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2021 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2021 report.

Taiwan language in the 2020 report: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2020-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

Selected Taiwan Language

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the East China Sea and likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2020, the Eastern Theater Command focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, and live-fire training. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include three group armies, a naval fleet, a naval aviation division, two marine brigades, two Air Force divisions, two operational Air Force bases, and one Rocket Force base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while they are conducting Senkakus-related operations. During a contingency, the Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some Strategic Support Force (SSF) units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.

In August and September 2020, the Eastern Theater Command conducted a series of military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan that featured large-scale naval and air maneuvers, amphibious operations, and multiple instances of PLA aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait. An Eastern Theater Command spokesperson stated that these drills were meant to further test and improve multi-service joint operations capabilities, as well as to deter “Taiwan independence” forces and foreign actors from threatening the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait region.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2020, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. In January 2020, despite the PRC’s election interference, President Tsai Ing-wen won reelection for a second term. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains steadfast that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “one China Principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan. President Tsai has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for the PRC to respect Taiwan’s democracy and agree to negotiations without preconditions. In her May 2020 inauguration speech, Tsai reiterated that her China policy would be based on the Republic of China’s constitution and the law governing cross-Strait relations, with a willingness to engage in dialogue on the principles of “peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue” to the PRC’s displeasure.

The PRC also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, thwarting Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Criminal Policy Organization (INTERPOL). Despite the stalled consultations with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to engage with Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party, and the PRC continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum, held virtually in August 2020, due to the pandemic.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention, such as the United States and/or other like- minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration, and signal its displeasure at warming Washington-Taipei ties, China has persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency. Throughout 2020, China’s military increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting combat drills such as island seizure operations. In 2020, Beijing also publicly refuted the existence of the Taiwan Strait ‘median line,’ a decades-long tacit agreement between the two sides intended to reduce miscalculation and avoid sparking accidental crises.

East China Sea

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which Taiwan also claims. It also continues to uphold the importance of abiding by the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the East China Sea but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only as a visible representation of the PRC’s sovereignty claims, but also in an effort to improve readiness and respond quickly to potential contingencies. During 2020, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous and territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In July, two PRC coast guard vessels conducted a record-setting patrol within the 12nm territorial waters that lasted 39 hours and 23 minutes, following a similar patrol just two days prior. These two patrols represented the longest time PRC vessels have ever spent continuously operating inside the Senkakus’ territorial waters since 2012. By the end of the year, PRC vessels had been observed in the contiguous waters of the islands for 333 days, breaking 2019’s record of 282 days.

PRC coast guard vessels also acted more assertively during their patrols in 2020, shadowing Japanese fishing vessels operating within the Senkakus’ territorial waters and ordering them to leave on multiple occasions. Japan’s government protested in late November 2020 when PRC ships entered Japan’s contiguous zone for the 306th time this year, further straining the relations between the PRC and Japan in relation to the Senkakus and complicating plans to reschedule a planned visit to Japan by President Xi Jinping.

The PRC’s Strategy & Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, and staked the PRC’s position for peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” Based on the 2019 speech, “once country, two systems” entails the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured. In 2020, senior PRC leaders and government spokespersons continued to call for cross-Strait discussions on the foundation of adhering to Beijing’s interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” and opposing Taiwan independence, and reiterated contents of Xi’s 2019 speech.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan, according to recent polling data, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under the pretenses of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC has increasingly resorted to an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to continue to develop and perfect its strategy and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
‒ Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
‒ Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
‒ Internal unrest in Taiwan;
‒ Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
‒ Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification; and
‒ Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non- peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC will also likely complement its air and maritime blockade operations with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island. In 2020, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan. Furthermore, the PRC continues to build capabilities that would contribute to a full-scale invasion; in 2019, the PLA completed construction of its first helicopter dock amphibious assault ship (LHA).

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRCs combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.

The PLA is capable of attempting various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture for a Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA)
The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and cross-sea amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate supporting a Taiwan operation is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. Despite COVID-19 mitigation efforts, extensive flooding in southern China, and conflict on the Indian border, PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2020. Training events included nighttime loading, concealed landing, simulated sea crossing operations, and joint landing operations integrating PLAA aviation, Special Forces, EW, armor, and mechanized infantry. Press reports also claim extensive use of sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

In addition to amphibious assault, PLAA aviation and air assault brigades will likely play a role in a large-scale amphibious assault. PLAA aviation and air assault brigades conducted significant training throughout 2020—some directly supporting a Taiwan scenario and others that improve skill sets necessary for a cross-sea invasion. Exercises included single-service operations and joint operations with the PLAN and PLAAF. In August 2020, PLAA helicopters left their land base, landed on PLAN ships, and then conducted an air assault mission. PLAA aviation units also completed “cross-sea [aerial] assault drills,” using UAVs to target opposing forces for air strikes in support of ground forces. PLAA aviation assets also conducted an exercise attacking air and maritime assets in an open-sea environment. Army aviation and air assault units extensively trained on scenarios in a maritime environment that support joint force operations similar to those necessary for a Taiwan invasion.

PLA Navy (PLAN)
The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, developing an at-sea nuclear deterrent, and introducing new multi- mission platforms capable of striking Taiwan’s naval forces in a cross-Strait conflict as well as conducting diverse missions in other contingency operations. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious ship fleet, however, has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious platform docks (LPDs) and flat deck landing helicopter assault (LHAs) ships, indicating a near term focus on regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault. There is also no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its force of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time—suggesting a traditional large-scale direct beach— assault operation requiring extensive lift remains aspirational. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assess it has sufficient amphibious capacity and mitigated shortfalls through investments in other operational modalities able to bring forces onto Taiwan such as the PLA’s rapidly expanding fleet of rotary-wing assets. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
The PLAAF has maintained a force posture that provides a variety of capabilities for a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long- range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. In addition, the PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations in a contingency.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)
The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations and in heightened readiness in preparation for rapid nuclear counterstrikes if called on.

Strategic Support Force (SSF)
PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper states that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for the use of EW and cyber operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain battlefield information control in contemporary informatized warfare. The SSF 311 Base would also be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF)
The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and
campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities

Taiwan is taking important steps to compensate for the growing disparities it has compared to the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges. Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirms recent adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense in depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. As of the end of 2020, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished its goal of filling 90 percent of the active duty billets, totaling approximately 169,000 personnel, with volunteers. Taiwan’s military modernization program envisions a continued decrease in Taiwan’s active duty force to approximately 175,000 personnel as part of a transition to an all-volunteer force. This transition has slowed due to severe difficulties recruiting volunteers. The cost savings from manpower reductions provides some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. The unanticipated magnitude of transition costs has led Taiwan to divert funds from foreign and indigenous defense acquisition programs, as well as near-term training and readiness. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisition and reforms. In August 2019, Taiwan said it would increase the island’s defense budget by 5.2 percent to NT $358 billion ($11.6 billion). In August 2020, the Tsai administration announced an additional 10% increase to the defense budget, increasing overall defense spending to more than 2% of gross domestic product and the highest level since the 1990’s. Meanwhile, the PRC’s official defense budget continues to grow, with much of it focused on developing the military joint operations capability that could be used to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include Electronic Warfare, cyber and information operations, fast attack maritime vessels, coastal defense missiles, rapid naval mining, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection.

The United States maintains its one-China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The United States is committed to deepening ties with Taiwan, which is a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner. The United States will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In October 2019, Taiwan announced the purchase of F-16V fighter aircraft for $8 billion. In 2020, the frequency of arms sales to Taiwan increased with authorizations totaling more than $5 billion. Authorized weapons sales included advanced unmanned aerial systems, long range missiles and artillery, and the Harpoon Coastal Defense System. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $23 billion in arms sales to Taiwan. In support of these efforts, the U.S. continues to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.

Key Take Aways

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.
  • PRC diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan intensified in 2020.
  • Throughout 2020, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting combat drills such as island seizure operations.
  • The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. In 2020, the PRC stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols.
  • Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • The PRC has a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap between the PLA and Taiwan’s military.
  • To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
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Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of 40 150mm M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzers for US$750 million

(Arlington, Virginia, August 4, 2021)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of 40 155mm M109A6 Paladin Medium Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems and related equipment to Taiwan at an estimated cost of US$750 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on August 4, 2021.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 21-44) is for 40 155mm M109A6 Medium Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems; 20 M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicles (FAASV); 1 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); 5 M88A2 Hercules vehicles; 5 M2 Chrysler Mount .50 caliber machine guns; and 1,698 multi-option, Precision Guidance Kits (PGK). Also included are M109A6/M992A2 overhaul, conversion and refurbishment services, along with additional equipment, testing, software and technical documentation, technical assistance, engineering, storage, and other related elements of technical, logistics, and program support.

Taiwan already operates older M109A2 and M109A5 variants of the Paladin, and holds M110A2 self-propelled howitzers and towed M114 howitzers in its existing inventory. The M109A6 provides enhanced armor and improved survivability over the older variants, and features a reduction in the time required for set up and fire.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “This notification for the M109A6 Paladin program is the first Taiwan arms sale under the Biden Administration. It serves as a timely reminder of the close national security partnership between the United States and Taiwan, particularly as the PRC is now violating the Taiwan AIDZ on a near daily basis. We expect to continue seeing normalized, timely, and regular arms sales from the U.S. that promote Taiwan’s military readiness. We also hope to see additional offers from the Biden Administration of new capabilities for Taiwan, to both help expand its current military posture and to continue improving its multilayered self-defense capacity.”

The US-Taiwan Business Council would also like to recognize the work of our dearly departed friend and former Board Member Greyson T. Bassett on this program.

Press Note: The words “package” and “packaging” often refer to slowing/stacking Taiwan arms sales notifications and sending them to Congress as a group, instead of individually forwarding them to Congress when they are ready. This was a common practice from 2007 to 2017, and resulted in large and irregular arms sales packages. The word “program” is preferred for items released in one Congressional notification.

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed Taiwan FMS of 40 M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzers
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Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of a Field Information Communications System (FICS) for US$280 million

(Arlington, Virginia, December 7, 2020)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of a Field Information Communications System (FICS) and related equipment. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this proposed arms sale on December 7, 2020.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 20-87) has a total expected program cost of US$280 million. The proposed sale consists of a Field Information Communications System (FICS) with 154 Communications Nodes (CN) with S-788 Type III shelter, 24 Communication Relays with S-788 Type III shelter, 8 Network Management Systems (NMS) with S-788 Type III shelter, Basic Issue Items (BII), communication support equipment, equipment integration, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of technical, engineering, equipment, logistics, and program support.

In response to this notification, US-Taiwan Business Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “We welcome the announcement of this program, showing that Taiwan’s military continues to modernize its military network backbone, providing its forces with improved communications and strengthening interoperability.”

“Additionally, the Council welcomes the timing of this congressional notification, showing that the process of supporting Taiwan’s legitimate force modernization needs continues through the transition to a new U.S. administration.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of a Field Information Communications System (FICS) for US$280 million
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Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of 4 MQ-9B SeaGuardian Surveillance Drones

(Arlington, Virginia, November 3, 2020)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of 4 Weapons-Ready MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft and related equipment. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this proposed arms sale on November 3, 2020.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 20-74) has a total expected program cost of US$600 million. The proposed sale consists of 4 Weapons-Ready MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft, 2 Fixed Ground Control Stations, 2 Mobile Ground Control Stations, and 14 Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigations Systems (EGI) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module. It also includes targeting and electronic surveillance measures systems, SeaVue patrol radars, data terminals, transponders, engines, secure communications and other equipment, spare and repair parts, training and engineering support, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

In response to this notification, the fifth involving Taiwan within the last two weeks, US-Taiwan Business Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “Taiwan continues to expand its existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure. Adding the SeaGuardian platform will provide Taiwan with substantial new maritime surveillance capabilities. This is a crucial mission for the Taiwan Navy, particularly given the PLA’s aggressive incursions in regional waters and in the Taiwan Strait. We can expect Taiwan to further expand this capability in the coming years.”

Hammond-Chambers added “Taiwan is hitting its stride in its efforts to modernize and develop its military capacity. SeaGuardian is a top-rated platform, and this sale reflects an adjustment by the Trump Administration to make available new capabilities – such as drones – to U.S. friends and allies to complicate PLA planning. American policy towards Taiwan should indeed include consideration of all platforms that enhance Taiwan’s defensive posture while also improving Northeast Asian security.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of 4 MQ-9B SeaGuardian Surveillance Drones
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Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of Mobile Coastal Defense Systems with RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Missiles

(Arlington, Virginia, October 26, 2020)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of up to 100 Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems (HCDS) with up to 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Surface Launched Missiles and related equipment and support. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this proposed arms sale on October 26, 2020.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 20-68) is for a total expected program cost of US$2.37 billion. The proposed sale consists of up to 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Surface Launched Missiles and 4 RTM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Exercise Missiles. Also included are 411 containers, 100 Harpoon Coastal Defense System Launcher Transporter Units, 25 radar trucks, spare and repair parts, and other elements of personnel, documentation, engineering, technical, and logistics support.

In response to this notification, the fourth involving Taiwan over the last week, US-Taiwan Business Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “it is important to look at the totality of Taiwan’s capacity-building efforts to fully grasp the effort to improve Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.”

Hammond-Chambers added “These mobile land-based coastal defense batteries, with proven and reliable Harpoon missiles, add to Taiwan’s existing anti-ship defenses and provide significant additional deterrent capabilities. The substantial expansion of Taiwan’s Coastal Defense Cruise Missile stocks, which also include the domestically designed and built Hsiung Feng II/III, is a welcome development.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Welcomes the Sale to Taiwan of Mobile Coastal Defense Systems with RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Missiles
Categories
Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on Three Proposed Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan for US$1.8113 billion

(Arlington, Virginia, October 21, 2020)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of three possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan of 135 AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) Missiles, 6 MS-110 Recce Pods, and 11 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) M142 Launchers, along with related equipment and support.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of these proposed arms sales on October 21, 2020. The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 20-69, 20-75, and 20-77) are for a total expected program cost of US$1.8113 billion.

  • Notification 70-69 – for an estimated program cost of US$1.008 billion – includes 135 AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) Missiles [a precision-guided, air-launched cruise missile], 4 ATM-84H SLAM-ER Telemetry Missiles, 12 CATM-84H Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), 151 containers, spare and repair parts, along with related equipment, training, engineering, and other elements of technical and logistics support.
  • Notification 70-75 – for an estimated program cost of US$367.2 million – includes 6 MS-110 Recce Pods [advanced reconnaissance for F-16 fighter jets], 3 Transportable Ground Stations, 1 Fixed Ground station, spare and repair parts, system support and equipment, training, documentation, and other related elements of logistical and program support.
  • Notification 20-77 – for an estimated program cost of US$436.1 million – includes 11 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) M142 Launchers [a truck-mounted light multiple rocket launcher], 64 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary Missiles. 7 M1152Al High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 11 M240B Machine Guns (7.62MM), and 17 International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (IFATDS). Also included are 54 M28A2 Low Cost Reduced Range Practice Rocket Pods (LCRRPR), 11 M2Al machine guns (.50 caliber), radio systems and radio ground stations, 11 M1084A2 cargo Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) Resupply Vehicles (RSV), 2 M1089A2 cargo wrecker FMTV RSV, and 11 M1095 trailer cargo FMTV (5-ton). In addition, the notification includes support, training, testing, and communications equipment, along with related elements of logistical and program support.

The US-Taiwan Business Council supports these Congressional notifications. Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers stated that “The quality of the three programs notified today clearly reflects the urgency of continued Taiwan force modernization to counteract China’s hegemonic behavior. Each program adds an important deterrent capability that should further complicate any consideration by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to threaten or to use force to coerce Taiwan into a political union.”

Hammond-Chambers went on to say “The US-Taiwan Business Council believes that Taiwan arms sales notifications should be driven by the regular internal process, and should be free of political delays. Today’s announcements continue the return to regular order for consideration, process, and release of needed capabilities.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/the-us-taiwan-business-council-comments-on-three-proposed-foreign-military-sales-to-taiwan/

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News U.S. Government

2020 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2020 report.

Selected Taiwan Language

Capabilities for Counter Intervention and Power Projection

The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. The PRC also continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency

China’s Coercive Approach

China’s leaders use tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s objectives. China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking armed conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.1 In recent years, the PLA has also increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China also employs non-military tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2019, the Eastern Theater Command focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, and live-fire training. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while conducting Senkakus-related operations.

In April 2019, the Eastern Theater Command JOCC commanded joint training east of Taiwan, which they asserted was to train for joint fire and maritime strike. The training included bombers, fighters, electronic jamming and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft circumnavigating Taiwan while naval combatants trained for mock strikes and helicopters delivered an amphibious landing force. In March, two J-11 fighters crossed the unofficial median line of the Taiwan Strait, for the first time since 1999. The Eastern Theater Command also likely played a significant role in a nationwide exercise across all five theater commands based on the locations of some of the exercise activity near Taiwan.

As of March 2019, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assigned its first fifth generation J-20s to an operational unit, a fighter brigade in the Eastern Theater Command, probably to improve its ability to respond to U.S. and allied aircraft in the area. In March 2019, a likely Eastern Theater Y-8Q anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft was also first observed operating in the East China Sea by Japan.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Relations between the PRC and Taiwan remained at an impasse through 2019. Since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president, China halted formal communication with Taiwan and has repeatedly stressed that Taiwan must accept the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. Since November 2016, China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to “one China,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for China to respect Taiwan’s democracy and agree to negotiations without preconditions.

The PRC also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, thwarting Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and INTERPOL. In 2019, the PRC convinced the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Despite the stalled consultations with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to engage with Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party, and the PRC continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai Administration, China has increased military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLAAF and naval exercises in the East China Sea.

Taiwan’s national defense report released in 2017 cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan poses an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait,” and that Taiwan requires a “multiple deterrence strategy,” including an emphasis on developing asymmetric warfare to counter PLA advances.

China’s Strategy and Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, President Xi Jinping publicly reiterated China’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue. In the same speech, Xi also reaffirmed China’s longstanding position for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically warned it would use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
– Formal declaration of Taiwan independence
– Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence
– Internal unrest in Taiwan
– Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
– Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification
– Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs
– Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. China’s use of such non-specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

China continues to view the Taiwan issue as the most important and sensitive issue between the United States and China.

China’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. China could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or unification dialogue under China’s terms. Notably, China would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, China would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, China might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which China would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. China will also likely complement its air and maritime blockade operations with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. China could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. China could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and EW. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island. In 2019, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan. Furthermore, China continues to build capabilities that would contribute to a full-scale invasion; in 2019, the PLA completed construction of its first helicopter dock amphibious assault ship (LHA).

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk.

The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan as well. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate international opposition.

Effect of PLA Reform on a Taiwan Contingency

One of the overarching goals of the structural reforms to reshape the PLA was to construct a military capable of conducting complex joint operations, including those that would be involved in a Taiwan contingency. PLA reforms seek to clarify command authorities, improving joint integration, and facilitating the transition from peace to war. The abolishment of military regions in favor of military theaters – in this case, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command – has also likely streamlined and improved the PLA’s ability to conduct yearlong planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA combat units are likely experiencing temporary decreases in readiness and proficiency to conduct large-scale joint operations as they reorganize units, integrate new capabilities, and adjust to new command structures.

A significant addition to the overall structure of the PLA is the establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). During a Taiwan contingency, the JLSF, in conjunction with subordinate joint logistics support centers, would coordinate joint logistics and the delivery of materiel as well as oversee various civil-military support systems to sustain the campaign. The creation of the SSF likely improves the PLA’s ability to execute and coordinate IO (particularly cyber, EW, and counterspace) in a Taiwan contingency. It may also improve the PLA’s ability to manage and provide space-based reconnaissance to the CMC and the Eastern Theater Command, improving PLA command staffs’ situational awareness of Taiwan’s military units and facilities. The PLA is likely still exploring how to reform its joint command processes to integrate IO and ISR capabilities more fully at the theater-level, but structural reforms have removed the biggest barriers to integrating these strategic capabilities at the theater-level.

Structural reforms within the military and paramilitary forces also have implications on resources and operational capabilities available to the PLA for a future Taiwan contingency.

Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities

Taiwan has historically enjoyed military advantages in the context of a cross-Strait conflict, such as technological superiority and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense, but China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of these advantages. Although Taiwan is taking important steps to compensate for the growing disparities – building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps – these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s declining defensive advantages.

Taiwan’s military spending remains at approximately two percent of its gross domestic product. In August 2019, Taiwan said it would increase the island’s defense budget by 5.2 percent to NT $358 billion ($11.6 billion). Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow, and for 2019, is roughly 15 times that of Taiwan, with much of it focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and EW, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection.

The United States maintains a “one-China” policy that is based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the three Joint Communiqués. The United States opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo. The United States continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace acceptable to both sides.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In May 2020, the White House publicly released a report to Congress entitled, United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China. The report states, “Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiques, as demonstrated by its massive military buildup, compels the United States to continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense, which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region.

In a 1982 memorandum, President Ronald Reagan insisted ‘that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.’” In October 2019, Taiwan announced the purchase of F-16V fighter aircraft for $8 billion. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $23 billion in arms sales to Taiwan.

Key Takeaways

  • The PLA is developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. U.S. defense planners often refer to these collective capabilities as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
  • The PRC continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve regional and global security objectives beyond a Taiwan contingency.
  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.
  • Relations between the PRC and Taiwan remained tense through 2019.
  • The PLA continued Taiwan Strait contingency preparations
  • Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which China has historically warned it would use force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • China has a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.
  • China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of the military advantages that Taiwan has historically enjoyed the context of a cross-Strait conflict.
  • To counter China’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
Categories
Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Comments on the Proposed Sale of Repair & Recertification of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missiles to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of Repair and Recertification of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missiles to Taiwan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the proposed arms sale on July 9, 2020.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 20-24) is for a total value of approximately US$620 million. The notification includes recertification of (PAC-3) missiles, Repair and Return of classified and unclassified PAC-3 missile items and Ground Support Equipment, replenishment of missile spares and GSE spares along with a seeker spares pool, air transportation services for missile processing, and other related technical and logistics support. [1]

The US-Taiwan Business Council is encouraged by these Congressional notifications. Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said “The maintenance of Taiwan’s PAC-3 capability is a welcome development. Taiwan is undertaking an important commitment to sustaining the quality of its legacy equipment, in support of deterring the coercive military threat from China. It is an important signal from the governments of Presidents Tsai and Trump that they are committed to peace and security in the Taiwan Strait through strong defensive capabilities.”

“Taiwan’s PAC-3 ground-to-air SAM system plays an essential role in protecting Taiwan from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missile forces that physically and politically threaten and intimidate the country. The U.S. is right to support all of Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs, whether new F-16 fighters or the upgrade of legacy equipment.”

Hammond-Chambers went on to say that “the PLA’s commitment to its own force modernization – and the threat that poses to peace and security in Asia – is a constant reminder that consistent arms sales to Taiwan is in the interests of the United States and of its Asia Pacific allies.”

[1] See the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales

https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/ustbc-comments-on-repair-recertification-of-pac-3-missiles-to-taiwan

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Press Releases U.S. Government

The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Sale of 18 MK-48 Mod6 Advanced Technology (AT) Heavy Weight Torpedoes (HWT) to Taiwan

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of 18 MK-48 Mod6 Advanced Technology (AT) Heavy Weight Torpedoes (HWT) and related equipment to Taiwan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed arms sale on May 20, 2020.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 20-07) is for a total value of approximately US$180 million. The notification includes 18 MK-48 Mod6 ATHWTs, as well as spare parts, support and test equipment, shipping and shipping containers, operator manuals, technical documentation, training, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.[1]

The US-Taiwan Business Council is encouraged by these Congressional notifications. Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said that “the return to regular arms sales has become a hallmark of the past several years. Taiwan’s commitment to growing its stock of munitions is important, and these MK-48 torpedoes will add to that stock. Taiwan’s balanced procurement priorities ensure that larger platforms – such as F-16s – are prioritized, while they are also tending to munitions stocks, life-cycle support, and services. It is the totality of all arms sales that helps Taiwan create a complete defense.”

Hammond-Chambers went on to say “The timing of the sale is also significant. Today, Tsai Ing-wen was sworn in to her second term as President of Taiwan. The United States, through this sale, is telegraphing that its support for Taiwan’s democracy isn’t just rhetorical – with positive statements on her inauguration coming from Secretary of State Pompeo. U.S. support is also material, as we maintain our commitment to providing Taiwan with weapons to deter the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China to Taiwan’s democratic way of life.”

[1] See the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales

https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/ustbc-comments-on-sale-of-18-mk-48-mod6-advanced-technology-heavy-weight-torpedoes-to-taiwan/

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Press Releases

Press Note: The U.S. Defense Community Mourns the Loss of Eight Taiwan Defense Officials, Including CGS Shen Yi-ming, Killed in Helicopter Crash

The US-Taiwan Business Council (USTBC) and the U.S. defense community today mourn the loss of eight Taiwan defense officials killed in a helicopter crash in the mountains of New Taipei City on the morning of January 2, 2020. The list of casualties include Taiwan’s top military official, Chief of the General Staff General Shen Yi-ming, who was one of nine military officials aboard along with three crew members and a reporter from the Military News Agency. The UH-60M Black Hawk helicopter was en route from Taipei to a base in Yilan as part of a pre-Lunar New Year visit with troops when it crashed.

In response, Taiwan has grounded its 52 Black Hawk helicopters for inspection of fuselage structure, radar, control, and other systems, including the 14 Black Hawks fielded by the Taiwan Air Force, 30 by the Taiwan Army, and 8 by the National Airborne Service Corps. The Ministry of National Defense has said that a special task force will be formed to investigate the cause of the crash. In addition, all three candidates in Taiwan’s January 11, 2020 presidential election have announced that they will temporarily suspend their campaigns to observe a period of mourning.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers expressed his thoughts, saying “USTBC, our members, and the entire U.S. defense community are saddened by this terrible tragedy. We mourn those lost, and hope for a swift recovery for the five survivors. In particular, the loss of CGS Shen Yi-ming is a blow to Taiwan’s ongoing determination to combat aggressive and coercive efforts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to end Taiwan’s free and democratic society. General Shen was a leading voice in the evolving strategy to combat PRC coercion on and around the island, as well as the procurement, training and posture necessary to deter the PRC from unilateral efforts to undermine the island’s sovereignty.”

“General Shen was a leading candidate for the post of Minister of National Defense, should President Tsai secure a second term. In addition, he was a kind and intelligent person steeped in humility and highly respected within Taiwan’s military and civilian leadership. He had also built a strong professional network in the U.S., particularly during his time as Vice Minister for Policy, which strengthened his importance as an indispensable voice. He will be greatly missed.”

The eight officials killed in the crash were:

  • Air Force General Shen Yi-ming, Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of National Defense
  • Major General Hung Hung-chun, Office of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Intelligence (J2)
  • Major General Yu Chin-wen, Deputy Director, Political Warfare Bureau
  • Lieutenant Colonel Yeh Chien-yi, Pilot
  • Captain Liu Chen-fu, Co-pilot
  • Sergeant Major Han Cheng-hung
  • Sergeant Hsu Hung-pin, Engineer
  • Major Huang Sheng-hang, Staff Officer, Office of the Chief of the General Staff

The five survivors are:

  • Lieutenant General Huang Yu-min, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Logistics (J4)
  • Lieutenant General Tsao Chin-ping, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Communications, Electronics & Information (J6)
  • Major General Liu Hsiao-tang, Director, Accounting Office, Operations & Planning (J3)
  • Lieutenant Colonel Chou Hsin-yi, Officer, Operations & Planning (J3)
  • Sergeant Chen Ying-chu, Reporter, Military News Agency

About the US-Taiwan Business Council:

The US-Taiwan Business Council (www.us-taiwan.org) is a membership-based non-profit association, founded in 1976 to foster trade and business relations between the United States and Taiwan. The Council provides its members with business intelligence, offers access to an extensive network of relationships, and serves as a vital and effective representative in dealing with business, trade, and investment matters.