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News U.S. Government

2017 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.
2017 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

One major section is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

 

The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has historically been rooted in the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, the natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, despite simultaneously professing its desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:

  • formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
  • undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
  • internal unrest on Taiwan;
  • Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
  • indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
  • foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
  • foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.

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U.S. Government

Taiwan Initiative in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2017

Update:

On Friday, December 23, 2016 President Obama signed into law the 2017 NDAA (which cleared the Senate in a 92-7 vote on Dec. 8 after approval in the House of Representatives by a vote of 375-34 on Dec. 2). That means these Military Exchanges with Taiwan are now part of U.S. Public Law No: 114-328.

Original:
On December 8, 2016 the U.S. Senate passed a conference report for its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, which provides funding for the U.S. military) for fiscal year 2017. The House of Representatives had passed its version of the conference report on December 1, 2016. The bill originally contained several measures on Taiwan, but only one – a requirement for military exchanges – made it into the final conference report/version.

S.2943

SH. Rept. 114-840

Sec. 1284. Sense of Congress on military exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.

(a) Military Exchanges Between Senior Officers and Officials of the United States and Taiwan.
–The Secretary of Defense should carry out a program of exchanges of senior military officers and senior officials between the United States and Taiwan designed to improve military to military relations between the United States and Taiwan.

(b) Exchanges Described.
–For the purposes of this section, an exchange is an activity, exercise, event, or observation opportunity between members of the Armed Forces and officials of the Department of Defense, on the one hand, and armed forces personnel and officials of Taiwan, on the other hand.

(c) Focus of Exchanges.
–The exchanges under the program described in subsection (a) should include exchanges focused on the following:
(1) Threat analysis.
(2) Military doctrine.
(3) Force planning.
(4) Logistical support.
(5) Intelligence collection and analysis.
(6) Operational tactics, techniques, and procedures.
(7) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

(d) Civil-Military Affairs.
–The exchanges under the program described in subsection (a) should include activities and exercises focused on civil-military relations, including parliamentary relations.

(e) Location of Exchanges.
–The exchanges under the program described in subsection (a) should be conducted in both the United States and Taiwan.

(f) Definitions.
–In this section: (1) The term “senior military officer”, with respect to the Armed Forces, means a general or flag officer of the Armed Forces on active duty. (2) The term “senior official”, with respect to the Department of Defense, means a civilian official of the Department of Defense at the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or above.

If signed into law by U.S. President Barack Obama, Pentagon officials higher than the level of assistant defense secretary would be permitted to visit Taiwan.

Source:
H. Rept. 114-840 – NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

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News U.S. Government

2016 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China.
2016 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

One major section (beginning on page 86) is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

 

There have been no signs that China’s military posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly. The PLA continues to develop and deploy military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, the natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits.

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U.S. Government

Admiral Harris – Commander, United States Pacific Command – Statement on Taiwan

 

Free and fair democratic elections in January on the island of Taiwan reflect shared values with the U.S. The U.S. maintains its unofficial relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan and we continue supporting Taiwan’s security. USPACOM will continue to fulfill U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act; continued arms sales to Taiwan are an important part of that policy and help ensure the preservation of democratic government institutions.

 

Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN
Commander, United States Pacific Command
Statement to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee
Tuesday, February 23, 2016

Hearing Details & Video
Admiral Harris’ Written Statement

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Press Releases U.S. Government

The Obama Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

 

The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the decision by the U.S. Department of State to announce its approval of possible Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certifications notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan sales on December 16, 2015.

 

The published Congressional Notifications (transmittal numbers 15-27, 15-44, 15-45, 15-72, 15-74, 16-01, 16-05, and 16-06) were for two of the four FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates that that the U.S. authorized by law for transfer to Taiwan a year ago, and associated materials (at a refurbishment and upgrade cost of US$190 million); 36 AAV-7 Assault Amphibious Vehicles (US$375 million); 13 MK 15 Phalanx Block 1B ship defense Close-In Weapon Systems, upgrade kits, ammunition, and support (US$416 million); 208 Javelin guided missiles, technical assistance, logistics, and program support (US$57 million); 769 BGM-71F-series TOW 2B Aero Radio Frequency anti-armor missiles, support, and training (US$268 million); 250 Block I-92F MANPAD Stinger missiles, related equipment and support (US$217 million); Taiwan Advanced Tactical Data Link System (TATDLS) and Link 11 communication systems integration (US$75 million); Follow-on support for Taiwan’s MIDS/LVT-1 and JTIDS previously procured (US$ 120 million).[i]

 

Taiwan is poised to elect a new President on January 16, 2016. The timing of this announcement is therefore useful as a modest signal to China that the U.S. has equities in the peaceful transition of power on the island, and that it supports Taiwan’s democratic system. However, the Taiwan Relations Act states that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In light of this recent sale, the US-Taiwan Business Council poses a number of questions for the Obama Administration:

 

  1. Why did it take over four years to prepare this arms package? The last U.S. arms sale to Taiwan took place on September 21, 2011.
  2. Why isn’t Taiwan being offered any new capabilities to counter changes to the Chinese threat over this period?
  3. What impact are delays in consideration and execution of Taiwan arms requests having on the island’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability?

 

The contents of the arms package announced today – along with the unprecedented four-year delay since the last arms sale – raises serious questions as to whether it serves as a response commensurate to the threat posed by China’s military. The past four years has seen increased Chinese force modernization efforts, and according to the U.S. Department of Defense “the PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary.”[ii]

 

The Obama Administration’s focus on China military-to-military engagement and other initiatives in which China’s cooperation is viewed as crucial, such as on climate change efforts, is directly and negatively impacting U.S. willingness to maintain consistent and credible support for Taiwan’s self-defense. This in turn directly impacts the seriousness with which China views our intentions to assist Taiwan.

 

Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers noted that “There have been myriad initiatives in U.S.-Taiwan bilateral security relations since the last arms sale in 2011. However, while China has deployed new fighters, submarines, and missiles during the last four years, the U.S. has consistently refused to consider providing Taiwan access to similar platforms, or even aiding their indigenous development.”

 

“In addition, the process for considering, assessing, and processing Taiwan arms sales is broken. The contorted efforts to provide the minimum over an extended period has amounted to long delays and to the U.S. providing only second-hand equipment and additional munitions for systems already in Taiwan’s inventory. The U.S. is placing its China priorities ahead of our legacy and legal requirement to provide for Taiwan’s self-defense. We see no effort to meaningfully address China’s modernization efforts with new capabilities for Taiwan – not because they are unneeded, but because the political cost to China relations is perceived as being too high. Yet that perception was roundly debunked by the Council and Project 2049 in our 2012 report on Chinese reactions to arms sales.”[iii]

 

Hammond-Chambers also said “The process that has seen the bundling of Taiwan arms sales into large packages has run its course. The arbitrary manner in which programs are considered, the absence of a broader strategy for providing Taiwan consistent material support, and the long delays in processing and notifying them to Congress is hampering Taiwan’s ability to mount a serious defense. By bundling programs into packages, the U.S. forces Taiwan to buy all necessary equipment at once rather than in an orderly year-on-year process. If requests go unaddressed for years, or programs are long delayed, how can Taiwan reasonably maintain domestic political support for them, or develop the budget for its ongoing force modernization?”

 

The US-Taiwan Business Council supports the return to a normal and regular process for assessing all Taiwan arms sales requests and sales. Additionally, the Council believes that the bilateral security relationship needs to be clear about what new capabilities should accompany ongoing training and exchanges in aid of Taiwan’s self-defense – including addressing quantitative issues impacting its fighter fleet, its requirement for submarines to complicate Chinese invasion scenarios, as well as further improvements in Taiwan’s missile defense capabilities.

 

[i] As of 1:00 pm on December 16, 2015. For details, see the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales
[ii] See: “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015” http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf
[iii] See: “Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales” http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf

Press Release: The Obama Administration Announces U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan (PDF)

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U.S. Government

Benjamin L. Cardin & John McCain Letter to President Obama Regarding Arms Sales to Taiwan – November 19, 2015

Letter (PDF):

Benjamin L. Cardin & John McCain Letter to President Obama Regarding Arms Sales to Taiwan – November 19, 2015

 

Text of the letter:

November 19, 2015

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20515

Dear President Obama,

America’s long-standing commitment to Taiwan is a multifaceted and bipartisan effort that includes many components, all of which must be exercised as we seek to support and safeguard the ability of the people on Taiwan to determine their own future. One critical component is U.S. security assistance and arms sales to Taiwan to help modernize and build the capacity of its armed forces. We believe this support must be more robust.

While recent relations between Taiwan and China have been more encouraging, we remain concerned that China’s ongoing military modernization, and the threat it poses to peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, is not being adequately addressed. We recognize that a great deal of bilateral security cooperation is taking place between the United States and Taiwan, including more than $12 billion worth of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since the start of your administration. These actions have been welcome. However, we are troubled that it has now been over four years – the longest period since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 – since the administration has notified Congress of a new arms sale package.

The United States must continue to further our interests in cross-Strait stability – a vital component of which is arms sales to Taiwan, pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act – even when doing so brings short-term tensions in our relationship with China. The United States should develop and implement an ongoing plan for Taiwan’s military modernization, including how the administration plans to address Taiwan’s legitimate requirement for additional new manned fighters and submarines and other self-defense articles and services. Given some of the obstacles with the current approach, we believe that a regular and routine process for the provision of security assistance to Taiwan is essential.

Finally, we believe that it is equally important that Taiwan strive to meet President Ma Ying-jeou’s 2008 commitment to invest at least 3 percent of its annual gross domestic product on defense. We are increasingly concerned that, absent a change in defense spending, Taiwan’s military will continue to be under-resourced and unable to make the investments necessary to maintain a credible deterrent across the strait, especially as its limited defense resources are increasingly constrained by growing military personnel costs.

Consistent with the requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act, which call for regular consultations between the Executive Branch and Congress, we look forward to the opportunity to discuss together how best we can support and strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, including any arms sales under consideration or planned.

Sincerely,

Benjamin L. Cardin
United States Senator

John McCain
United States Senator

Categories
News Taiwan Government

National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST) Releases Promotional Videos

In preparation for their participation in the 2015 Paris Air Show, Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology released promotional videos to feature alongside the hardware that they will be exhibiting at the show. The aim is to “promote Taiwan’s achievements in defense technology and other areas,” and “exploring opportunities to introduce locally produced key weapon modules into international supply chains.”

The main Paris Air Show video, along with others featuring several indigenous Taiwan weapons systems, are available on the official NCIST YouTube channel, and include showcases for:

 

The Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship missile (HF III “Brave Wind”)

The Tien Kung III surface-to-air missile (TK III “Sky Bow”)

The Cardinal II unmanned aircraft system

The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST) is Taiwan’s main weapons research and development center. The organization, previously known only as CSIST, was spun off from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) in April of 2014.

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U.S. Government

Proposed Taiwan Initiatives in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2016

Update: November 16, 2015

The original version of the NDAA 2016 bill vas vetoed by the president in October of 2015. On November 10, 2015, the Senate passed the “Motion to Concur in the House Amendment to S. 1356” – sending a new version of the bill (which the House had already passed on November 5, 2015) to the President for signature.

In that House version of the bill, Taiwan is listed as a potential recipient of funds to participate in the new South China Sea Initiative (page 883).

However, during its deliberations on November 5, the House removed all the other Taiwan amendments from both the House and Senate versions of the original bill. During this process, the House also made a statement regarding its views on Taiwan, which was entered into the congressional record. The text of the relevant sections:

 

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1257) requiring the Secretary of Defense to invite the military forces of Taiwan to participate in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise if the Secretary has invited the military forces of the People’s Republic of China to participate in such maritime exercise.
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The House recedes.
We note the matters addressed in the House provision are addressed elsewhere in the agreement.

 

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1263) that would express the sense of the Senate on Taiwan’s asymmetric military capabilities and bilateral training activities.
The House bill did not contain a similar provision.
The Senate recedes.

 

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1264) that would encourage the Secretary of Defense to carry out a program of exchanges of senior military officers and senior officials between the United States and Taiwan to improve military to military relations between the United States and Taiwan. The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1257) that would require the Secretary of Defense to invite the military forces of Taiwan to participate in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise if the Secretary has invited the military forces of the People’s Republic of China. The Senate amendment also contained a provision (sec. 1263) that would express the sense of the Senate on Taiwan’s asymmetric military capabilities and bilateral training activities.

We believe that the United States, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), should continue to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense. The United States should continue to support the efforts of Taiwan to integrate innovative and asymmetric capabilities to balance the growing military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China, including fast-attack craft, coastal-defense cruise missiles, rapid-runway repair systems, offensive mines, and submarines optimized for defense of the Taiwan straits. With regards to training, we believe the military forces of Taiwan should be permitted to participate in bilateral training activities hosted by the United States that increase credible deterrent capabilities of Taiwan, particularly those that emphasize the defense of Taiwan Island from missile attack, maritime blockade, and amphibious invasion by the People’s Republic of China. Toward this end, we believe that Taiwan should be encouraged to participate in exercises that include realistic air-to-air combat training, including the exercise conducted at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, and Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, commonly referred to as “Red Flag.”

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense carry out a program of exchanges of military officers between the United States and Taiwan designed to improve military-to-military relations between the United States and Taiwan. The officer exchanges should include field-grade officers, particularly officers with combat and specialized experience, and general officers, who can provide support to Taiwan to develop and improve its joint warfighting capabilities.

We also note that section 1259A of the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291) includes the recommendation on inviting Taiwan to the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief portions of multilateral exercises.

 

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1264) authorizing the Department of Defense to conduct exchanges between senior military officers and senior officials focused on a variety of subjects between the United States and Taiwan designed to improve military-to-military relations between those two countries.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The Senate recedes.
We note the matters addressed in the House provision are addressed elsewhere in the agreement.

 
Sources:
The November 5 reconciliations to the bill, along with the statement on Taiwan, start on page H8010 of the congressional record:
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2015/11/05/house-section/article/H7747-5

Text of the final House version, with which the Senate concurred on November 10:
http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20151102/s1356_sus_xml.pdf

 

On May 15, 2015 the U.S. House of Representatives passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, which provides funding for the U.S. military) for fiscal year 2016. An amendment (#69, included as Section 1257) to the House NDAA bill (H.R. 1735) expressed support for Taiwan participation in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) – a large international naval exercise, held every two years off the coast of Hawaii – if China is also invited to participate.

 

Section 1257 of H.R. 1735

SEC. 1257. REQUIREMENT TO INVITE THE MILITARY FORCES OF TAIWAN TO PARTICIPATE IN RIMPAC EXERCISES.

(a) In General.–The Secretary of Defense shall invite the military forces of Taiwan to participate in any maritime exercise known as the Rim of the Pacific Exercise if the Secretary has invited the military forces of the People’s Republic of China to participate in such maritime exercise.
(b) Effective Date.–This section takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and applies with respect to any maritime exercise described in subsection (a) that begins on or after such date of enactment.

Source: Congress.gov

 

 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate is deliberating its version of the NDAA, which as of May 26, 2015 includes two Taiwan-related initiatives. One is language that would give the Pentagon authority to train and equip “a variety of South China Sea states” for maritime security, and to provide funding to do so. Taiwan is one of several singled out for participation.

In addition, one section of the S. 1376 bill expresses the Senate’s support for “Taiwan Asymmetric Military Capabilities and Bilateral Training Activities”

 

Section 1263 of S. 1376

SEC. 1263. SENSE OF SENATE ON TAIWAN ASYMMETRIC MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND BILATERAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) the United States, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), should continue to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense;

(2) the United States should continue to support the efforts of Taiwan to integrate innovative and asymmetric measures to balance the growing military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China, including fast-attack craft, coastal-defense cruise missiles, rapid-runway repair systems, offensive mines, and submarines optimized for defense of the Taiwan straits;

(3) the military forces of Taiwan should be permitted to participate in bilateral training activities hosted by the United States that increase credible deterrent capabilities of Taiwan, particularly those that emphasize the defense of Taiwan Island from missile attack, maritime blockade, and amphibious invasion by the People’s Republic of China;

(4) toward that goal, Taiwan should be encouraged to participate in exercises that include realistic air-to-air combat training, including the exercise conducted at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, and Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, commonly referred to as “Red Flag”; and

(5) Taiwan should also be encouraged to participate in advanced bilateral training for its ground forces, Apache attack helicopters, and P–3C surveillance aircraft in island-defense scenarios.

Source: Congress.gov

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Analysis & Commentary

The DPP’s National Defense Agenda

DPP’s  Defense  Agenda

Frequently Accessed

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 1 – DPP’s  Defense  Agenda
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 4 – New Chapter for Taiwan‐U.S. Defense Partnership
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 5 – China’s Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 6 – New Generation of Soldiers
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 9 – Taiwan’s Military Capacities in 2025
DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 12 – Preparing the Development of Indigenous Defense Industry
 

 

On May 26, 2015 the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released four “blue papers” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda. (Press Conference)

The first of these papers (Defense Policy Blue Paper 9) has been completely translated into English, but in the remaining reports only the forewords have been translated. Forewords are written by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen.

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 9 – Taiwan’s Military Capacities in 2025

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 10 – Information Protection and Strategic Communications

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 11 – Refinement of Veteran Affairs

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 12 – Preparing the Development of Indigenous Defense Industry

 

 

On December 5, 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released its eight “blue paper” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda.

Titled “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief,” the paper calls for the Taiwan armed forces to expand their role and mission in order to improve military effectiveness in contingencies other than war.

English language foreword by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen

Report Announcement

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 8 – Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

 

 

On October 6, 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released its seventh “blue paper” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda.

Titled “Bolstering Taiwan’s Core Defense Industries,” the paper calls for reviving the domestic defense industry, with the goal of elevating Taiwan’s capacity to produce its own defensive equipment and weaponry.

English language foreword by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen

Report Announcement

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 7 – Bolstering Taiwan’s Core Defense Industries

 

 

On August 22, 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released its sixth “blue paper” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda.

Titled “New Generation of Soldiers,” the paper calls for initiating reform of internal military affairs with personnel considerations as a core value, and strengthening the connection between the military and society.

English language foreword by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen

Report Announcement

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 6 – New Generation of Soldiers

 

 

On March 3, 2014, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released its fifth “blue paper” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda.

In announcing the report, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang firmly stressed the need for Taiwan to pursue stronger defense capabilities. He stated that the DPP will take full responsibility of becoming the catalyst for strengthening national defenses by encouraging indigenous defense production, especially for submarine capabilities. He also stated that Taiwan must “promptly adjust its national defense strategy, military strategy, and operational concepts” to meet growing Chinese military threats and “establish Taiwan’s self-defense capability.”

The report itself stated that Taiwan should focus on fostering private investment in indigenous R&D, next-generation weapons, and cyber warfare.

Both the Chinese and English versions have been compiled into one document (the English translation begins on page 37).

Report Announcement

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 5 – China’s Military Threats against Taiwan in 2025

 

 

On June 6, 2013 the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank New Frontier Foundation released four “blue papers” covering the DPP’s national defense agenda. (Press Conference, Report Announcement)

The first report covers the overall strategy and philosophy behind the DPP’s national defense policy. The second report covers recommendations on transforming the quasi-governmental Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), and on strengthening the nation’s military-industrial and research capabilities. The third report covers recommendations for Taiwan’s National Security Council (NSC), while the fourth outlines the DPP’s plans to strengthen military cooperation between Taiwan and the United States.

The first paper has been completely translated into English, but in the remaining reports only the forewords have been translated.

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 1 – DPP’s  Defense  Agenda

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 2 – Transforming  the  CSIST: Strengthening Indigenous Defense Research and Development

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 3 – An Accountable National Security Council

DPP Defense Policy Blue Paper 4 – New Chapter for Taiwan‐U.S. Defense Partnership

Categories
News U.S. Government

2015 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The U.S. Department of Defense has released its annual report to Congress on the military power of China. 2015 – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (PDF)

One major section (beginning on page 56) is called Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency.

 

Security in the Taiwan Strait is largely a function of dynamic interactions between and among mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States. China’s strategy toward Taiwan has been influenced by what it sees as positive developments in Taiwan’s political situation and approach to engagement with China. However, China’s overall strategy continues to incorporate elements of persuasion and coercion to deter or repress the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence.

China and Taiwan have made progress in expanding cross-Strait trade/economic links and people-to-people contacts. Alongside positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in China following the re-election of President Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, there have been no signs that China’s military posture opposite Taiwan has changed significantly.

The PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.