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U.S. Government

Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress 1990-2022

Updated Charts: Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2022

Taiwan Arms Sales notified to Congress from 1990 to December 28, 2022. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) only, in US$ billion and by number of notifications.

Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2022 - Amount in Billions (December 28, 2022)
Taiwan Arms Sales 1990-2022 - Number of Notifications (December 28, 2022)

Sources:
– FMS Data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales
– Kan, Shirley A., “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990” Congressional Research Service Report RL30957, January 5, 2015

Notes:
Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
The four gaps in the charts above reflect the lack of congressional notifications between these dates:

October 25, 2005 – February 28, 2007
October 3, 2008 – January 29, 2010
September 21, 2011 – December 16, 2015
December 16, 2015 – June 29, 2017 (not considered a “freeze”)

Arms Sales Freezes:
President George W. Bush
The November 9, 2007 – October 3, 2008 arms sales freeze lasted 11 months. It was the most politically charged freeze, but not the longest. The longest was March 30, 2004 – October 25, 2005 (1 year and 7 months).

President Barack Obama
The September 21, 2011 – December 16, 2015 arms sales freeze lasted 4 years and 3 months.

Chart Data:

Web-Export-Taiwan-Arms-Sales-1990-2022Download
Categories
U.S. Government

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2023

Update, December 23, 2022

On this date, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023.

Update, December 15, 2022

On this date, the U.S. Senate passed the bipartisan, bicameral text of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 by a vote of 83-11.

The NDAA 2023 now goes to the President’s desk to be signed.

Update, December 8, 2022

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the bipartisan, bicameral text of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 by a vote of 350-80.

Update, December 6, 2022

On this date, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) jointly released the the text of an agreement reached on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. The NDAA now goes to the Senate and House for a vote.

The released text included multiple Taiwan provisions, including the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (see below selections from Subtitle A). A selection of the Taiwan provisions are reproduced below.

In summarizing these provisions, the HASC said:

Expresses congressional support for the U.S. defense relationship with Taiwan, requires additional measures to improve readiness related to Taiwan, and supports the use of joint military exercises with Taiwan, including the 2024 Rim of the Pacific exercise.

House Armed Services Committee (HASC)

Select Taiwan provisions

SEC.1263. Statement of Policy on Taiwan
(a)Statement of Policy. —Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.
(b)Fait Accompli Defined. —In this section, the term “fait accompli” refers to the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.

SEC.1264. Sense of Congress on Joint Exercises with Taiwan
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) joint military exercises with Taiwan are an important component of improving military readiness;

(2) the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command possesses the authority to carry outsuch joint military exercises, including those that—
(A) involve multiple warfare domains and exercise secure communications between the forces of the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners;
(B) incorporate the participation of multiple combatant and subordinate unified commands; and
(C) present complex military challenges, including the multi-domain capabilities of a capable adversary;

(3) the United States should seek to use existing authorities more effectively to improve the readiness of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and

(4) the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise, as appropriate, conducted in 2024.

SEC.1265. Sense of Congress on Defense Alliances and Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific Region
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should continue efforts that strengthen United States defense alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region so as to further the comparative advantage of the United States in strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China, including by—
…
(6) strengthening the United States partnership with Taiwan, consistent with the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), and the Six Assurances with the goal of improving Taiwan’s defensive military capabilities and promoting peaceful cross-strait relations;

Selection from Subtitle A—Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act:

SEC.5502. Modernizing Taiwan’s Security Capabilities to Deter and, if Necessary, Defeat Aggression by the People’s Republic of China.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Taiwan Security Programs.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall use the authorities under this section to strengthen the United States-Taiwan defense relationship, and to support the acceleration of the modernization of Taiwan’s defense capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8).

(c) Purpose.—In addition to the purposes otherwise authorized for Foreign Military Financing programs under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), a purpose of the Foreign Military Financing Program should be to provide assistance, including equipment, training, and other support, to build the civilian and defensive military capabilities of Taiwan—
(1) to accelerate the modernization of capabilities that will enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, anddeny attempts by People’s Liberation Army forces—(A) to conduct coercive or grey zone activities; (B) to blockade Taiwan; or (C) to secure a lodgment on any islands administered by Taiwan and expand or otherwise use such lodgment to seize control of a population center or other key territory in Taiwan; and
(2) to prevent the People’s Republic of China from decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing or rendering ineffective Taiwan’s civilian and defense leadership.

(d) Regional Contingency Stockpile.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to sub section (h), not more than $100,000,000 may be used during each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2032 to maintain a stockpile (if established pursuant to section 5503(b)), in accordance with section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h).

(e) Availability of Funds.—
(1) Annual Spending Plan.—Not later than March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a plan to the appropriate congressional committees describing how amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (h), if made available, would be used to achieve the purpose described in subsection (c).
(2) Certification.— (A) In General.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) are authorized to be made avail- able after the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, certifies not less than annually to the appropriate commit- tees of Congress that Taiwan has increased its defense spending relative to Taiwan’s defense spending in its prior fiscal year, which includes support for an asymmetric strategy, excepting accounts in Taiwan’s defense budget related to personnel expenditures, (other than military training and education and any funding related to the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency). (B) Waiver.—The Secretary of State may waive the certification requirement under sub-paragraph (A) if the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that for any given year— (i) Taiwan is unable to increase its defense spending relative to its defense spending in its prior fiscal year due to severe hardship; and (ii) making available the amounts authorized under subparagraph (A) is in the national interests of the United States.
(3) Remaining Funds. —Amounts authorized to be appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to subsection (h) that are not obligated and expended during such fiscal year shall be added to the amount that may be used for Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan in the subsequent fiscal year.

(f) Annual Report on Advancing the Defense of Taiwan. —
(1) Initial Report. —Concurrently with the first certification required under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes steps taken to enhance the United States-Taiwan defense relation- ship and Taiwan’s modernization of its defense capabilities.
(2) Matters To Be Included. —Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) an assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to implement a military strategy that will deter and, if necessary, defeat military aggression by the People’s Republic of China, including the steps that Taiwan has taken and the steps that Taiwan has not taken towards such implementation;
(B) an assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and employ within its forces counter- intervention capabilities, including— (i) long-range precision fires; (ii) integrated air and missile defense systems; (iii) anti-ship cruise missiles; (iv) land-attack cruise missiles; (v) coastal defense; (vi) anti-armor; (vii) undersea warfare, including manned and unmanned systems; (viii) survivable swarming maritime assets; (ix) manned and unmanned aerial systems; (x) mining and countermining capabilities; (xi) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; (xii) command and control systems; (xiii) defensive cybersecurity capabilities; and (xiv) any other defense capabilities that the United States determines, including jointly with Taiwan, are crucial to the defense of Taiwan, consistent with the joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan created pursuant to section 5506;
(C) an evaluation of the balance between conventional and counter intervention capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of the date on which the report is submitted;
(D) an assessment of steps taken by Tai- wan to enhance the overall readiness of its defense forces, including— (i) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and providing regular and relevant training to such forces; (ii) the extent to which such training is realistic to the security environment that Taiwan faces; and (iii) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such forces;
(E) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to ensure that the Taiwan’s reserve forces and All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency can recruit, train, equip, and mobilize its forces; (iii) the efforts made by Taiwan to
address such shortages;
(F) an evaluation of— (i) the severity of manpower shortages in the military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces; (ii) the impact of such shortages in the event of a conflict scenario; and (iii) the efforts made by Taiwan to address such shortages;
(G) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to boost its civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to raise awareness among the population of Taiwan of the risks Taiwan faces;
(H) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to secure its critical infrastructure, including in transportation, telecommunications networks, satellite communications, and energy;
(I) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to enhance its cybersecurity, including the security and survivability of official civilian and military networks;
(J) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to improve the image and prestige of its defense forces among the population of Taiwan;
(K) an assessment of any significant gaps in any of the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J) with respect to which the United States assesses that additional action is needed;
(L) a description of cooperative efforts be-tween the United States and Taiwan on the matters described in subparagraphs (A)
through (K); and
(M) a description of any challenge in Taiwan to— (i) implement the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J); or (ii) United States support or engage ment with regard to such matters.
(3) Subsequent Reports.—Concurrently with subsequent certifications required under subsection (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit updates to the initial re- port required under paragraph (1) that provides a description of changes and developments that occurred in the prior year.
(4) Form.—The reports required under paragraphs (1) and (3) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(5) Sharing of Summary.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly share any unclassified portions of the reports, pursuant to paragraph (4), with Taiwan, as appropriate.

SEC.5503. Increase in Annual Regional Contingency Stockpile Additions and Support ForTaiwan.
(a) In General.—Section 514(b)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ‘‘$200,000,000’’ and all that follows and inserting ‘‘$500,000,000 for any of the fiscal years 2023, 2024, or 2025.’’.

(b) Establishment.—Subject to section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), the President may establish a regional contingency stockpile for Taiwan that consists of munitions and other appropriate defense articles.

(c) Inclusion of Taiwan Among Other Allies Eligible for Defense Articles.—Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) is amended—
(1) in section 514(c)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2321h(c)(2)), by inserting ‘‘Taiwan,’’ after ‘‘Thailand,’’;
(2) in section 516(c)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)), by inserting ‘‘to Taiwan,’’ after ‘‘major non-NATO allies on such southern and southeastern flank,’’

(d) Annual Briefing.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the President shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding the status of a regional contingency stockpile established under sub-section (b).

SEC.5504. International Military Education and Training Cooperation with Taiwan
(a) In General.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan designed to—
(1) enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations between the United States and Taiwan;
(2) enhance rapport and deepen partnership between the militaries of the United States and Taiwan, and foster understanding of the United States among individuals in Taiwan;
(3) improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities; and (4) train future leaders of Taiwan, promote professional military education, civilian control of the military, and protection of human rights.

(b) Elements.—The training program required by subsection (a) should prioritize relevant and realistic training, including as necessary joint United States-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale military exercises, and an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness and utilizing United States defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan.

(c) Authorization of Participation of Taiwan in the International Military Education and Training Program.—The Secretary of State is authorized to provide training and education to relevant entities in Taiwan through the International Military Education and Training program authorized under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 234 et seq).

SEC.5505. Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan.
(a) Drawdown Authority.—Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following paragraph: “(3) In addition to amounts already specified in this section, the President may direct the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, of an aggregate value of not to exceed $1,000,000,000 per fiscal year, to be provided to Taiwan.”

b) Emergency Authority.—Section 552(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “In addition to the aggregate value of $25,000,000 authorized in paragraph (2) of the preceding sentence, the President may direct the drawdown of commodities and services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the United States Government for the purposes of providing necessary and immediate assistance to Taiwan of a value not to exceed $25,000,000 in any fiscal year”.

(c) Use of Special Defense Acquisition Fund.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall seek to utilize the Special Defense Acquisition Fund established under chapter 5 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2795 et seq.) to expedite the procurement and delivery of defense articles and defense services for the purpose of assisting and supporting the armed forces of Taiwan.

SEC.5506. Multi-Year Plan to Fulfill Defensive Requirements of Military Forces of Taiwan.
(a) Multi-Year Plan.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall engage for the purposes of establishing a joint consultative mechanism with appropriate officials of Taiwan to develop and implement a multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined training, exercises, and planning activities consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(b) Elements.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of the defensive military capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of Taiwan that are required to— (A) allow Taiwan to respond effectively to (B) advance a strategy of denial, reduce the threat of conflict, thwart an invasion, and mitigate other risks to the United States and Taiwan.
(2) An assessment of the relative priority as aggression by the People’s Liberation Army or other actors from the People’s Republic of China; and signed by appropriate departments and agencies of Taiwan to include its military to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.
(3) An explanation of the annual resources committed by Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.
(4) A description and justification of the relative importance of overcoming each identified capability gap and capacity shortfall for deterring, delaying, or defeating military aggression by the People’s Republic of China;
(5) An assessment of— (A) the capability gaps and capacity short-falls that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by Taiwan; and (B) the capability gaps and capacity short-falls that are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner solely by Taiwan.
(6) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (5)(B) that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by— (A) the Foreign Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales programs of the Department of State; (B) Department of Defense security assistance authorized by chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code; (C) Department of State training and education programs authorized by chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.); (D) section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318); (E) the provision of excess defense articles pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); or (F) any other authority available to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.
(7) A description of United States or Taiwan engagement with other countries that could assist in addressing in a sufficient and timely manner the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls identified pursuant to paragraph (1).
(8) An identification of opportunities to build interoperability, combined readiness, joint planning capability, and shared situational awareness between the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners and allies, as appropriate, through combined training, exercises, and planning events, including—(A) table-top exercises and wargames that allow operational commands to improve joint and combined planning for contingencies involving a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; (B) joint and combined exercises that test the feasibility of counter-intervention strategies, develop interoperability across services, and develop the lethality and survivability of combined forces against a well-equipped adversary; (C) logistics exercises that test the feasibility of expeditionary logistics in an extended campaign with a well-equipped adversary; (D) service-to-service exercise programs that build functional mission skills for addressing challenges posed by a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; and (E) any other combined training, exercises, or planning with Taiwan’s military forces that the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State consider relevant.
(9) An identification of options for the United States to use, to the maximum extent practicable, existing authorities or programs to expedite military assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict, including— (A) a list of defense articles of the United States that may be transferred to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict; (B) a list of authorities that may be used to provide expedited military assistance to Tai- wan during a crisis or conflict; (C) an assessment of methods that could be used to deliver such assistance to Taiwan during a crisis or conflict, including— (i) the feasibility of employing such methods in different scenarios; and (ii) recommendations for improving the ability of the Armed Forces to deliver such assistance to Taiwan; and (D) an assessment of any challenges in providing such assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or conflict and recommendations for addressing such challenges.

(c) Recurrence.—The joint consultative mecha- nism required in subsection (a) shall convene on a recur- ring basis and not less than annually.

SEC.5507. Fast-Tracking Sales to Taiwan Under Foreign Military Sales Program.
(a) Pre-Clearance Of Certain Foreign Military Sales Items.—
(1) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, and in conjunction with coordinating entities such as the National Disclosure Policy Committee, the Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group, and other appropriate entities, shall compile a list of available and emerging military platforms, technologies, and equipment that are pre-cleared and prioritized for sale and release to Taiwan through the Foreign Military Sales program.
(2) Rules Of Construction.— (A) Selection Of Items.—The list compiled pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be construed as limiting the type, timing, or quantity of items that may be requested by, or sold to, Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program. (B) Notifications Required.—Nothing in this Act may be construed to supersede congressional notification requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et. seq.).

(b) Prioritized Processing of Foreign Military Sales Requests From Taiwan.—
(1) Requirement.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall prioritize and expedite the processing of requests from Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program, and may not delay the processing of requests for bundling purposes.
(2) Duration.—The requirement under paragraph (1) shall continue until the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that the threat to Taiwan has significantly abated.

(c) Interagency Policy.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly review and update interagency policies and implementation guidance related to Foreign Military Sales requests from Taiwan, including incorporating the preclearance provisions of this section.

SEC. 5508. Arms Exports Delivery Solutions for Taiwan and United States Allies in The Indo-Pacific.
(a) Appropriate Committees Of Congress Defined.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(b) Report Required.—Not later than March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report with respect to the transfer of all defense articles or defense services that have yet to be completed pursuant to the authorities provided by—
(1) section 3, 21, or 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753, 2761, or 2776); or
(2) section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

(c) Elements.—The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following elements:
(1) A list of all approved transfers of defense articles and services authorized by Congress pursuant to sections 25 and 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2765, 2776) with a total value of $25,000,000 or more, to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, or New Zealand, that have not been fully delivered by the start of the fiscal year in which the report is being submitted.
(2) The estimated start and end dates of delivery for each approved and incomplete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), including additional details and dates for any transfers that involve multiple tranches of deliveries.
(3) With respect to each approved and incomplete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), a detailed description of— (A) any changes in the delivery dates of defense articles or services relative to the dates anticipated at the time of congressional approval of the transfer, including specific reasons for any delays related to the United States Government, defense suppliers, or a foreign partner; (B) the feasibility and advisability of pro- viding the partner subject to such delayed deliv- ery with an interim capability or solution, including drawing from United States stocks, and the mechanisms under consideration for doing so as well as any challenges to implementing such a capability or solution; (C) authorities, appropriations, or waiver requests that Congress could provide to improve delivery timelines or authorize the provision of interim capabilities or solutions identified pursuant to subparagraph (B); and (D) a description of which countries are ahead of Taiwan for delivery of each item listed pursuant to paragraph (1).
(4) A description of ongoing interagency efforts to support attainment of operational capability of the corresponding defense articles and services once delivered, including advance training with United States or armed forces of partner countries on the systems to be received. The description of any such training shall also include an identification of the training implementer.
(5) If a transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1) has been terminated prior to the date of the submission of the report for any reason— (A) the case information for such transfer, including the date of congressional notification, delivery date of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), final signature of the LOA, and information pertaining to delays in delivering LOAs for signature; (B) a description of the reasons for which the transfer is no longer in effect; and (C) the impact this termination will have on the intended end-user and the consequent implications for regional security, including the impact on deterrence of military action by countries hostile to the United States, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and other factors.
(6) A separate description of the actions the United States is taking to expedite and prioritize deliveries of defense articles and services to Taiwan, including— (A) a description of what actions the Department of State and the Department of Defense have taken or are planning to take to prioritize Taiwan’s Foreign Military Sales cases; (B) current procedures or mechanisms for determining that a Foreign Military Sales case for Taiwan should be prioritized above a sale to another country of the same or similar item; and (C) whether the United States intends to divert defense articles from United States stocks to provide an interim capability or solution with respect to any delayed deliveries to Taiwan and the plan, if applicable, to replenish any such diverted stocks.
(7) A description of other actions already undertaken by or currently under consideration by the Department of State and the Department of Defense to improve delivery timelines for the transfers listed pursuant to paragraph (1).

(d) Form.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC.5513. Strategy to Respond to Influence and Information Operations Targeting Taiwan.
(a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—
(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘‘United Front’’ work related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise sup- ported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and
(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under sub- section (a) shall include descriptions of—
(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan’s public and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities; (B) assistance to enhance Taiwan’s ability to develop a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and (C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;
(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;
(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations; and
(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.

SEC.5525. Sense Of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations with Taiwan.
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan has benefitted the people of both the United States and Taiwan, as Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of imports, and a key destination for United States agricultural exports;
(2) further integration would benefit both peoples and is in the strategic and diplomatic interests of the United States; and
(3) the United States should explore opportunities to expand economic agreements between Taiwan and the United States, through dialogue, and by developing the legal templates required to support potential future agreements.

Update, July 18, 2022

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee filed the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 in the U.S. Senate as S.4543. The NDAA was filed by Committee Chairman Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) and Ranking Member Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK).

The filed text included 3 Taiwan provisions:

SEC.1244. Defense of Taiwan
(a) Definitions – In this section:
(1) Deny – The term “deny” means to use combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, resulting in—
(A) the termination of hostilities or at least the attempted fait accompli; or
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.
(2) Fait accompli – The term “fait accompli” refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces can respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the United States Armed Forcesby convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

(b) Statement of Policy – Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

SEC. 1245. Multi-Year Plan to Fulfill Defensive Requirements of Military Forces of Taiwan and Modification of Annual Report on Taiwan Asymmetric Capabilities and Intelligence Support
(a) Multi-year Plan – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall seek to engage with appropriate officials of Taiwan to develop and implement a multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined trainings, exercises, and planning activities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(b) Elements – The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of Taiwan.

(2) An assessment of the relative priority assigned by appropriate officials of Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.

(3) An explanation of the annual resources committed by Taiwan to address such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls.

(4) An assessment of–
(A) the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by unilateral efforts of Taiwan; and
(B) the defensive capability gaps and capacity shortfalls that are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner solely through unilateral efforts.

(5) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (4)(B) that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely manner by—
(A) Department of Defense security assistance authorized by chapter 16 of title 10, United States Code;
(B) the Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales programs of the Department of State;
(C) the provision of excess defense articles pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
(D) section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; or
(E) any other authority available to the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.

(6) An identification of opportunities to build interoperability, combined readiness, joint planning capability, and share situational awareness among the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners and allies, as appropriate, through combined trainings, exercises, and planning activities, including— 
(A) table-top exercises and wargames that allow operational commands to improve joint and combined war planning for contingencies involving a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign;
(B) joint and combined exercises that test the feasibility of counter-intervention strategies, develop interoperability across services, and develop the lethality and survivability of combined forces against a well-equipped adversary;
(C) logistics exercises that test the feasibility of expeditionary logistics in an extended campaign with a well-equipped adversary;
(D) service-to-service exercise programs that build functional mission skills for addressing challenges posed by a well-equipped adversary in a counter-intervention campaign; and
(E) any other combined training, exercise, or planning activity with the military forces of Taiwan that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant.

SEC. 1251. Sense of the Senate on Supporting Prioritization of the People’s Republic of China, the Indo-Pacific Region, and Taiwan.
It is the sense of the Senate that the Senate— 
(1) supports the designations by the Department of Defense, as reflected in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and statements by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and other senior Department officials, of— 
(A) the People’s Republic of China as the Department’s pacing challenge;
(B) the Indo-Pacific as the Department’s priority theater; and
(C) a Taiwan contingency as the Department’s pacing scenario;

(2) underscores the importance of the Department continuing to prioritize the deterrence of aggression by the People’s Republic of China, particularly in the form of an invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, as the Government of the People’s Republic of China expands and modernizes the People’s Liberation Army; and

(3) strongly urges the Department to manage force allocations across theaters to ensure, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), that the United States Armed Forces maintain the ability to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

Update, July 14, 2022

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (H.R. 7900) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 329-101.

The text of the legislation included 3 Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1303. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations
It is the sense of Congress that— 
1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by— 
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of— (i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning; (ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and (iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should be committed to the defense of a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC. 1312. Sense of Congress on Inviting Taiwan to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise
It is the sense of Congress that the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2024.

SEC. 1313. Joint Exercises with Taiwan
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) joint military exercises with Taiwan are an important component of improving military readiness and joint operability of both countries;
(2) the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, and other commands in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility, already possess the legal authority to carry out such exercises; and
(3) the United States should better use existing authorities to improve the readiness and joint operability of United States and Taiwanese forces.

(b) Authority Recognized
The Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command is authorized to carry out military exercises with Taiwan that—
(1) include multiple warfare domains and make extensive use of military common operations network used by United States, allied, and Taiwanese forces;
(2) to the maximum extent practical, incorporate the cooperation of 2 or more combatant and subordinate unified commands; and (3) present a complex military problem and include a force presentation of a strategic competitor.

Update, June 16, 2022

On this date, the Senate Armed Services Committee completed its markup draft of the NDAA 2023. In a vote of 23-3, the Committee voted to advance the bill to the Senate Floor for consideration.

The executive summary of the draft bill included Taiwan as an important priority:

Strengthening U.S. Posture in the Indo-Pacific Region
– Requires engagement with Taiwanese officials to develop and implement a multiyear plan to provide for the acquisition of appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of combined trainings, exercises, and planning activities.
– States that it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

Update, May 27, 2022

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as H.R. 7900. It was then referred to the House Committee on Armed Services.

For the 2022 version of this post, see Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2022

Categories
Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Aircraft Spare Parts to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sales of Aircraft Spare Parts to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, December 7, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of two possible Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan, supplying aircraft standard and nonstandard spare parts and related equipment at an estimated total cost of US$428 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sales on December 6, 2022.

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 22-55 and 22-56) are for the expansion of the Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement for stock replenishment supply of aircraft standard and non-standard spare parts and related equipment. These two notifications include consumables, accessories, and repair and replacement support for the F-16, C-130, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), and all other Taiwan aircraft and systems or subsystems of U.S. origin, as well as other related elements of logistics and program support.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented on today’s sale, “We welcome the news that the U.S. government continues to support the sustainment of Taiwan’s air power. A modern, well-equipped air force is required to handle an all-phases approach to Taiwan’s national defense. That includes the parts and sustainability required to maintain operational rates commensurate with the threat from China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

The PLAAF’s grey zone activities represent a daily challenge to Taiwan’s sovereignty and national integrity. The upgrade program for Taiwan’s legacy F-16s is proceeding well, and in 2023 we can expect to see the first of Taiwan’s new F-16s start to arrive on the island. By 2026, Taiwan will have the largest and most modern fleet of F-16s in the Asia-Pacific – a capability well worth the investment and support. This too is true for Taiwan’s fleet of C-130s required for logistical support. Taiwan’s budget priorities should continue to ensure that its legacy equipment is well maintained, including through the procurement of parts.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “USTBC has been consistent in noting that the Biden Administration is focused on munitions and sustainment, and these congressional notifications are part of those types of programs. As we move into 2023, we can expect more arms sales in these two areas.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

Additional Data:

For more details on Taiwan arms sales, please visit our dedicated defense website at www.ustaiwandefense.com. The post “Taiwan Arms Sales Notified to Congress 1990-2022” contains charts showing a summary of arms sales data by year, along with a link to the raw data compiled by the Council from DSCA and other sources.

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Aircraft Spare Parts to Taiwan
Categories
News U.S. Government

2022 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on China’s military power. This post contains selected Taiwan-related language in the 2022 report.

The Taiwan language in the previous year’s report (2021) is available here: https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/2021-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china/

Selected Taiwan Language

Eastern Theater Command

The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the East China Sea and likely executes operational control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Armies; the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; two Air Force divisions, two operational PLAAF bases, and one PLARF base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related to the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. During a contingency, the Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some Strategic Support Force (SSF) units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.

In 2021, the Eastern Theater Command focused on training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness with long-distance maneuvers and mobilization, aerial combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified civilian ferries to augment transportation.

Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait

Throughout 2021, island-seizure exercises became more frequent and realistic. The PLA conducted more than 20 naval exercises with an island-capture element, greatly exceeding the 13 observed in 2020. Many of these exercises focused on combat realism and featured night missions, training in adverse weather conditions, and simultaneous multi-domain operations.The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived as necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any intervention by a third-party, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration, and signal its displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, China has persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency. Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone and numerous island seizure exercises.

East China Sea

The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.

The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels—including four equipped with deck guns—sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express “extremely serious concerns” in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of escalation.

Southern Theater Command

The Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea (SCS). This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is responsible for securing the SCS, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any operation against Taiwan, and assuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to China’s global ambitions. PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command include 74th and 75th Group Armies, the Southern Theater Navy, three marine brigades, two PLA Air Force bases, and two PLA Rocket Force bases. The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command as needed over all CCG and PAFMM vessels conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”

The PRC’s Strategy & Capabilities Development in the Taiwan Strait

Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in Taiwan.

In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon the island’s sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan’s future be decided in accordance with the will of its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of “the motherland” was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait − referring to Taiwan, which Xi described as “sacred” territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take “drastic measures” if Taiwan makes moves towards formal independence.

The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from making moves toward independence. In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.” In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” are ensured. However, the PRC’s 2022 Taiwan White Paper published by the Taiwan Affairs Office restated the PRC’s preference for peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework, while maintaining a refusal to renounce the use of force to compel unification, if needed.

Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.

The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:
– Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
– Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
– Internal unrest in Taiwan;
– Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
– Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
– Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.

Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non- specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic ambiguity.

PRC Military Courses of Action Against Taiwan

The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign— capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or undermine the public’s resolve to resist.

Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key targets or the entire island. The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full- scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port facilities.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.

The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful international opposition.

The PLA’s Current Posture for a Taiwan Conflict

PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army. Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.

The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021—in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship (Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces’ operational capabilities and vessel maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship—the Type 076. The new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform.

PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth- generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities— such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets— to address this gap. The PLA may also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.

PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations. Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party intervention.

PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.

Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and cyberspace domains in joint operations. The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.

Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Ability to Deter Force

Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitioned to an all-volunteer force, the cost savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate in refresher training. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization within its national security structure to improve whole of society mobilization to support defense.

Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and bolster its forces against PRC pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense spending to be the highest level since 1990. Taiwan announced a further 10 percent increase from the previous year, bringing the 2021 defense budget to NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion), and representing more than 2% of Taiwan’s GDP. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow and is about 17 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of it focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four minelaying ships to supplement its navy.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.

Key Takeaways

  • The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea. The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of executing a Taiwan invasion.
  • The PRC intensified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan in 2021. Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense Identification Zone and conducting island-seizure exercises.
  • The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.
  • In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols.
  • The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes.
  • The PRC’s Spratly outposts are capable of supporting military operations, include advanced weapon systems, and have supported non-combat aircraft; however, no large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed there.
  • In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine- dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island.
  • Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.
  • The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of feasibility and risks associated.
  • The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military.
  • To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
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Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Additional Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Additional Harpoon and Sidewinder Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, September 2, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of three possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan of AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Missiles, AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II Missiles, as well as Contract Logistics Support for the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP) and related equipment, at an estimated total cost of US$1.106 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on September 2, 2022.

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 22-44, 22-45, and 22-46) is for 100 AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder tactical missiles and 4 AIM-9X Block II tactical Guidance Units – along with containers, spare & repair parts, support & test equipment, documentation, training, and other support. It is also for 60 AGM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II missiles and 4 ATM-84L-1 Harpoon Block II exercise missiles. Also included are Harpoon Guidance Control Units (GCUs), Radar Seekers and Altimeters, Captive Air Test Missiles (CATMs) as well as containers, spare & repair parts, support & test equipment, documentation, training, and other assistance and support. Finally, today’s notifications included follow-on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP). That includes program management, minor modifications and upgrades, spares and repair/return parts, documentation, as well as related elements of engineering, technical, logistical, and other program support.

These are not new capabilities. Taiwan already has AIM-9 and Harpoon missiles in its existing inventory, and the Taiwan Surveillance Radar Program (SRP) has now been up and running for near a decade. The US-Taiwan Business Council welcomes continued security assistance support for Taiwan. We expect the Biden Administration to continue to focus its efforts on munitions and sustainment, which fits with their “asymmetric” approach to Taiwan. This views arms sales to Taiwan only through the narrow prism of a D-Day style attack, rather than as an all-phases assessment of the Chinese threat.

The Council opposes this limited approach. As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently demonstrated in its mock blockade, the island faces a range of threats that require a range of capabilities. To deny the island the ability to mount a full defense will, over-time, create new gaps in Taiwan’s defenses that the PLA can exploit. America’s current policy of strategic ambiguity does not allow for the U.S. to clarify that it would fill those gaps as they emerge.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented on today’s sale, “The Council has long opposed the ‘packaging’ of programs into a single batch of Congressional Notifications. It is an irregular use of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, where programs should be notified to Congress when they are ready, rather than bundled together. It raises the likelihood of politicized timing, and places stress on Taiwan’s budget process as its government has to manage the ebbs and flows of erratic sales.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “Notifying a bundle of programs in excess of US$1 billion tends to magnify the political impact of an arms sales announcement. In conjunction with the passage of the USS Antietam and USS Chancellorsville through the Taiwan Strait in the past week, we should consider today’s sale a part of the hard-power response to the PRC’s threats and irresponsible behavior after Speaker Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan.

However, if the intention is to both boost Taiwan’s national security and make a political point to China, notifying this sale at 5:00 pm on a holiday weekend is a failing grade. Attempts to bury so-called ‘sensitive’ arms sales announcements late in the day or before a 3-day weekend have happened in the past as well. It appears that one faction within the Biden Administration wants to make a solid point to the PRC about material support for Taiwan in the face of PLA pressure, while another seems to want to minimize that point by announcing it the evening before a long weekend.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Additional Missiles and Radar Sustainment to Taiwan
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Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, July 15, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Blanket Order Contractor Technical Assistance Support, at an estimated cost of US$108 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on July 15, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-31) is for contractor technical assistance support consisting of unclassified spare and repair parts and assembly for tanks and combat vehicles. It also covers technical assistance, technical and logistical support, and other related elements.

The US-Taiwan Business Council acknowledges the need for sustainment of Taiwan’s military. This sale will help Taiwan maintain its vehicles, small arms, combat weapon systems, and logistical support items.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “As the US-Taiwan Business Council has previously noted, the Biden Administration’s security assistance policy through 2025 will focus on sustainment and munitions. Force modernization of Taiwan’s armed forces is no longer a priority. We expect to soon learn more about the new limits of U.S. security assistance to Taiwan after the June Monterey Talks and Special Channel talks in Washington, D.C. and Annapolis, Maryland.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “More information will allow us to better predict where U.S. policy will start to open up critical gaps in Taiwan’s all-phases approach to the defense of the island. The PLA will naturally focus on these emerging vulnerabilities, as they adapt to the shortcomings of U.S. policy. The US-Taiwan Business Council again calls on the Biden Administration to provide strategic clarity on where U.S. forces will fill gaps in Taiwan’s defense brought on by these changes to U.S. policy.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance Support to Taiwan
Categories
Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan

(Arlington, Virginia, June 9, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of naval spare and repair parts, at an estimated cost of US$120 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on June 8, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-22) is for spare and repair parts for ships and ship systems, technical assistance, technical and logistical support, and other related elements of logistics support. The notification indicated that the equipment will be sourced from approved U.S. Navy vendors and/or U.S. Navy stock.

The US-Taiwan Business Council acknowledges the need for sustainment of Taiwan’s military. The upkeep of the Taiwan armed forces is an essential aspect of Taiwan’s overall force posture, and supports its efforts to ensure that its military operational rates are high.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said, “As the Biden Administration undertakes the most significant narrowing of U.S.-Taiwan security assistance since 1979, these types of notifications covering sustainment efforts are the most likely over the next 18-24 months. There appears to now be little to no U.S. support for substantial Taiwan force modernization efforts, so we should expect to see mostly sustainment and munitions programs through the remainder of President Biden’s term (or terms) in office.”

Hammond-Chambers added, “One significant impact this approach will have is to constrain force modernization for entire areas of Taiwan’s military capability. We are likely to see the loss of infrastructure, hollowing out of operational experience, and the loss of decades of expertise. Once lost, that expertise will not return to the Taiwan military. This creates new vulnerabilities for the Chinese military to exploit. Far from improving Taiwan security, as time progresses this new directed approach will supply the PLA with emerging areas of military weakness, heightening – not lessening – the likelihood of attack.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Naval Spare and Repair Parts to Taiwan
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Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System

(Arlington, Virginia, April 6, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Contractor Technical Assistance and related maintenance and sustainment articles and services for the Patriot Air Defense System, at an estimated cost of US$95 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on April 5, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 22-16) is for support of the Patriot Air Defense System in Taiwan, and helps underpin Taiwan’s efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability. It includes Contractor Technical Assistance support consisting of training, planning, fielding, deployment, operation, maintenance, and sustainment of the Patriot Air Defense System, associated equipment, and logistics support elements. It also includes Patriot Ground Support Equipment, spare parts, and consumables.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “The sustainment of Taiwan’s existing weapons systems is an essential commitment by its armed forces to maintain high operational rates for its legacy gear.” “The normalized and regularized process of assessing all requested weapons systems for Taiwan’s use must remain a top priority for the Biden Administration. That should entail the acceptance from Taiwan of Letters of Request (LoRs), so that a full inter-agency assessment – that includes the uniformed services – can ascertain the utility of the request.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS of Contractor Technical Assistance for Taiwan’s Patriot Air Defense System
Categories
Press Releases U.S. Government

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS in Support of Taiwan Participation in Patriot IESP & FSP

Press Release:
The US-Taiwan Business Council Comments on the Proposed Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Equipment and Services to Support Participation in Patriot IESP and FSP

(Arlington, Virginia, February 7, 2022)

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale of equipment and services to support Taiwan’s participation in the Patriot International Engineering Services Program (IESP) and Field Surveillance Program (FSP) for five years, at an estimated cost of US$100 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on February 7, 2022.

The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 21-66) is for engineering services support designed to sustain, maintain, and improve the Patriot Air Defense System in Taiwan. It includes missile field surveillance support for legacy (Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM)) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles, to ensure the reliability and performance of the Patriot missile through storage and aging programs, surveillance firing programs, and configuration management. It is also for legacy and PAC-3 missile stockpile reliability testing, to provide quantitative reliability assessments of the deployed missile round. The potential sale also includes engineering, technical, and logistics support, as well as other related elements of program support. Participation in the shared IESP and FSP for the life of the Patriot system is a requirement of the U.S. government.

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers said: “The Biden Administration’s commitment to ensure that Taiwan’s military equipment is well supported and maintained is welcome. While ongoing force modernization is essential to combat the growing threat from China, maintenance of Taiwan’s existing equipment is similarly crucial. Taiwan and the U.S. should also seek to integrate Taiwan’s missile defense capabilities into America’s regional architecture, including cooperation with allies such as Japan and Australia.”

Source: See the DSCA website at https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales

USTBC Comments on the Proposed FMS in Support of Taiwan Participation in Patriot IESP & FSP
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U.S. Government

Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2022

Update, December 27, 2021

On this date, U.S. President Joe Biden signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2022. The NDAA became Public Law No: 117-81.

Update, December 15, 2021

On this date, the U.S. Senate agreed to the House amendments in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S.1605) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 88 – 11.

The NDAA 2022 now goes to the President’s desk to be signed.

Update, December 7, 2021

On this date, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (S.1605) was passed in the House by a Yea/Nay Vote of 363 – 70.

This legislation is substantially based on two bills: (1) H.R. 4350, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, which passed the House on September 23 by a vote of 316-113; and (2) S. 2792, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, which was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 21 by a vote of 23-3. 
(source)

The December 7 version of the bill included multiple Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1246. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations

It is the sense of Congress that–
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of a peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan and the policy of the United States to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability should be maintained; and

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by–
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales,
direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests by Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan, including, as appropriate, inviting Taiwan to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2022, that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) deepening interoperability with Taiwan in defensive capabilities, including maritime and air domain awareness and integrated air and missile defense systems;
(E) encouraging exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of–
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(F) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(G) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

SEC. 1247. Statement of Policy on Taiwan

a) Statement of Policy — Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et. seq.), it shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.
(b) Definition — In this section, the term “fait accompli” refers to the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.

SEC. 1248. Annual Report on Taiwan Asymmetric Capabilities and Intelligence Support

(a) In General — The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall each year through fiscal year 2027, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), perform an annual assessment of matters related to Taiwan, including intelligence matters, Taiwan’s asymmetric defensive capabilities, and how defensive shortcomings or vulnerabilities of Taiwan could be mitigated through cooperation, modernization, or integration. At a minimum, the assessment shall include the following:
(1) An intelligence assessment regarding–
(A) conventional military threats to Taiwan from China, including exercises intended to intimidate or coerce Taiwan; and
(B) irregular warfare activities, including influence operations, conducted by China to interfere in or undermine the peace and stability of the TaiwanStrait.
(2) The current defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional and irregular military threats.
(3) The interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners.
(4) The plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures underpinning the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan.
(5) A description of additional personnel, resources, and authorities in Taiwan or in the United States that may be required to meet any shortcomings in the development of Taiwan’s defensive capabilities identified pursuant to this section.
(6) The applicability of Department of Defense authorities for improving the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
(7) The feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan in the domestic production of defensive asymmetric capabilities, including through the transfer of intellectual property, co- development, or co-production arrangements.
(8) An assessment of ways in which the United States could enhance cooperation with on intelligence matters with Taiwan.
(9) A description of any non-Department of Defense efforts by the United States Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external efforts that degrade its free and democratic society.
(10) A description of any significant efforts by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and other elements of the intelligence community to coordinate technical and material support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence operations referred to in this subsection.
(11) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(b) Plan — The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop a
plan for assisting Taiwan in improving its defensive asymmetric capabilities and addressing vulnerabilities identified pursuant to subsection (a) that includes-
(1) recommendations for new Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to existing Department authorities, necessary to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and subject matter expert engagement between Department personnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and
(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for leveraging non-Department authorities, resources, and capabilities to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.

(c) Report — Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually through fiscal year 2027, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-
(1) a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) the plan required by subsection (b).

(d) Form –The report required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Definitions — In this section:
(1) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means–
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) The term “defensive asymmetric capabilities” means the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan against conventional external threats, including coastal defense missiles, naval mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, cyber defenses, and special operations forces.

SEC. 1249. Feasibility Briefing on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) In General — Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.

(b) Elements — The briefing required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.
(2) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including –
(A) disaster and emergency response;
(B) cyber defense and communications security;
(C) military medical cooperation;
(D) Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and
(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.
(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.
(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate

Update, September 23, 2021

On this date, the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (H.R.4350) by a Yea/Nay Vote of 316-113.

The passed text included 3 additional Taiwan-related amendments:

Floor 53, Rule 628
Directs the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a report on influence operations conducted by China to interfere in or undermine peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific Region and efforts by the U.S. to work with Taiwan to disrupt such operations.

Floor 59, Rule 616
Supports Taiwan’s investment in an asymmetric defense strategy by requiring a report with programmatic and policy options to support Taiwan’s defense budgeting and procurement process in a manner that facilitates sustained investment in capabilities aligned with Taiwan’s asymmetric defense strategy.

Floor 84, Rule 795
Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of Commerce to submit a report that includes an assessment of establishing a preclearance facility in Taiwan.

Update, September 17, 2021

On this date, the House Committee on Armed Services filed a supplemental report on the NDAA. The text of the supplemental report mentioned Taiwan in regards to Chinese Mine Warfare and on PLA Civilian Strategic Mobility Capacity. It also included two additional Taiwan-related items:

TITLE XII–MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS

Items of Special Interest

Report on Anti-Ship Systems for Defense of Taiwan

The committee supports the strategic partnership between the United States and Taiwan, and notes the importance of anti-ship systems in defending the territorial integrity of the Government of Taiwan. The committee further notes the urgent need for ground-based anti-ship cruise missiles, ground-based cruise missiles, and anti-ship mines to defend United States and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific against growing threats and deter conflict in the region.

The committee strongly supports an effort to expand defense industrial cooperation with the Government of Taiwan. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report by January 31, 2022, on what anti-ship systems and capabilities in the extant U.S. military hardware inventory might be used to enhance the defense of Taiwan, and plans on how these systems and capabilities could be incorporated into the current military of the Government of Taiwan to enhance their self-defense capabilities.

Report on Engaging Taiwan in Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogues or Forums

The committee recognizes the value of Taiwan-U.S. relations, and the importance Taiwan plays in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by March 1, 2022, on the Department of Defense’s plan to meaningfully engage Taiwan in regional security dialogues or forums that shall include the following:

    (1) An assessment of list of security regional dialogues or forums that would fit for Taiwan’s participation.

    (2) A discussion of current and future plans to achieve engaging Taiwan in regional security dialogues or forums.

    (3) An evaluation of the feasibility of cooperating on a range of activities with the aforementioned security dialogues or forums, including: (a) humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief; (b) supply chain security; (c) cyber security; (d) coast guard; and (e) any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

Update, September 10, 2021

On this date, the NDAA, as H.R.4350, was reported (amended) in the House by the House Committee on Armed Services.

The text included three provisions for enhancing the defense and security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan:

SEC. 1243. Report on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) Report – Not later than February 15, 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan. Such report shall include the following:

(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the 10 preceding calendar years,
including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.

(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including-
(A) disaster and emergency response;
(B) cyber defense and communications security;
(C) military medical cooperation;
(D) cultural exchange and education of members of the National Guard in Mandarin Chinese; and
(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.

(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.

(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.–In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means-
(1) the congressional defense committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 1247. Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations

It is the sense of Congress that –
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C.3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations;

(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of grave concern to the United States;

(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan;

(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained;

(5) the United States should continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, including by–
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities;
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and services;
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self- defense capability, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act;
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of–
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning;
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan; and
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan;
(E) identifying improvements in Taiwan’s ability to use asymmetric military capabilities to enhance its defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and

(6) the United States should be committed to the defense of a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise.

SEC. 1248. Sense of Congress on Inviting Taiwan to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise.

It is the sense of Congress that the naval forces of Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise conducted in 2022.

July 21, 2021

On this date, the NDAA 2022, as S. 2792, was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee by a vote of 23-3. 

The text included three Taiwan provisions:

SEC. 1245. Assessment of and Plan for Improving the Defensive Asymmetric Capabilities of Taiwan

(a) Assessment – The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall conduct an assessment of –
(1) the current defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional military threats;
(2) the applicability of Department of Defense authorities for improving the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(3) the feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan in the domestic production of defensive asymmetric capabilities, including through the transfer of intellectual property, co-development, or co-production arrangements;
(4) the plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures underpinning the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan;
(5) the interoperability of current and future defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the United States and its allies and partners; and
(6) any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

(b) Plan – The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan for assisting Taiwan in improving its defensive asymmetric capabilities that includes –
(1) recommendations for new Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to existing Department authorities, necessary to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and subject matter expert engagement between Department personnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and
(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for leveraging non-Department authorities, resources, and capabilities to improve the defensive asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

(c) Report – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-(1) a report on the results of the assessment required by subsection (a); and
(2) the plan required by subsection (b).

(d) Definitions – In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress – The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means –
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Defensive asymmetric capabilities.–The term “defensive asymmetric capabilities” means the capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan against conventional external threats, including coastal defense missiles, naval mines, anti-aircraft capabilities, cyber defenses, and special operations forces.

SEC. 1246. Annual Feasibility Briefing on Cooperation Between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a) Sense of Congress — It is the sense of Congress that the United States should —
(1) continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by increasing exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and
functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of –
(A) improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan;
(B) improving the reserve forces of Taiwan; and
(C) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
(2) expand and strengthen Taiwan’s capability to conduct security activities, including traditional activities of the combatant commands, cooperation with the National Guard, and through multilateral activities; and
(3) using appropriate authorities and consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), seek to develop a partnership between the National Guard and Taiwan as a means of maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) Briefing —
(1) In general — Not later than February 15, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.
(2) Elements — Each briefing required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.
(B) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including–
(i) disaster and emergency response;
(ii) cyber defense and communications security;
(iii) military medical cooperation;
(iv) Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and
(v) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.
(C) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.
(D) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.

SEC. 1247. Defense of Taiwan

(a) Definitions — In this section:
(1) Deny — The term “deny” means to use combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, resulting in–
(A) the termination of hostilities or at least the attempted fait accompli; or
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the People’s Republic of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.
(2) Fait accompli — The term “fait accompli” refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces can respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the United States Armed Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

(b) Statement of Policy — It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli against Taiwan in order to deter the People’s Republic of China from using military force to unilaterally change the status quo with Taiwan.

July 2, 2021

The NDAA 2022, as H.R.4350, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on July 2, 2021.

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