capabilities and promoting peaceful cross-strait relations;

Selection from Subtitle A—Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act:

SEC.5502. Modernizing Taiwan’s Security Capabilities to Deter and, if Necessary, Defeat Aggression by the People’s Republic of China.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Taiwan Security Programs.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall use the authorities under this section to strengthen the United States-Taiwan defense relationship, and to support the acceleration of the modernization of Taiwan’s defense capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8).

(c) Purpose.—In addition to the purposes otherwise authorized for Foreign Military Financing programs under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), a purpose of the Foreign Military Financing Program should be to provide assistance, including equipment, training, and other support, to build the civilian and defensive military capabilities of Taiwan—
(1) to accelerate the modernization of capabilities that will enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, anddeny attempts by People’s Liberation Army forces—(A) to conduct coercive or grey zone activities; (B) to blockade Taiwan; or (C) to secure a lodgment on any islands administered by Taiwan and expand or otherwise use such lodgment to seize control of a population center or other key territory in Taiwan; and
(2) to prevent the People’s Republic of China from decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing or rendering ineffective Taiwan’s civilian and defense leadership.

(d) Regional Contingency Stockpile.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to sub section (h), not more than $100,000,000 may be used during each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2032 to maintain a stockpile (if established pursuant to section 5503(b)), in accordance with section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h).

(e) Availability of Funds.—
(1) Annual Spending Plan.—Not later than March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a plan to the appropriate congressional committees describing how amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (h), if made available, would be used to achieve the purpose described in subsection (c).
(2) Certification.— (A) In General.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) are authorized to be made avail- able after the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, certifies not less than annually to the appropriate commit- tees of Congress that Taiwan has increased its defense spending relative to Taiwan’s defense spending in its prior fiscal year, which includes support for an asymmetric strategy, excepting accounts in Taiwan’s defense budget related to personnel expenditures, (other than military training and education and any funding related to the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency). (B) Waiver.—The Secretary of State may waive the certification requirement under sub-paragraph (A) if the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that for any given year— (i) Taiwan is unable to increase its defense spending relative to its defense spending in its prior fiscal year due to severe hardship; and (ii) making available the amounts authorized under subparagraph (A) is in the national interests of the United States.
(3) Remaining Funds. —Amounts authorized to be appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) that are not obligated and expended during such fiscal year shall be added to the amount that may be used for Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan in the subsequent fiscal year.

(f) Annual Report on Advancing the Defense of Taiwan.
(1) Initial Report. —Concurrently with the first certification required under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes steps taken to enhance the United States-Taiwan defense relation- ship and Taiwan’s modernization of its defense capabilities.
(2) Matters To Be Included. —Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) an assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to implement a military strategy that will deter and, if necessary, defeat military aggression by the People’s Republic of China, including the steps that Taiwan has taken and the steps that Taiwan has not taken towards such implementation;
(B) an assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and employ within its forces counter- intervention capabilities, including— (i) long-range precision fires; (ii) integrated air and missile defense systems; (iii) anti-ship cruise missiles; (iv) land-attack cruise missiles; (v) coastal defense; (vi) anti-armor; (vii) undersea warfare, including manned and unmanned systems; (viii) survivable swarming maritime assets; (ix) manned and unmanned aerial systems; (x) mining and countermining capabilities; (xi) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; (xii) command and control systems; (xiii) defensive cybersecurity capabilities; and (xiv) any other defense capabilities that the United States determines, including jointly with Taiwan, are crucial to the defense of Taiwan, consistent with the joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan created pursuant to section 5506;
(C) an evaluation of the balance between conventional and counter intervention capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of the date on which the report is submitted;
(D) an assessment of steps taken by Tai- wan to enhance the overall readiness of its defense forces, including— (i) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and providing regular and relevant training to such forces; (ii) the extent to which such training is realistic to the security environment that Taiwan faces; and (iii) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such forces;
(E) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to ensure that the Taiwan’s reserve forces and All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency can recruit, train, equip, and mobilize its forces; (iii) the efforts made by Taiwan to
address such shortages;
(F) an evaluation of— (i) the severity of manpower shortages in the military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces; (ii) the impact of such shortages in the event of a conflict scenario; and (iii) the efforts made by Taiwan to address such shortages;
(G) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to boost its civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to raise awareness among the population of Taiwan of the risks Taiwan faces;
(H) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to secure its critical infrastructure, including in transportation, telecommunications networks, satellite communications, and energy;
(I) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to enhance its cybersecurity, including the security and survivability of official civilian and military networks;
(J) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to improve the image and prestige of its defense forces among the population of Taiwan;
(K) an assessment of any significant gaps in any of the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J) with respect to which the United States assesses that additional action is needed;
(L) a description of cooperative efforts be-tween the United States and Taiwan on the matters described in subparagraphs (A)
through (K); and
(M) a description of any challenge in Taiwan to— (i) implement the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J); or (ii) United States support or engage ment with regard to such matters.
(3) Subsequent Reports.—Concurrently with subsequent certifications required under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit updates to the initial re- port required under paragraph (1) that provides a description of changes and developments that occurred in the prior year.
(4) Form.—The reports required under paragraphs (1) and (3) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(5) Sharing of Summary.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly share any unclassified portions of the reports, pursuant to paragraph (4), with Taiwan, as appropriate.

SEC.5503. Increase in Annual Regional Contingency Stockpile Additions and Support ForTaiwan.
(a) In General.—Section 514(b)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ‘‘$200,000,000’’ and all that follows and inserting ‘‘$500,000,000 for any of the fiscal years 2023, 2024, or 2025.’’.

(b) Establishment.—Subject to section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), the President may establish a regional contingency stockpile for Taiwan that consists of munitions and other appropriate defense articles.

(c) Inclusion of Taiwan Among Other Allies Eligible for Defense Articles.—Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) is amended—
(1) in section 514(c)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2321h(c)(2)), by inserting ‘‘Taiwan,’’ after ‘‘Thailand,’’;
(2) in section 516(c)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)), by inserting ‘‘to Taiwan,’’ after ‘‘major non-NATO allies on such southern and southeastern flank,’’

(d) Annual Briefing.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the President shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding the status of a regional contingency stockpile established under sub-section (b).

SEC.5504. International Military Education and Training Cooperation with Taiwan
(a) In General.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan designed to—
(1) enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations between the United States and Taiwan;
(2) enhance rapport and deepen partnership between the militaries of the United States and Taiwan, and foster understanding of the United States among individuals in Taiwan;
(3) improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities; and (4) train future leaders of Taiwan, promote professional military education, civilian control of the military, and protection of human rights.

(b) Elements.—The training program required by subsection (a) should prioritize relevant and realistic training, including as necessary joint United States-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale military exercises, and an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness and utilizing United States defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan.

(c) Authorization of Participation of Taiwan in the International Military Education and Training Program.—The Secretary of State is authorized to provide training and education to relevant entities in Taiwan through the International Military Education and Training program authorized under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 234 et seq).

SEC.5505. Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan.
(a) Drawdown Authority.—Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following paragraph: “(3) In addition to amounts already specified in this section, the President may direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, of an aggregate value of not to exceed $1,000,000,000 per fiscal year, to be provided to Taiwan.”

b) Emergency Authority.—Section 552(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “In addition to the aggregate value of $25,000,000 authorized in paragraph (2) of the preceding sentence, the President may direct the drawdown of commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the United States Government for the purposes of providing necessary and immediate assistance to Taiwan of a value not to exceed $25,000,000 in any fiscal year”.

(c) Use of Special Defense Acquisition Fund.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall seek to utilize the Special Defense Acquisition Fund established under chapter 5 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2795 et seq.) to expedite the procurement and delivery of defense articles and defense services for the purpose of assisting and supporting the armed forces of Taiwan.

SEC.5506. Multi-Year Plan to Fulfill Defensive Requirements of Military Forces of Taiwan.
(a) Multi-Year Plan.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall engage for the purposes of establishing a joint consultative mechanism with appropriate officials of Taiwan to develop and implement a multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined training, exercises, and planning activities consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(b) Elements.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of the defensive military capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of Taiwan that are required to— (A) allow Taiwan to respond effectively to (B) advance a strategy of denial, reduce the threat of conflict, thwart an invasion, and mitigate other risks to the United States and Taiwan.
(2) An assessment of the relative priority as aggression by the People’s Liberation Army or other actors from the People’s Republic of China; and signed by appropriate departments and agencies of Taiwan to include its military to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.
(3) An explanation of the annual resources committed by Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.
(4) A description and justification of the relative importance of overcoming each identified capability gap and capacity shortfall for deterring, delaying, or defeating military aggression by the People’s Republic of China;
(5) An assessment of— (A) the capability gaps and capacity short-falls that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by Taiwan; and (B) the capability gaps and capacity short-falls that are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner solely by Taiwan.
(6) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (5)(B) that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by— (A) the Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales programs of the Department of State; (B) Department of Defense security assistance authorized by chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code; (C) Department of State training and education programs authorized by chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.); (D) section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318); (E) the provision of excess defense articles pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); or (F) any other authority available to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.
(7) A description of United States or Taiwan engagement with other countries that could assist in addressing in a sufficient and timely manner the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls identified pursuant to paragraph (1).
(8) An identification of opportunities to build interoperability, combined readiness, joint planning capability, and shared situational awareness between the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners and allies, as appropriate, through combined training, exercises, and planning events, including—(A) table-top exercises and wargames that allow operational commands to improve joint and combined planning for contingencies involving a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; (B) joint and combined exercises that test the feasibility of counter-intervention strategies, develop interoperability across services, and develop the lethality and survivability of combined forces against a well-equipped adversary; (C) logistics exercises that test the feasibility of expeditionary logistics in an extended campaign with a well-equipped adversary; (D) service-to-service exercise programs that build functional mission skills for addressing challenges posed by a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; and (E) any other combined training, exercises, or planning with Taiwan’s military forces that the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State consider relevant.
(9) An identification of options for the United States to use, to the maximum extent practicable, existing authorities or programs to expedite military assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict, including— (A) a list of defense articles of the United States that may be transferred to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict; (B) a list of authorities that may be used to provide expedited military assistance to Tai- wan during a crisis or conflict; (C) an assessment of methods that could be used to deliver such assistance to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict, including— (i) the feasibility of employing such methods in different scenarios; and (ii) recommendations for improving the ability of the Armed Forces to deliver such assistance to Taiwan; and (D) an assessment of any challenges in providing such assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict and recommendations for addressing such challenges.

(c) Recurrence.—The joint consultative mecha- nism required in subsection (a) shall convene on a recur- ring basis and not less than annually.

SEC.5507. Fast-Tracking Sales to Taiwan Under Foreign Military Sales Program.
(a) Pre-Clearance Of Certain Foreign Military Sales Items.
(1) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, and in conjunction with coordinating entities such as the National Disclosure Policy Committee, the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, and other appropriate entities, shall compile a list of available and emerging military platforms, technologies, and equipment that are pre-cleared and prioritized for sale and release to Taiwan through the Foreign Military Sales program.
(2) Rules Of Construction.— (A) Selection Of Items.—The list compiled pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be construed as limiting the type, timing, or quantity of items that may be requested by, or sold to, Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program. (B) Notifications Required.—Nothing in this Act may be construed to supersede congressional notification requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et. seq.).

(b) Prioritized Processing of Foreign Military Sales Requests From Taiwan.—
(1) Requirement.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall prioritize and expedite the processing of requests from Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program, and may not delay the processing of requests for bundling purposes.
(2) Duration.—The requirement under paragraph (1) shall continue until the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that the threat to Taiwan has significantly abated.

(c) Interagency Policy.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly review and update interagency policies and implementation guidance related to Foreign Military Sales requests from Taiwan, including incorporating the preclearance provisions of this section.

SEC. 5508. Arms Exports Delivery Solutions for Taiwan and United States Allies in The Indo-Pacific.
(a) Appropriate Committees Of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(b) Report Required.—Not later than March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report with respect to the transfer of all defense articles or defense services that have yet to be completed pursuant to the authorities provided by—
(1) section 3, 21, or 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753, 2761, or 2776); or
(2) section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

(c) Elements.—The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following elements:
(1) A list of all approved transfers of defense articles and services authorized by Congress pursuant to sections 25 and 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2765, 2776) with a total value of $25,000,000 or more, to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, or New Zealand, that have not been fully delivered by the start of the fiscal year in which the report is being submitted.
(2) The estimated start and end dates of delivery for each approved and incomplete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), including additional details and dates for any transfers that involve multiple tranches of deliveries.
(3) With respect to each approved and incomplete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), a detailed description of— (A) any changes in the delivery dates of defense articles or services relative to the dates anticipated at the time of congressional approval of the transfer, including specific reasons for any delays related to the United States Government, defense suppliers, or a foreign partner; (B) the feasibility and advisability of pro- viding the partner subject to such delayed deliv- ery with an interim capability or solution, including drawing from United States stocks, and the mechanisms under consideration for doing so as well as any challenges to implementing such a capability or solution; (C) authorities, appropriations, or waiver requests that Congress could provide to improve delivery timelines or authorize the provision of interim capabilities or solutions identified pursuant to subparagraph (B); and (D) a description of which countries are ahead of Taiwan for delivery of each item listed pursuant to paragraph (1).
(4) A description of ongoing interagency efforts to support attainment of operational capability of the corresponding defense articles and services once delivered, including advance training with United States or armed forces of partner countries on the systems to be received. The description of any such training shall also include an identification of the training implementer.
(5) If a transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1) has been terminated prior to the date of the submission of the report for any reason— (A) the case information for such transfer, including the date of congressional notification, delivery date of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), final signature of the LOA, and information pertaining to delays in delivering LOAs for signature; (B) a description of the reasons for which the transfer is no longer in effect; and (C) the impact this termination will have on the intended end-user and the consequent implications for regional security, including the impact on deterrence of military action by countries hostile to the United States, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and other factors.
(6) A separate description of the actions the United States is taking to expedite and prioritize deliveries of defense articles and services to Taiwan, including— (A) a description of what actions the Department of State and the Department of Defense have taken or are planning to take to prioritize Taiwan’s Foreign Military Sales cases; (B) current procedures or mechanisms for determining that a Foreign Military Sales case for Taiwan should be prioritized above a sale to another country of the same or similar item; and (C) whether the United States intends to divert defense articles from United States stocks to provide an interim capability or solution with respect to any delayed deliveries to Taiwan and the plan, if applicable, to replenish any such diverted stocks.
(7) A description of other actions already undertaken by or currently under consideration by the Department of State and the Department of Defense to improve delivery timelines for the transfers listed pursuant to paragraph (1).

(d) Form.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC.5513. Strategy to Respond to Influence and Information Operations Targeting Taiwan.
(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—
(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘‘United Front’’ work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise sup- ported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and
(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under sub- section (a) shall include descriptions of—
(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan’s public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities; (B) assistance to enhance Taiwan’s ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and (C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;
(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;
(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations; and
(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.

SEC.5525. Sense Of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations with Taiwan.
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan has benefitted the people of both the United States and Taiwan, as Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of imports, and a key destination for United States agricultural exports;
(2) further integration would benefit both peoples and is in the strategic and diplomatic interests of the United States; and
(3) the United States should explore opportunities to expand economic agreements between Taiwan and the United States, through dialogue, and by developing the legal templates required to support potential future agreements.


Update, July 18, 2022

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee filed the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 in the U.S. Senate as S.4543. The NDAA was filed by Committee Chairman Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) and Ranking Member Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK).

The filed text included 3 Taiwan provisions:

SEC.1244. Defense of Taiwan
(a) Definitions – In this section:
(1) Deny – The term “deny” means to use combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, resulting in—
(A) the termination of hostilities or at least the attempted fait accompli; or
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.
(2) Fait accompli – The term “fait accompli” refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces can respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the United States Armed Forcesby convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

(b) Statement of Policy – Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

SEC. 1245. Multi-Year Plan to Fulfill Defensive Requirements of Military Forces of Taiwan and Modification of Annual Report on Taiwan Asymmetric Capabilities and Intelligence Support
(a) Multi-year Plan – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall seek to engage with appropriate officials of Taiwan to develop and implement a multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined trainings, exercises, and planning activities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(b) Elements – The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of Taiwan.

(2) An assessment of the relative priority assigned by appropriate officials of Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.

(3) An explanation of the annual resources committed by Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.

(4) An assessment of–
(A) the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by unilateral efforts of Taiwan; and
(B) the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls that are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner solely through unilateral efforts.

(5) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (4)(B) that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by—
(A) Department of Defense security assistance authorized by chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code;
(B) the Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales programs of the Department of State;
(C) the provision of excess defense articles pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
(D) section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; or
(E) any other authority available to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.

(6) An identification of opportunities to build interoperability, combined readiness, joint planning capability, and share situational awareness among the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners and allies, as appropriate, through combined trainings, exercises, and planning activities, including— 
(A) table-top exercises and wargames that allow operational commands to improve joint and combined war planning for contingencies involving a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign;
(B) joint and combined exercises that test the feasibility of counter-intervention strategies, develop interoperability across services, and develop the lethality and survivability of combined forces against a well-equipped adversary;
(C) logistics exercises that test the feasibility of expeditionary logistics in an extended campaign with a well-equipped adversary;
(D) service-to-service exercise programs that build functional mission skills for addressing challenges posed by a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; and
(E) any other combined training, exercise, or planning activity with the military forces of Taiwan that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant.

SEC. 1251. Sense of the Senate on Supporting Prioritization of the People’s Republic of China, the Indo-Pacific Region, and Taiwan.
It is the sense of the Senate that the Senate— 
(1) supports the designations by the Department of Defense, as reflected in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and statements by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and other senior Department officials, of— 
(A) the People’s Republic of China as the Department’s pacing challenge;
(B) the Indo-Pacific as the Department’s priority theater; and
(C) a Taiwan contingency as the Department’s pacing scenario;

(2) underscores the importance of the Department continuing to prioritize the deterrence of aggression by the People’s Republic of China, particularly in the form of an invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, as the Government of the People’s Republic of China expands and modernizes the People’s Liberation Army; and

(3) strongly urges the Department to manage force allocations across theaters to ensure, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), that the United States Armed Forces maintain the ability to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.


Update, July 14, 2022

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (H.R. 7900) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 329-101.

The text of the legislation included 3 Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1303. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations
It is the sense of Congress that— 
1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by— 
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of— (i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning; (ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and (iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should be committed to the defense of a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC. 1312. Sense of Congress on Inviting Taiwan to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise
It is the sense of Congress that the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2024.

SEC. 1313. Joint Exercises with Taiwan
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) joint military exercises with Taiwan are an important component of improving military readiness and joint operability of both countries;
(2) the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, and other commands in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility, already possess the legal authority to carry out such exercises; and
(3) the United States should better use existing authorities to improve the readiness and joint operability of United States and Taiwanese forces.

(b) Authority Recognized
The Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command is authorized to carry out military exercises with Taiwan that—
(1) include multiple warfare domains and make extensive use of military common operations network used by United States, allied, and Taiwanese forces;
(2) to the maximum extent practical, incorporate the cooperation of 2 or more combatant and subordinate unified commands; and (3) present a complex military problem and include a force presentation of a strategic competitor.


Update, June 16, 2022

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee completed its markup draft of the NDAA 2023. In a vote of 23-3, the Committee voted to advance the bill to the Senate Floor for consideration.

The executive summary of the draft bill included Taiwan as an important priority:

Strengthening U.S. Posture in the Indo-Pacific Region
– Requires engagement with Taiwanese officials to develop and implement a multiyear plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined trainings, exercises, and planning activities.
– States that it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.


Update, May 27, 2022

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as H.R. 7900. It was then referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

For the 2022 version of this post, see Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2022

Categories
News U.S. Government

2022 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on China’s military power. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2022 report.

The Taiwan language in the previous year’s report (2021) is available here: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2021-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

Selected Taiwan Language

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the East China Sea and likely executes operational control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Armies; the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; two Air Force divisions, two operational PLAAF bases, and one PLARF base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related to the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. During a contingency, the Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some Strategic Support Force (SSF) units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.

In 2021, the Eastern Theater Command focused on training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness with long-distance maneuvers and mobilization, aerial combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified civilian ferries to augment transportation.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Throughout 2021, island-seizure exercises became more frequent and realistic. The PLA conducted more than 20 naval exercises with an island-capture element, greatly exceeding the 13 observed in 2020. Many of these exercises focused on combat realism and featured night missions, training in adverse weather conditions, and simultaneous multi-domain operations.The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived as necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any intervention by a third-party, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration, and signal its displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, China has persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency. Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone and numerous island seizure exercises.

East China Sea

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels—including four equipped with deck guns—sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express “extremely serious concerns” in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of escalation.

Southern Theater Command

The Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea (SCS). This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is responsible for securing the SCS, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any operation against Taiwan, and assuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to China’s global ambitions. PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command include 74th and 75th Group Armies, the Southern Theater Navy, three marine brigades, two PLA Air Force bases, and two PLA Rocket Force bases. The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command as needed over all CCG and PAFMM vessels conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”

The PRC’s Strategy & Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait − referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured. However, the PRC’s 2022 Taiwan White Paper published by the Taiwan Affairs Office restated the PRC’s preference for peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework, while maintaining a refusal to renounce the use of force to compel unification, if needed.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
– Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
– Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
– Internal unrest in Taiwan;
– Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
– Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
– Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non- specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign— capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island. The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture for a Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021—in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship—the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities— such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets— to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability to Deter Force

Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitioned to an all-volunteer force, the cost savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization within its national security structure to improve whole of society mobilization to support defense.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense spending to be the highest level since 1990. Taiwan announced a further 10 percent increase from the previous year, bringing the 2021 defense budget to NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion), and representing more than 2% of Taiwan’s GDP. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow and is about 17 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of it focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Key Takeaways

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea. The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of executing a Taiwan invasion.
  • The PRC intensified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan in 2021. Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting island-seizure exercises.
  • The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.
  • In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols.
  • The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes.
  • The PRC’s Spratly outposts are capable of supporting military operations, include advanced weapon systems, and have supported non-combat aircraft; however, no large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed there.
  • In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine- dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island.
  • Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.
  • The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.
  • To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
Categories
Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

(Arlington, Virginia, April 6, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Contractor Technical Assistance and related maintenance and sustainment articles and services for the Patriot Air Defense System, at an estimated cost of US$95 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on April 5, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-16) is for support of the Patriot Air Defense System in Taiwan, and helps underpin Taiwan’s efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability. It includes Contractor Technical Assistance support consisting of training, planning, fielding, deployment, operation, maintenance, and sustainment of the Patriot Air Defense System, associated equipment, and logistics support elements. It also includes Patriot Ground Support Equipment, spare parts, and consumables.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “The sustainment of Taiwan’s existing weapons systems is an essential commitment by its armed forces to maintain high operational rates for its legacy gear.” “The normalized and regularized process of assessing all requested weapons systems for Taiwan’s use must remain a top priority for the Biden Administration. That should entail the acceptance from Taiwan of Letters of Request (LoRs), so that a full inter-agency assessment – that includes the uniformed services – can ascertain the utility of the request.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales